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A Model of School Managerial Control
ABSTRACT
The theoretical construct of control has been defined as necessary
(Etzioni, 1965), ubiquitous (Vickers, 1967), and on-going (E.
Langer, 1983). Empirical measures, however, have not adequately
given meaning to this potent construct, especially within complex
organizations such as schools. Four stages of theory-development
and empirical testing of school building managerial control using
principals and teachers working within the nation's fourth largest
district are presented in this dissertation as follows: (1) a
review and synthesis of social science theories of control across
the literatures of organizational theory, political science,
sociology, psychology, and philosophy; (2) a systematic analysis
of school managerial activities performed at the building level
within the context of curricular and instructional tasks; (3) the
development of a survey questionnaire to measure school building
managerial control; and (4) initial tests of construct validity
including inter-item reliability statistics, principal components
analyses, and multivariate tests of significance. The social
science synthesis provided support of four managerial control
processes: standards, information, assessment, and incentives.
The systematic analysis of school managerial activities led to
further categorization between structural frequency of behaviors
and discretionary qualities of behaviors across each of the
control processes and the curricular and instructional tasks.
Teacher survey responses (N=486) reported a significant difference
between these two dimensions of control, structural frequency and
discretionary qualities, for standards, information, and
assessments, but not for incentives. The descriptive model of
school managerial control suggests that (1) teachers perceive
structural and discretionary managerial behaviors under
information and incentives more clearly than activities
representing standards or assessments, (2) standards are primarily
structural while assessments are primarily qualitative, (3)
teacher satisfaction is most closely related to the equitable
distribution of incentives, (4) each of the structural managerial
behaviors has a qualitative effect on teachers, and that (5)
certain qualities of managerial behaviors are perceived by
teachers as distinctly discretionary, apart from school structure.
The variables of teacher tenure and school effectiveness reported
significant effects on school managerial control processes, while
instructional levels (elementary, junior, and senior) and
individual school differences were not found to be significant for
the construct of school managerial control.
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And until the leaders of educational thought in America go
beyond gathering statistics and the prosecution of scientific
inquiry, however valuable and necessary these undertakings may
be, and grapple courageously with this task of analysis and
synthesis, the system of education will lack direction and the
theory of education will but reflect the drift of the social
order.
-George S. Counts
The American Road to
Culture, 1930
In dealing with a problematic situation, a decision maker
must develop a concept - a representation or a model - of
it. He attempts to solve the problem as he conceives it.
Thus if his conception is wrong, the solution to the problem
as conceived may not solve the problem as it exists. A common
example is a formulation of a problem that leads to the
suppression of symptoms rather than the removal of the cause
of a deficiency that creates the problem. Because of such
errors of conceptualization, it has often been observed that
we more frequently fail to face the right problem than fail to
solve the problem we face.
-Russell L. Ackoff
The Art of Problem
Solving, 1978
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1CHAPTER ONE
A Study of School Managerial Control
Introduction
There is little agreement among organizational researchers
or school administrators as to the meaning and use of the
abstract concept organizational control. At one end of the
theoretical spectrum, control is considered as a first principle
of organizational theory, a key to understanding organizational
structure and individual behaviors. Control is portrayed as so
potent a concept that it is referred to as the "glue" that holds
organizations together (Pfeffer, 1978a). Words that have been
used to describe its function range from "necessary" (Etzioni,
1965) and "on-going" (E. Langer, 1983) to "ubiquitous" (Vickers,
1967). In these instances, it shares equal prominence with the
concepts "power" (Etzioni, 1965) and "influence" (Cartwright,
1965; Smith & Tannenbaum, 1963) such that clear distinctions are
difficult to decipher (Meier, 1982).
Yet not all theories hold "control" in such high esteem. In
fact, many empirical studies such as Turcotte (1974) measure the
negative consequences of organizational control mechanisms. At
this opposite end of the theoretical spectrum, control is
narrowly defined by formal authority or hierarchical structures.
The predominant indicators of its presence are rules and
regulations and the frequency of formal, supervisory interactions
between individuals within organizations. Unlike the expansive
definitions held by some control theorists, the latter empirical
2definitions view control as a matter of constraints and
conformity.
The Search for Meaning
The conception of control as managerial activities is
largely a matter of choice (Tannenbaum, Kavcic, Rosner, Vianelle,
& Wieser, 1974). It, therefore, involves skills (Koontz, 1971;
E. Langer, 1983), processes (Hanson, 1981; Lawler & Rhode, 1976;
Smith & Tannenbaum, 1963), judgment (Vickers, 1967), and
knowledge. Various control typologies have different sets of
reference points: written policies and directives (Lang, 1965),
organizational structure and size (Blau & Scott, 1962; Peterson,
1984), politics (Pfeffer, 1978a), professional norms,
socialization, and values (Argyris & Schon; 1982, Vickers, 1967),
external environments (Meyer & Scott, 1983; Pfeffer, 1978a),
public opinion (Bidwell, 1965), and the needs of individuals (E.
Langer, 1983). Yet none of these reference points by themselves
offers a sufficient yardstick to measure organizational control.
It is only when each is measured interactively that the
complexity and validity of control emerges.
The position taken in this study is that a synthesis of
disciplines, typologies, activities, and needs is both required
and possible given (a) the evidence of complexity of school
organizations (Astuto & Clark, 1985; Lortie, 1977; Miles, 1981;
Patterson, Purkey, & Parker, 1986) and (b) social science
research methodology and measurement models (Fielding & Fielding,
31986; Lennox, 1988; Long, 1983a; 1983b; Hughes, Price, & Marrs,
1986) which permit the testing of hypotheses that link
theoretical constructs to empirical data. Others who have
attempted similar syntheses have reported the road littered with
disagreements, entanglements, and contradictory findings
(Cartwright, 1965; Hanson, 1981; Lortie, 1969). There are,
however, circumstances today which offer greater opportunities
for success through advances in substantive theory in school
organizations and in social science research methodology.
Several academic disciplines have had much to say about the
meaning of control. Philosophers debate issues of freedom and
responsibility, the role of the individual within the state, and
ways of knowing which influence and link ideas with actions;
organizational theorists study the effects of structures and
behaviors on performance; political scientists describe the
dynamic struggles for power and influence among key actors and
groups, including those outside the organizations' boundaries;
sociologists reveal the effects of cultures, roles, and norms on
human interaction; and, psychologists report on cognitive
processes and the needs people have to be in control. It is not
just organizations that suffer when not under control, so, too,
do individuals. The emphases and orientations of the disciplines
are each different, but the objectives are the same: the search
for meaning of the concept of control, how it operates, and what
effect it has on organizational effectiveness and the quality of
life. Without understanding gained by specific measurable
4indicators, however, the latter issues remain a matter of
speculation.
Managerial Control
one focus of this study was to validate the theoretical
construct of managerial control. The delimitation of managerial,
as opposed to organizational, is significant in that the former
permits one to confine the research to building-level variables
and participants. The trend in school organizations is towards
growth, centralization (Meyer & Scott, 1983), and standardization
(Darling-Hammond & Wise, 1985). As a result, organizational or
institutional control seems more a matter of occurrences outside
the school building itself. Not only are the effects of such
external efforts inchoate (Fullan, 1982; Mann, 1978; McLaughlin,
1978), but their legitimacy is suspect (Elmore, 1983; 1987).
Similarly, recent related areas of empirical research on
effective schools (Edmonds, 1979), school improvement (Goodlad,
1987), planned change (Fullan, 1982), and cultural leadership
(Sergiovanni, 1987) all seem to converge on the building level or
what Vickers (1967) called the "level of action."
The action domain within schools revolves around the
management and implementation of curriculum and instruction at
the building level (Bossert, Dwyer, Rowan, & Lee, 1982; Griffin,
1988; Little & Bird, 1987). A study of managerial control that
is delimited to managerial behaviors associated only with
curricular and instructional tasks would seem to have heuristic
value. Such a specific focus would not deny the influence of
either environmental (Rossmiller, 1983) or classroom-level
teacher control (Kerr, 1987) on curricular and instructional
behaviors. Successful building administrators need to be
consciously aware of the restraints imposed by both groups of
variables which affect the management and implementation of
curriculum and instruction. In fact, administrators, teachers,
and the curriculum "must be acceptable to the forces of [extra-
organizational] control" (Counts, 1930 /1971, p. 23).
Nevertheless, managerial control processes have their strongest
behavioral impact at the juncture of building-level
administrator-teacher relations (Andrews, 1987; Little & Bird,
1987).
But no matter how narrowly circumscribed is the analysis of
managerial control, it remains an abstract, theoretical
construct. The concept is abstract in that it is a latent,
aggregate variable which has common characteristics across
different behaviors and tasks. It would be worthwhile,
therefore, to define these common characteristics and to
operationalize behaviors so as to provide school building
administrators with guidelines for improved managerial practice.
Since the turn of the century, control functions have been
consistently listed among the four or five primary areas of
administration (Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings, 1985). Its
administrative importance lies not only with fostering
organizational stability, but also with developing change
6strategies that improve organizational effectiveness and the
quality of organizational life (Koontz, 1971; Lawler & Rhode,
1976; Patz & Rowe, 1977; Vickers, 1967). What is still unclear
is the meaning and daily operations of control (Bossert, Dwyer,
Rowan, & Lee, 1982; Hanson, 1981; Lortie, 1969; Pfeffer, 1978a).
As an abstract concept, it is not simply one thing or a single
behavior, the effect of which may be known to us fully and
immediately. It exists, in different degrees, in all
organizational contexts (Etzioni, 1965; Pfeffer, 1978a).
Evidence of its existence is both a priori, in understanding and
reason (E. Langer, 1983) as well as in experience (Koontz, 1971).
A clearer understanding of the concept of managerial control
and how it is exercised over the dominant technology of schools -
curriculum and instruction- cannot by itself determine the
rightness of any one course or reform. Managerial controls are
not ends in themselves, but are instrumental in maintaining
organizational health and, when necessary, assisting with change
efforts (Bossert, et al, 1982; Patz & Rowe, 1977). Vision and
direction are functions more of organizational leadership than of
control (Greenfield, 1987; R. Harrison, 1985, pp. 133-134);
control is largely a matter of managerial skills (E. Langer,
1983), techniques (Koontz, 1971), and processes (Lawler & Rhode,
1976) which create immediate and reciprocal, looking-glass
perceptions among individuals within organizations (Locke, 1977,
p. 183).
Managerial controls can signal when the technical behaviors
7are ineffective and help educators to do what they do better.
This duality suggests that the elements of control are matters of
(1) conformity to known standards (Lawler & Rhode, 1976; Locke,
1977; Vickers, 1967), (2) information sources and uses (Pfeffer,
1978a; Sproull, 1981), (3) measures of success (Vickers, 1967),
and (4) incentives to-planned change strategies (Bossert, et al.,
1982; Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 137; Schein, 1972, pp. 76-79).
When control is viewed at any one specific point in time, the
emphasis is largely on conformity to standards, output measures,
and sanctions for deviance (Koontz, 1971. p. 140). But when
control is described as a series of processes towards a desired
end, then it emerges as a proactive system (Koontz, 1971, p. 141;
Patz & Rowe, 1977, pp. 66-73; Schein, 1972, 76-79), with other
attributes.
Based on a synthesis of research findings, the definition of
managerial control assumes:
1. that control is a potent theoretical concept that is
present in every organization regardless of its formal structure;
2. that control operates, at the building or technical core
level, along a series of organizational processes which include
standards, information, assessment, and incentives; and
3. that each of the above processes are defined by two
dimensions (Ames & Ames, 1987; Astuto & Clark, 1985): structural
patterns of frequency, persistence, and regularity (Dornbusch &
Scott, 1975, p. 354) and qualitative behaviors measuring the
manner in which patterns and technology are operationalized
(Locke, 1977; Miles & Vergin, 1966).
It should be noted that any discussion of managerial control
is inherently optimistic, for it implies, unlike the 'garbage
can' model (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), that the problems
facing organizations are ultimately solvable. Solutions for the
problems facing school organizations, however, are neither simple
nor straightforward. State legislative policies and district
directives are only partial ingredients in the managerial control
formula. Their kinds of solutions - rule-making, social
engineering, or rational-structural approaches - ignore the needs
and capabilities of people within a specific cultural context.
Instead, the real underpinnings of control have as much to do
with internal human qualities as with external structure,
politics, and social factors. All people share needs to succeed
on some level. But it is also a basic human need to derive
satisfaction from succeeding. Any control system that ignores
the latter ingredient cannot succeed over time. Thus, the nature
of control mechanisms is not simply technological advances, but
rather knowledgeable advances linked to satisfying human needs.
Control in Org-anizations
Research in organizational theory has identified non-
hierarchic and non-bureaucratic mechanisms of control (Lortie,
1969). Included among these non-hierarchic determinants are
professionalism (Bidwell, 1965; Blau & Scott, 1962), collegiality
(Etzioni, 1965; Lortie, 1969), school and community culture
9(Sergiovanni, 1987), trust and confidence (Meyer & Rowan, 1977),
and participation (Hanson, 1981; E. Langer, 1983, p. 83; Smith &
Tannenbaum, 1963). Each of these determinants of control are
present, in varying degrees, in schools as well as in other
organizational settings. Unfortunately, the interaction among
these factors as well as their optimum presence under different
conditions is still largely a matter of speculation, particularly
in the active task areas of school curriculum and instruction
(Dornbusch & Scott, 1975).
In reporting these non-hierarchic findings, the tendency has
been to discard the older, rational, bureaucratic paradigm,
replacing it in toto with revised analyses of non-rational
explanations (Lincoln, 1985; Patterson, Purkey & Parker, 1986;
Sergiovanni, 1987). Lost in this paradigmatic shift is the
explanatory power of structural analyses (Pfeffer, 1978b). This
loss seems too high a price to pay, no matter how difficult it
may be to integrate measures of the two paradigms. Our
preliminary investigation, reported in Chapter Three, caused us
to hypothesize that control operates in two interrelated
dimensions: a quantitative, structural dimension measured by the
frequency and stability of interactions between building-level
administrators and teachers, and a qualitative dimension which
explores the salient qualities and the behavioral impact of these
interactions. The dimensions are to be viewed as complementary,
rather than exclusionary.
Because of the necessary relationship between control and
10
organizations, it is admittedly difficult to discuss control
without referring directly or indirectly to organizational
structures, and, hence, by implication, to paradigms (Meyer,
Scott, & Deal, 1983). Yet, it is equally well established that
organizations consist of individuals, each having subjective and
differing needs and wants, among them the individuals' need to
control his or her own environment (E. Langer, 1983).
When organizations are viewed along a structural,
quantitative dimension, organizational control has been defined
by the patterns of formal authority (Blau & Scott, 1962),
specifically, the chain of command, the organizational technology
(Thompson, 1967), and the flow of information (Eisenhardt, 1985).
Structural analyses of control often avoid looking at processes
(Charters, 1981). Their units of analyses are structural
variables such as size, organizational levels, and personnel
policies, each synonymous with formal hierarchy (Blau & Scott,
1962). Even in more democratic organizations, formal authority
and control are still viewed as fundamentally hierarchic
(Tannenbaum et al., 1974). Informal arrangements may also follow
clearly identifiable patterns which add to the stability and
regularly of the organizations' structure. Thus, structural
control measures need not be limited to written rules, job
description, and organizational charts.
The control structures assist in aligning idiosyncratic
diversity with the organizations' goals and purposes. As
organizations grow in size and complexity, the structural control
11
systems themselves grow accordingly to encompass related and
complex systems of technology, communication, and coordination
(Cohen, Deal, Meyer, & Scott, 1979; Cohen & Miller, 1980; Lawler
& Rhode, 1976, p. 1976; Wellisch, MacQueen, Carriere, & Duck,
1978).
In a broader, social context, however, organizational
control also contributes to opportunities for individual growth
and achievement (Patz & Rowe, 1977). This aspect of control
exists as part of the organizational structure, yet distinct from
it as well. Along this other dimension, the needs and qualities
of control remain the same regardless of the organizations'
structural patterns (E. Langer, 1983). While control is an
integral part of organizational life (Etzioni, 1965; Pfeffer,
1978a; Vickers, 1967), it may also be viewed as essential to life
itself (E. Langer, 1983; Scott & Scott, 1971). Somewhat
arbitrarily, Heilbroner (1975) refers to man's two underlying
personality traits: a "hunger" for political authority and a
"fantasy" of political identification (p. 122). Since these
needs for control reside within the individual, the discussion of
organizational control becomes more than just evidence for any
one particular structural entity or framework (Pfeffer, 1978a).
Along this so-called qualitative dimension, control occurs
as part of the natural phenomenon of human social interaction
(Scott & Scott, 1971). Every interaction involves some measure
of control by which individuals are influenced by the manner of
that interaction. This suggests that a more comprehensive
12
approach to the understanding of control involves an integration
of these two dimensions in such a way that the synthesis
clarifies the role of both the controller and the controlled
(Scott & Scott, 1971). Both parties become aware of four
aspects: themselves, the other, the specific tasks they perform,
and managerial control processes. At the core of this synthesis
are the perceptions held by the individuals (Andrews, 1987,
Argyris & Schon, 1982; Locke, 1977; Vickers, 1967), the
organizational processes (Schein, 1972; Smith & Tannenbaum,
1963), and the techniques and skills employed in exercising
control (Koontz, 1971; E. Langer, 1983).
Smith & Tannenbaum (1963) have defined control as "any
process in which a person or group determines or intentionally
affects what another person will do." Based on this global
definition, Tannenbaum and his associates have reported positive
correlations between high "total control" and both organizational
effectiveness (Smith & Tannenbaum, 1963, Tannenbaum, et al.,
1974) and expert power (Bachman, et al., 1968). Although these
are certainly potent hypotheses, they still leave unexplained the
specific daily managerial processes, their interrelationships,
and their effects on belief systems and performance unexplained
(Bossert et al., 1982; Pfeffer, 1978a; Koontz, 1971).
Recent empirical studies on school organizations have
generally reported an absence of formal curricular and
instructional control mechanisms. The measures used to support
these conclusions have been primarily district office-principal
13
and principal-teacher interactions (Cohen, et al., 1979; Cohen &
Miller, 1980; Deal & Cellotti, 1980; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975,
Eye, Netzer, & Krey, 1971; Fallon, 1979; Hannaway & Sproull,
1978-79; Martin & Willower, 1981; Pellicer, 1982; Peterson,
1984). All of these measures have a quantitative bias that
stressed perceptions of the presence of formal policies and the
frequency of interactions. It is assumed that the higher the
frequency, the greater the managerial control.
Not only is it likely that this assumption is erroneous
(James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982, pp. 51-54; Turcotte, 1974), but
the definition of control as formal policy and as interaction
frequency is theoretically inadequate (Bidwell, 1965; Pfeffer,
1978a; 1978b). Ironically, when evidence of frequent
administrator-teacher interactions has been empirically supported
(Ogawa & Hart, 1985; Peterson, Murphy, & Hallinger, 1987), it has
been suggested elsewhere that their function is not
organizational effectiveness, but rather largely symbolic,
serving only to legitimize educational institutional status
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
The weak empirical findings regarding the presence of school
organizational control stand in direct opposition to theoretical
views of control which argue that control functions are
ubiquitous (Vickers, 1967), on-going (E. Langer, 1983), necessary
(Etzioni, 1965; Pfeffer, 1978a), correlated to effectiveness
(Smith & Tannenbaum, 1963) and to the attainment of
organizational goals (Koontz, 1971), and, ultimately, serving as
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the 'glue' which holds the organization together (Pfeffer,
1978a). This raises an obvious question: how can such a
seemingly potent concept remain hidden to empirical researchers?
The answer would appear to lie in the measures used to define
control.
Identifying the concept, activities, and measures of school
organizational control is a complex undertaking (Cartwright,
1965; Hanson, 1981; Lortie, 1969). When limited to the formal
structure and hierarchy, it tends to explain too much about too
little. Multivariate empirical findings on control have begun to
peel away normative ideals of how schools ought to be. This line
of research reports that school organizations have multiple,
conflicting, and ambiguous objectives, isolated work
arrangements, diverse instructional technologies, infrequent
supervision, and limited formal and informal evaluations and
incentives (Patterson, Purkey, & Parker, 1986). There is neither
complete information processes nor continuous monitoring and
measures of performance. Such a non-rational composite adds
complexity to the task of theory building, for it suggests that
control activities involve more than top down rules and written
regulations. It further implies that there is an art to control
that requires measures of artistic appreciation (Vickers, 1967).
The task of theory building will take time and sustained
effort to decipher and systematize descriptive activities beyond
the "vague objectives of managerial work" (Bacharach & Lawler,
1982; Mintzberg, 1971). The work must proceed in stages: from a
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comprehensive, yet explicit rationale to the identification of
discrete behavioral indicators and measures to an auxiliary
theory that can be put into practice. There is a need for
studies that report on the positive directions taken at each of
these stages, along with a need to report on false starts,
miscalculations, and errors in judgment so that future efforts
may avoid repeating them.
Statement of Purpose
Presently, no adequate definition or typology of control
exists which can provide school principals with practical
guidelines for curricular and instructional decision-making. The
purpose of this study was to increase understanding of the
theoretical construct, managerial control, as it relates
specifically to building-level, curricular and instructional
tasks performed and delegated by school principals. A rationale
for a process model of control is needed and construct validation
must be supported by data analyses.
As a theoretical study, there was a need to synthesize
diverse literatures relevant to the concept of control. As an
empirical research design, there was a need to validate the
process model of managerial control in order to provide school
administrators with specific guidelines for improved practice.
Research Objectives
The research objectives of this study were:
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(1) to develop a process classification model to
increase understanding of how school building administrators
exercise managerial control over curriculum and instruction at
the building-level, and
(2) to test the construct validity of the control
process classification model by determining the manner and extent
to which principals exercise building-level control over
curriculum and instruction.
Overview of Procedures
The first step in accomplishing objective one, the
development of a process model of managerial control, involved
the synthesis of research findings from several bodies of
literature within the fields of organizational theory, political
science, sociology, psychology, and philosophy. The
contributions from these disciplines were then integrated into
the cultural and contextual framework of public school
organizations. This task was accomplished through a literature
review of school control mechanisms and through a preliminary
research study whose objectives were (a) to identify specific
activities of principals as instructional leaders, and (b) to
categorize control activities which emerged from the responses of
principals' and other building level personnel.
In a preliminary study by this researcher, in-depth
interviews were conducted with a small sample of principals who
were nominated by their district as effective instructional
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leaders. This investigation generated a comprehensive list of
activities often associated with influence-gaining activities in
schools (Bossert, et al., 1982) and with school control
categories at the state, district, and building levels (R.
Campbell, Cunningham, McPhee, & Nystrand, 1985; Peterson, 1984;
Peterson, Murphy, & Hallinger, 1987). The literature by itself,
however, falls short of providing school principals with specific
task and administrative guidelines for improved practice (Duke,
1982; Peterson, 1984).
In analyzing both published studies and the interview data,
the need for a different classification scheme became apparent.
A rationale for process classification was developed based on an
interdisciplinary review of literatures on control theories and
on the open-ended responses in the preliminary interview study.
A theoretical distinction was made between two dimensions
found within each of the control processes: a structural
dimension comprised of structural patterns, formal as well as
informal, and a qualitative dimension which reflects the
attitudes, needs, and beliefs associated with managerial control
processes and behaviors. Structural control patterns, such as
formal control mechanisms and structural constraints, have
received primary attention within the research on school control
and instructional leadership. These reported findings reveal
that structural and formal mechanisms provide only partial
explanations of control, regardless of which specific dependent
school variable is chosen (Deal & Cellotti, 1980; Cohen & Miller,
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1980).
Although the qualitative dimension of theoretical
constructs, including control, have been proposed elsewhere (Ames
& Ames, 1987; Astuto & Clark, 1985; Cartwright, 1965; Turcotte,
1974), its role and treatment to date have been cursory and far
less systematic than research using structural variables.
Qualitative measures are often excluded from initial hypothesis-
testing procedures, reported instead as implications (Cohen &
Miller, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1985). It is in establishing
behavioral indicators and measures of the qualitative dimension
as an integral part of the managerial control concept that
present the most challenging and unique aspect of this study.
Following the synthesis of literatures, managerial control
was hypothesized to be four distinct, yet interrelated control
processes involving standards, information, assessment, and
incentives; each of which operate along two dimensions: (1)
stable and regular building-level, structural patterns, and (2)
qualitative administrative behaviors. Under each of the four
control processes, which are considered here as aggregate, latent
variables, the salient quantitative and qualitative indicators
were defined and measured. These indicators emerged from both
the literature reviews and the preliminary study. Their content
validity, however, has yet to be tested empirically as part of a
control model within school organizations. Therefore, at this
stage of analysis, they represent assumptions or hypotheses
within each of the four school control processes.
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The indicator frequency was used as the dominant measure of
administrative-teacher quantitative interactions. The
qualitative behavioral indicators describe the manner in which
managerial control activities are exercised as well as the
perceptions they create in teachers. It is assumed that these
indicators interact with the structural-frequency indicators of
control. For example, in the case of standards, qualities of
clarity and difficulty complement the frequency measure on which
principals and other building level administrators articulate
standards. Their combined explanation forms a stronger basis on
which to define the school control standards process. Similarly,
the combination of frequency and qualitative measures are used
for each of the other control processes.
The second research objective links a set of empirical
survey data to the theoretical construct of managerial control.
In order to test for construct validity, the first step involved
the development of a curricular and instructional control
instrument. The items on the questionnaire were taken directly
from the results of the preliminary interview study. The
questionnaire was pretested and then administered to teachers
whose perceptions of administrative behaviors have been
considered valid measures of control processes (Andrews, 1987;
Cohen, et al., 1979). Specific curricular and instructional task
contexts were included in each item. The tasks selected were
teacher evaluation, staff development, curricular development,
and the selection of textbooks and instructional materials
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(Cawelti & Adkisson, 1986).
The proposed curricular and instructional control model
represents a theoretical construct. It is unrealistic to expect
a single indicator or entity to describe this complex construct
(Hughes, Price, & Marrs, 1986; Pfeffer, 1978a; Schein, 1972).
For this reason, multivariate procedures were used to analyze the
interactions among the behavioral indicators as well as among the
latent, composite variables. The four processes of control are
aggregate or composite variables of both structural and
qualitative indicators. It was assumed that although there may
be high correlations among the composite variables and observable
indicators, they are distinct enough to allow for discussion and
analysis.
Principal components analysis was used to link the empirical
data to the aggregate latent variables. Although the procedure
is considered exploratory (Lennox, 1988), the same restrictions
for confirmatory factor analysis were enforced, namely, that the
model be explicitly identified prior to statistical testing and
respecification (Alwin, 1974). Based on the substantive theory,
the interrelationships between the variables and behavioral
indicators will be stated. It was predicted that the highly
correlated variables would form principal components
characterized by managerial behaviors of standards, information,
assessments, and incentives respectively. It is likely that
reformulation or respecification of the measurement model will be
necessary since (a) causal relations between the latent variables
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and behavioral indicators are more complex than implied by the
basic measurement model which ignores causality (Herting &
Costner, 1985), (b) the data set initially contains responses to
indicators which may not be discriminantly valid for a variety of
reasons, and (c) a number of the model's assumptions contradict
previous findings which hold that control varies according to
different technologies (Eisenhardt, 1985; Koontz, 1971; Ouchi,
1978; Thompson, 1967). A fuller discussion of each of these
assumptions and limitations is addressed in Chapter Five of the
study.
Finally, because of the exploratory nature of this study,
descriptive statistical data were used to report the frequency
and correlations among all the survey items and aggregate
variables. Statistical tests of significance were employed to
investigate a number of demographic relationships. Of particular
interest were the relationships between control processes and
dimensions and (a) instructional level, (b) teacher tenure, (c)
individual school effects, and (d) school effectiveness. At this
stage in theory development, it remains necessary for researchers
to lay a stronger foundation for the comparison of research
findings across different settings (Hughes, Price & Marrs, 1986).
The purpose for reporting the results of post hoc statistical
tests of significance is not to assert causal relationships (or
even causal direction), but rather to generate specific
hypotheses for future research.
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Limitations
Too often, organizational theorists' concern with matters of
theoretical import has led them to overlook the
operationalization of social science theories. Heuristic
concepts are formulated with little or no consideration given to
linkages with empirical findings. The more complex the
theoretical model, the greater the difficulty in testing
interacting variables. In the case of organizational control,
its singular focus upon relationships of structural variables has
tended to limit measures to formal authority and hierarchy. When
the concept is reformulated to include qualitative variables
found within informal patterns, professional, and technological
relationships, then the exclusive use of structural variables
(e.g., frequency of formal interactions, organizational size,
among others) is inadequate. At best, structural evidence can
provide partial explanatory support for the complex abstraction.
At worst, the reported results are wrong. Usually, the matter is
left at a fragmented, incoherent stage which calls for further
research.
In order to break out of this unproductive cycle, greater
attention must be paid to the validity and reliability of the
theoretical constructs offered. Hypotheses based on abstract
concepts cannot be tested directly (Sullivan & Feldman, 1979, p.
10). Therefore, the development of measurable indicators that
are valid and reliable is an essential step in theory building.
Recent advancements is computer software permit a variety of ways
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to test concepts by linking them to data sets. The task,
however, is neither simple nor straightforward since even the use
of such rigorous criteria as those of confirmatory factor
analysis is largely an exploratory endeavor (Lennox, 1988; Long,
1983b).
One of the primary concerns in establishing the construct
validity of managerial control over curriculum and instruction
involves the use of self-report, perceptual measures. How valid
and reliable are these response indicators? The questions that
needed to be answered in this study concerned the convergence of
measures into cohesive dimensions and processes, yet at the same
time, as measures that were sufficiently distinct to discuss and
analyze differences. This objective raised concern about
measurement error, inherent in all empirical research. Was it
unsystematic, or did it reflect systematic bias or instrument
interference such that respondents were not actually addressing
the intended variable (Sullivan & Feldman, 1988, p. 12-13)?
Multiple sources and multiple indicators give us more confidence
in the results. However, their linkages created problems of
interpretation (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). Finally, the
validity of the data set may raise questions about the sample
size used in the preliminary interview study.
Self-Report Measures
The decision to develop instrumentation for this study
created limitations with respect to the reliance on principal and
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teacher perceptions as the key measure of curricular and
instructional control. Based on previous research, self-report
perceptions of control processes were assumed to be an accurate
measure of building-level control (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975;
Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 80; Locke, 1977; Vickers, 1967) so long
as the following criteria were met:
criterion 1: attitudes and perceptions are linked
contextually with overt and useful administrative behaviors
(Koontz, 1971; Schuman & Presser, 1981, p.232; Sudman &
Bradburn, 1983);
criterion 2: attitudes and perceptions are taken from
different organizational levels so as to reflect both
position control and mutual control (Abbott, 1975; Blau &
Scott, 1962);
criterion 3: attitudes and perceptions relate to specific
technology (Mahoney & Frost, 1977; Thompson, 1967) and
include teachers as a source of data (Andrews, 1987; Cohen,
et al., 1979);
criterion 4: attitudes and perceptions reflect both formal
structural patterns and constraints as well as the
discretionary activities of teachers and administrators
(Crowson & Morris, 1985; Preliminary interview study).
criterion 5: there is little motivation to distort attitudes
and perceptions and an assurance of individual anonymity
(Lawler & Rhode, 1976, pp. 166, 169).
Each survey question reflected the teachers' attitudes
(criterion 3) regarding specific managerial behaviors of building
administrators (criterion 1). The wording of the questions were
all taken directly from the interview data of principals in the
preliminary study so that both building organizational levels
would be represented (criterion 2). In order to create
managerial process variables (aggregate, latent variables),
similar items were asked across four distinct curricular and
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instructional tasks (criterion 3). In addition, under each
process as well as under each task, the survey questions included
both quantitative frequency perceptions and qualitative
behavioral perceptions, some of which reflected informal
discretionary actions (criterion 4).
Lastly, all participants were assured orally and in writing
that their participation was completely anonymous (criterion 5).
This criterion had even greater applicability to this study than
it might another study on a different construct such as
leadership. The reason is that the term control itself elicits
negative responses and feelings (Converse & Presser, 1986, pp.
13-14). Therefore, the use of the term control was limited to
one interview question asked near the end of the interview, and
was completely omitted from the survey questionnaire.
Sample Size
Although the concept of control within school settings has
been discussed for over twenty years (Bidwell, 1965; Lortie,
1969), there is little understanding or synthesis of the research
findings. Research in this area remains at the exploratory stage
(Sproull, 1981; Peterson, 1984), that is, for the purpose of
generating hypotheses. Towards this objective, Sproull (1981)
held that a small sample is justified for this kind of
exploratory research effort which is needed to generate
hypotheses and increase organizational understanding.
In the preliminary study, twelve respondents from six
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schools were used. Nevertheless, because only those principals
who were judged to be knowledgeable curriculum and instruction
leaders were selected, a wide, representative range of the
managerial activities in this domain was generated. Based on the
percentages each principal and informant ascribed to curricular
and instructional activities - well over what was reported as
levels in the literature - the list of activities compared
favorably with larger studies of typical principals.
Somewhat fortuitously, certain circumstances tended to place
these principals in situations where the opportunity for
curricular and instructional leadership were maximized. In one
instance, a principal in a school's first year was using
effective school literature findings as the basis for staff
development and curricular planning activities; another principal
was in the process of converting a regular junior-high school
into a middle-school program, which required faculty to devote
considerable time to learning about middle-school philosophy and
practices. Moreover, five of the six principals labelled
themselves as innovators and had received district wide, state-
wide, or private foundation recognition for innovative programs.
Sample size is similarly an issue in the analysis of the
survey data. A high enough sample was needed for defining each
of the factors in the principal components analysis and for
subsequent multivariate analyses. Two procedures were used to
minimize the loss of data from missing values and aggregated
variables: (a) the substitution of mean values by levels of
27
instruction for missing values; and (b) the use of a 75 percent
teacher response rate for aggregated variables.
Significance
Although much has been written about the concept of
organizational control and the difficulties associated with its
implementation (Koontz, 1971), neither the definitions nor
measures have proven to be adequate, especially in professional
or semi-professional settings (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975). Ideas
about good management practices have not kept pace with research
findings related to organizational complexity and environment.
Control is still commonly perceived as a matter of rules,
regulations, and directives. Conceptually, the managerial
functions of control are stuck on planning and monitoring (Duke,
1982; Florida Council on Educational Management, 1984-85). This
narrow, closed stance inhibits educators from publicly testing
their decisions (Argyris & Schon, 1982).
The mechanisms and language of control reinforce a closed-
system perception whereby control restraints are emphasized over
the managerial activities which give meaning to the restraints.
Controls are neither fixed nor immutable, but rather reflect
content and values which change over time.
The control indicators offered here represent a syntheses of
what various disciplines have reported about organizational,
political, social, and psychological control. They reflect the
complex reality and open systems' logic of both school
28
organizations and individual behavior. The objective is to
provide a conceptual framework circumscribing indicators
conducive to improving administrative practice. In order to
succeed, a climate for re-education must be created. A step in
that direction begins with the validation of control mechanisms
as reciprocal (teacher-administrator) managerial processes.
As early as 1974, Turcotte reported that the number and
frequency of control reports did not improve performance within
public organizations. Nevertheless, administrative practice and
empirical research continue to count the frequency of control
interactions such as supervision and evaluation in the practice
and study of managerial control - while concluding that (1)
control within school organizations cannot be fully explained by
the structural patterns, and (2) that there are other
administrative processes and behaviors that explain control which
are at least as important as structural patterns (Pfeffer, 1978a;
1978b). The next step is to explicitly define the specific
indicators of the non-structural dimension of control in a manner
which is helpful for administrative practice. In research terms,
what is needed is to establish the construct validity of
managerial control in order to generate hypotheses for empirical
testing.
Aside from the enormous theoretical value of construct
validity, the results can affect the curricular and instructional
policy-making decisions being made nationwide during the present
educational reform movement. A political struggle for control
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over curriculum and instruction is being waged today between
state legislative policy-makers and educators. On the one hand,
virtually every state legislature has passed laws directing
schools to meet minimum standards of performance (M. Cohen, 1985;
Doyle & Hartle, 1985; Odden & Odden, 1984). On the other hand,
there is a growing body of school research which suggests that
the critical unit of school improvement is the school building
itself (Edmonds, 1979). The research on school effectiveness,
teacher effectiveness, and program implementation each concludes
that what takes place within schools has a significant effect on
the performance and output of teachers and students. The
research further suggests that schools are unique and diverse,
each with its own culture (Sergiovanni, 1987).
Policy-makers, however, view education from a managerial
perspective, amenable to uniform directives, not only in
administrative and financial areas, but in curriculum and
instruction as well (Darling-Hammond & Wise, 1985; Elmore, 1983,
Wirt & Kirst, 1982). So, at precisely the same time that
educators believe they have a better understanding of learning,
teaching, and schooling under diverse circumstances, external
policy-makers are directing schools to follow uniform rules and
policies which affect curriculum and instruction.
Understanding how control is exercised within school
buildings can assist educators and policy-makers in closing the
wide gap between policy-making and implementation. The record of
successful implementation of externally directed school
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innovations is disappointing (Fullan, 1982; Mann, 1978). Yet, in
spite of this dismal record, educational reforms continue to
follow a top-down policy approach (Elmore, 1983). This trend
has resulted in the growth of centralized school district
bureaucracies and the proliferation of laws (Meyer, 1983). But,
instead of their being greater educational control and
accountability, these actions have had the opposite effect:
increased growth and complexity, and decreased control (Elmore,
1983).
School policy reflects how the public views education.
State and national reform movements have been critical of school
performance. But the top-down approach to school improvement
contributes little to the quality of performance since it
reflects a poor understanding of how policies are implemented at
the building-level. Important decisions must be made in
restructuring schools, training of administrative personnel, and
in the professionalization of teachers. Understanding how
managerial control operates and its subsequent effect on learning
can contribute to the policy-making debate. A managerial model
which gains the confidence of policy-makers and improves
implementation practices would be welcomed. A valid
conceptualization of managerial control will contribute to the
accomplishment of these objectives.
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Oranization of the Re-ort
The following chapter presents a comprehensive review and
synthesis of social science and school control theories. In
Chapter Three, the objectives, procedures, and findings of the
preliminary study of school managerial behaviors and context are
reported. The proposed model of school managerial control is
fully described in Chapter Four. Chapter Five describes the
procedures and methods used to empirically test the model.
Statistical findings are reported in Chapter Six. And, the final
chapter contains the summary, conclusions, and implications for
further research.
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CHAPTER TWO
Review of Related Literature: Part I
Overview
For over 20 years, organizational researchers have been
aware of the entangled complexity inherent in organizational
control practices (Cartwright, 1965; Lortie, 1969). The meaning
of organizational control is understood as not solely determined
by formal authority structures or hierarchy, particularly within
professional and semi-professional organizations (Bidwell, 1965;
Blau & Scott, 1962; Etzioni, 1965; Lortie, 1969). It is also
understood in theory that the traditional, prescriptive
managerial functions expressed by the acronym POSDCORB reflect
"vague objectives" (intzberg, 1971) that have given way to more
empirically diverse descriptions of administrative behaviors and
control mechanisms. These revised conceptions acknowledge (a)
political processes, (b) professional, social, and cultural
norms, and (c) individual characteristics and needs as
complementary and competing determinants of organizational
control.
Since these determinants of organizational control emerged
originally as distinctive findings within several social science
disciplines, each with its own models, methods, and measures,
published findings have differed. As a result, there is little
to link organizational control research findings across
disciplines. Moreover, the complexity of the theoretical
construct itself has inhibited synthesis research efforts
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(Cartwright, 1965).
Neither theory nor practice of organizational control has
progressed much beyond the sociological findings of the 1960's
(Bidwell, 1965; Cartwright, 1965; Etzioni, 1965; Lortie, 1969).
In fact, the ten principles of educational theory described by
Counts in 1930 may still represent the most systematic account of
the underlying concepts related to American educational control.
These principles include: faith in education, government
responsibility, local initiative, individual success, democracy,
national solidarity, social conformity, mechanical efficiency,
practical utility, and philosophic uncertainty (1930/1971).
Empirical research on the concept of control is still being
conducted at the exploratory stages (Peterson, 1984; Peterson,
Hallinger, & Murphy, 1987; Sproull, 1981). No operational
definition of control has been offered which provides managers
with guidelines for daily practice (Bossert et al., 1982;
Pfeffer, 1978a). The complexities revealed by empirical studies
have tended to lead organizational theorists to the conclusion
that different circumstances and unique situations most probably
account for, if not define, managerial control practices (Hanson,
1979). Yet, contingency theory itself has produced equivocal
results (Pfeffer, 1978a; 1978b) due largely to the fact that
researchers have chosen single organizational entities on which
to base their conclusions. Uncovering complexity of
organizational processes and the interactive relationships among
individual participants has not as yet been translated into a
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cohesive, theoretical framework.
During the late 1970's and 80's, the importance of control
as an organizational dynamic has reemerged through the studies
conducted by loose coupling theorists. Building on the
sociological foundations of Bidwell (1965) and Lortie (1969), and
the open systems' logic of Thompson (1967), loose coupling
theorists began to identify pervasive, latent, institutional and
cultural control variables such as mutuality, trust, good faith,
shared beliefs, and confidence (Deal, 1987; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Ouchi, 1978; Scott, 1983; Sergiovanni, 1987; Weick, 1976) as
alternative explanations to the traditional, hierarchical control
mechanisms of rules, standard operating procedures, close
supervision, and formal evaluation.
Nevertheless, the more traditional, hierarchical language
of control has recently reappeared under the framework of state
and national educational reforms. The present reform movement
reflects a shift in political power from local school districts
to the state level, whereby most of the educational reforms,
including curricular and instructional, now originate within
state legislatures (Apple, 1982; Kirst, 1984). This change
contrasts sharply with educational policy findings reported only
decade ago which rated state political culture "moderate to low"
in curricular and instructional areas (Wirt & Kirst, 1982).
Today, there are "strong" state political cultures in the
majority of states (Apple, 1982; Doyle & Hartle, 1985;
McLaughlin, 1983).
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The shift in political power to the states has occurred in
spite of evidence offered by effective school researchers who
argue that educational differences are more significantly
affected by school building-level variables than by external
control directives (Edmonds, 1979). This view is further
supported by research findings in effective teaching, program
implementation, school cultures, and symbolic leadership (Odden &
Odden, 1984; Sergiovanni, 1987). Although such findings have
been incorporated sporadically into building-level administrative
practices, they have not been reported to have measurably
influenced the political policy making processes.
The literature reviews of control theories provide a
systematic framework for understanding the behavioral impact of
managerial tasks related to control. Understanding the effects
on individuals who are confronted with specific managerial
control techniques can help to determine the legitimacy,
appropriateness, and the relative efficacy of managerial control
activities. From these diverse research agendas come a logical
framework with a common language in which to analyze the
processes of control across different school settings.
From a strict empirical perspective, discrete structures and
individual behaviors appear neither systematic nor rational,
thus, implying that control may not exist under all
circumstances. This frequent assertion with regard to school
organizations may be erroneous however. The alternative
explanation may be that control, as a series of processes, occurs
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over time and in relationship to organizational dynamics which
are felt as well as observed. Thus, the causal connections or
relationships between events are not immediately perceived or
determined. Neither curricular nor instructional tasks are
reducible to immediate effects nor to formal structure (Dornbusch
& Scott, 1975). Moreover, the sequence of events of tasks do not
necessarily follow the same linear pattern (Marzano, et al.,
1988). As a result, empirical descriptions based on observation
of either formal events, the frequency of interactions, or their
perceptions are insufficient measures of organizational control
processes (Patz & Rowe, 1977, p. 72). No matter how accurate are
the reported empirical observations of formal structures, they
cannot reveal the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs created by
administrative behaviors and structural events. Control theory,
however, necessarily incorporates such thoughts, feelings, and
beliefs.
At the root of all measures are two epistemological
directions: one observable, the other logical or intuitive.
One problem created by this dichotomy is that physical entities
change over time, while logical forms do not. Thus, within
epistemology there has been a continuing search for the linkages
between thoughtful, logical categories and empirical happenings.
In 1781, Kant wrote in his Critku of re Reason that all
knowledge is based on experience, but it does not arise from it.
With respect to control theory, we need to discover thought
processes which unite the many different discrete events involved
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in managerial control. Present day organizational theorists and
social science methodologists have already joined in the
epistemological search for the links between quantity and quality
(Ames & Ames, 1987; Astuto and Clark, 1985; Sergiovanni, 1987).
Control is a function of organizational structure as well as
an internal, logical variables. Control theory is part a priori
rational categories and part empirical, observable measures.
Together they represent structure, stability, action, and
motivation. The purpose of this literature review is to describe
how the two dimensions, structure and quality, emerged and to
explain how they function interactively at the school-building
level. The different discipline-oriented theories of control
offer competing, yet complementary explanations which support one
or more of the complex administrative options facing school
administrators (Clark & Astuto, 1988; Miles, 1981). Each offers
its unique insights that contribute to a more valid, general
theory of curricular and instructional control. Organizational
structure, politics, sociology, and psychology comprise the
practical administrative science of organizational control
theory. As a practical science, the level of understanding is
necessarily limited and inexact (McKeon, 1941, pp. xxviff). To
Counts (1930/1971), "theory which is abstracted from practice is
certain to contain numerous contradictions and to lack
completeness" (p. 7). Therefore, each discipline's theory
offers, at best, a partial contribution to our overall
understanding of the subject.
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In practical science research, construct validation of
concepts should be of the highest priority. Understanding the
underlying meaning of control as structure, thoughts, and beliefs
is necessary if we are to go beyond discrete events and
contingency analyses. Only then can we confidently link the
model to empirical findings using multiple sources and
statistical measurement theories (Hoy & Miskel, 1982; Hughes,
Price, & Marrs, 1986).
Orgranizational Thoy Complexity adHierarchy
Schools are complex organizations (Astuto & Clark, 1985;
Lortie, 1977; Miles, 1981). A valid theory of control must be
able to cope with the realities and dilemmas of organizational
and managerial complexity. Sometimes in pursuit of more solid
ground, the definitional boundaries of control so tightly
circumscribe formal control structures that much of the daily
operational processes and interactions have been intentionally
excluded from analysis (Charters, 1981). At other times, the
pervasiveness of organizational complexity results in a host of
alternative explanations and metaphors, many of which contradict
rational bureaucratic, and cybernetic models of control (Astuto &
Clark, 1985; Hannaway & Sproull, 1978-79; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
The narrow view addresses managerial activities that are
specifically authorized by formal policies and structures, while
the broader perspectives encompass all activities not explicitly
prohibited by formal policy and structure. Missing is that
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middle ground that systematically incorporates organizational and
managerial complexity into the discussion of controlling
behaviors.
Problematic effects of organizational complexity.
Educational organizations have grown from small, self-
contained local school units into large, complex institutions,
increasing the bureaucratic centralization of school governance
(Meyer, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1983, p. 143).
While the size of school organizations tends to correlate
positively with bureaucracy and complexity, it also correlates
negatively with centralized control (Child, 1977; Elmore, 1983).
Increased organizational complexity adds divisional
specialization and levels to an organization, requiring added
coordination and integration (Blau & Scott, 1962; Pfeffer, 1978b;
Thompson, 1967) as well as the need for more information and
control systems. Specialization and increased organizational
levels bring diversity of goals and expectations (Turcotte,
1974). Consequently, the central organizational processes such
as decision-making, implementation, evaluation, and control
become problematic rather than formal and rational (Elmore, 1983;
Turcotte, 1974). The most persuasive evidence to support this
conclusion is found within the disappointing historical record of
school program implementation efforts (Fullan, 1982; Fullan &
Pomfret, 1977; Mann, 1978; McLaughlin, 1978; Meyer, 1983).
Curricular and instructional tasks are assigned to different
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levels and roles within school organizations and environments.
Since the publications in the early 1980's of the national
reforms reports, state legislatures and state departments of
education have assumed greater formal authority over curriculum
and instruction (Darling-Hammond & Wise, 1985). Curricular
specialists are employed by the state departments' of education
to provide state-wide guidelines and directions for local school
district use (McDonnell, 1985). At the district level, under the
superintendent's authority, there are subject area specialists
who provide curricular frameworks and advice to department heads
and classroom teachers. And, at the school level, formal
responsibility for curriculum and instruction rests with the
building principal (Doud & Montgomery, 1985; Duke, 1982;
Rutherford, 1985) who delegates specific tasks to assistant
principals, department and grade-level chairpersons, and
individual classroom teachers.
No cohesive theory exists which clarifies the interactions
among these various levels. Empirical school studies tend to
begin and end indiscriminantly. Researchers rely almost as much
on accessible subjects and measures as they do on theory. In
general, the reported organizational typologies simplify the
complex interactions and are usually based on single measures,
entities, or concepts applied across the board (Miles, 1981).
Two notable exceptions are the research efforts of Miles
(1981) and Clark and Astuto (1988). Determining the nature of
organizational complexity of schools is first and foremost an
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empirical question (Miles, 1981, p. 112). Both Miles (1981) and
Clark and Astuto (1988) have offered worthwhile maps of common
school properties and behaviors. But, what is so unusual about
these geographies is their recognition of organizational and
managerial dilemmas, i.e., recognition of two or more
contradictory images which emerge from the same terrain.
Although Clark and Astuto have expressed the hope that
additional variables will be added to their coupling taxonomy
that will lead to greater organizational clarity (see Astuto &
Clark, 1985), they acknowledge that the present reality facing
school administrators is often two or more alternatively good
choices (1988). Miles (1981) had suggested two reasons for the
empirical knowledge gap of school organizations: one is the
absence of correlational measures between alternative choices
(e.g., coordination/flexibility to knowledge use,
diversity/uniformity to effectiveness); and the second is the
lack of basic understanding as to the nature of organizational
concepts, such as teacher autonomy and internal change. Since
neither speculative ideas nor prescriptive organizational
typologies can contribute to the closing of these knowledge gaps,
Miles (1981) recommended descriptive, empirical studies based on
contingency, comparative, or experimental analyses. The
comparative implementation paradigm proposed by Berman (1981) is
an example of just such a descriptive model.
By limiting generalizations, making sensible distinctions
among different types of variables, experimenting with time
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-dependent measurements and longitudinal research designs,
and structuring analysis in conditional forms, researchers
might be able to reduce inconsistency across studies and
produce results relevant to policy and practice (Berman,
1981, p. 282).
Problematic effects of managerial complexity.
Growth and complexity of school organizations have also
resulted in changes in the role of school administrators
(Bidwell, 1965; Goodlad, 1978). Centralized bureaucratic
decision-making limits the ability of school administrators to
exercise direct control over all decision-making and
implementation processes (Apple, 1982; Fullan, 1982). Other
factors identified as limiting the exercise of building-level
managerial control include the lack of training for school
administrators (Fallon, 1979; Pellicer, 1982), the lack of time
needed to address non-routine curricular and instructional
matters (Crowson & Morris, 1985), the growing complexity of
substantive issues, and technology in public organizations (Hall,
Jr., 1956). The uniformity and standardization of school laws
and policies (Darling-Hammond & Wise, 1985) has resulted in
increased prescription of roles, conformity, and caution (Child,
1977). The combined effect from these factors seems to point
towards a decrease in discretionary managerial activity.
Yet, it would also appear that the rudimentary nature of
school bureaucracies (Bidwell, 1965) permits discretionary
decision-making, especially at the school building level (Eye, et
al., 1971). The interrelationship of federal, state, local
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district, building, and classroom levels makes it doubtful
whether school administrators, at any of these levels, could have
total control (Bidwell, 1965; Elmore, 1983; Miles, 1981; Meyer,
1983). Thus, in spite of the trend towards bureaucratic
centralization and standardization, the levels of school
organizations tend to be loosely coupled (Bidwell, 1965; Weick,
1976; 1985).
Similarly, technological complexity may foster, rather than
inhibit, discretionary decision-making. Curricular and
instructional tasks have been categorized as active and non-
routine (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975, p. 348) which are more
optimally performed within decentralized decision-making
environments. Active tasks and non-routine decisions are
characteristics of managerial complexity. With the growing
inability - and inadvisability - for direct, substantive, or
technical controls, administrators must rely more on their skills
and understanding of managerial processes, i.e., how decisions
are made and carried out, rather than on the content or substance
of the policies themselves (Hall, Jr., 1956).
Certain hypotheses argue that non-routine decisions and
active curricular and instructional tasks do not present clear
output standards. To these theorists, performance or behavioral
controls are preferable to output controls (Thompson, 1967;
Mahoney & Frost, 1977). Under the same conditions, however,
other theorists argue that output controls are necessary
precisely because of the non-routine nature of the task (Ouchi,
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1978; Eisenhardt, 1985).
What contributes to such contrary viewpoints are the
idiosyncratic uses of managerial terms. In one instance, the
term behavioral is defined as flexible and subtle (Ouchi, 1978);
elsewhere, it is used as a human need (Patz & Rowe, 1977, pp.
273-274); and in another empirical control study, behavioral
control is defined by structural rules (Peterson, 1984). Similar
conceptual inconsistencies are found throughout the research on
control theory.
Overall understanding of managerial complexity has been
greatly enhanced by the structured observational methodology
developed by Nintzberg (1971). Prior analyses prominent in
managerial texts prescribed normative administrative functions of
what good administrators ought to do. This literature offered
"vague managerial objectives" (intzberg, 1971), acronyms such as
POSDCORB, rational assumptions, and theoretical models which have
been aptly described as a "semantic jungle" (Koontz, 1978).
intzberg's (1971) structured observations of what
administrators actually did signaled a significant breakthrough
in our knowledge of administrative behaviors. Unlike the
rational prototypes of the managerial texts, the evidence
intzberg reported did not fit accepted normative prescriptions.
He reported that administrators exhibited six nonrational
characteristics:
(1) administrators do a great quantity of work at an
unrelenting pace;
(2) they do not follow any regular work pattern, instead the
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work is characterized by variety, fragmentation, and
brevity;
(3) they prefer current and specific issues which emerge on
an ad hoc basis;
(4) they are situated between the organization and a network
of contacts, thus receiving far more information than
they emit;
(5) they prefer verbal communications; and
(6) they are in control of their own affairs (despite
initiating only 32% of the verbal contacts).
Most of these administrative characteristics have been
supported in subsequent school-based studies using Mintzberg's
method of structured observation (Martin & Willower, 1981). What
still remains unclear, however, is the effect these fragmented
behaviors have on building level operations, particularly in the
areas of curriculum and instruction (Bossert et al., 1982). At
one extreme of the loose-coupling paradigm is the assertion that
there is no pattern in school decision-making. The process is
described metaphorically as an "organized anarchy" functioning in
a "garbage can" (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). The empirical
literature on instructional leadership suggests that the time
devoted to instructional tasks is extremely limited (Hannaway &
Sproull, 1978-79; Martin & Willower, 1981; Pellicer, 1982; Rowan,
1982). Indeed, one study reported as little as four minutes a
day given to curricular and instructional tasks (Sproull, 1981).
At the other bureaucratic extreme are tight coupling
viewpoints (Hallinger & Murphy, 1985; 1986) which provide support
for strong administrative directives at both the state and
building levels. Crowson & Morris (1985) reported that one-half
of the principal's time can be accounted for by formal,
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hierarchical controls (i.e., budget, personnel, scheduling, and
pupil behavior). There are numerous studies which indicate that
curricular and instructional administrative behaviors play a
significant role in schools (Edmonds, 1979; Lightfoot, 1986;
Ogawa & Hart, 1985; Rutherford, 1985).
Within this paradigmatic debate is evidence for a middle
ground. "Simultaneous loose and tight coupling" (DuFour, 1986)
and contingency theories suggest that different controls are
appropriate depending on task structures (Eye, et al., 1971;
House, 1981; Mahoney & Frost, 1977; Koontz, 1971; Ouchi, 1978).
Unfortunately, most contingency models fall short of their
efforts to provide contextual and adaptive strategies for two
reasons: (1) they tend to overgeneralize their findings (Berman,
1981), and (2) they ignore the underlying complexity needed for
establishing organizational control (Patz & Rowe, 1977).
The complexity of strategic, non-routine decisions has
raised the question of whether there exists an logical underlying
structure or pattern (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976).
According to Mann (1975), policy decision-making divorces mental
processes from actions. The mental processes were considered as
"calculation" in which demands are recognized, goals identified,
alternatives weighed and estimated, and a choice of action
selected. The latter process, labelled "control," included the
action stages of implementation, enforcement, and enactment.
Mintzberg, et al. (1976) conducted research to see if there
was an underlying structure behind "active" tasks. The study
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identified three mental phases: identification, development, and
selection. Each mental phase was supported by three empirical
routines: politics, communication, and control. Although the
findings linked the mental processes with the empirical routines,
it stopped short of action phases, such as implementation and
compliance. The recent literature on program implementation
argues persuasively in support of the proposition that decision-
making per se is not equivalent to implementation processes
(Fullan, 1982). In sum, the incorporation of managerial
complexity into the meaning of control strongly suggests that
knowledge of how and what people perceive is as vital to
understanding control as is subsequent actions.
Hierarchical control: Formal authority variables
In identifying the determinants of control, a logical
starting point is the organization's structure as defined by its
formal authority framework. This framework is inevitably
hierarchical (Tannenbaum, et al. 1974) as measured by the number
of levels within the organization (Blau & Scott, 1962), the
division of work to be done on each particular level, and the
formal mechanisms which connect vertical and horizontal work
arrangements. Not all organizations have the same organizational
structure, yet all exhibit a relative degree of hierarchy based
on the position level or status role within the organization
(Smith & Tannenbaum, 1963). Vertically-oriented organizations
emphasize the flow of information, generally directives, from top
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levels of authority to lower levels. As directives flow
downward, discretionary authority is limited and circumscribed
(Lang, 1965, p. 852). Roles are prescribed and uniform and there
is "no recourse but to obey" (Child, 1977; Lang, 1965). Formal
authority ascribes power and rights to certain individuals to
make decisions affecting others. At such times, subordinates are
asked to suspend their own judgment and to uncritically accept
authority (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982, p. 29).
The pattern is less evident within flatter, horizontally-
oriented organizations in which the flow of information increases
among employees working within the same level. Subordinates are
not expected to suspend their judgment and information is used in
a mutually-influencing process. Thus, while authority flows
downward, influence is multidirectional (Bacharach & Lawler,
1982, p.29).
One straightforward measure of organizational hierarchy is
defined as the span of control, that is, the number of
subordinates directly under the control of or reporting to an
executive or supervisor (Applewhite, 1965; Blau & Scott, 1962).
Applewhite's (1965) review of the literature on the optimum span
of control using arithmetic models reported no conclusive
findings. There is evidence that under certain conditions, close
supervision based on a small span of control is more effective,
while under different conditions, close supervision impedes
performance (Applewhite, 1965; Blau & Scott, 1962). Applewhite's
review, however, identified other variables which potentially
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mediated the effects of the span of control. Among these
mediating variables were (a) staff and line positions, wherein
staff positions may exert greater influence than that position
would formally indicate; (b) organizational tenure, which may
give certain individuals more access and information; and, (c)
the number of organizational levels, which affect the management,
coordination, and communication within the organization (Blau &
Scott, 1962).
A more comprehensive hierarchical control variable than span
of control is the organizations' technology. Woodward (1970) and
Thompson (1967) each proposed technology typologies to analyze
organizational structure and behaviors. Woodward's typology,
which was based on studies of manufacturing organizations,
proposed that technological control operated along two structural
continuums: the first continuum measured the degree of personal
control versus mechanical control, and the second continuum
measured the integration versus fragmentation of control systems.
By taking the end points of each continuum, Woodward identified
four different control strategies: that is, personal and
integrated, personal and fragmented, impersonal and fragmented,
and impersonal and integrated.
Just as the studies on span of control had indirectly
revealed mediating, non-structural variables, so, too, did
Woodward's typology. From the two structural continuums,
Woodward arrived at a number of administrative and political
hypotheses to better explain organizational behavior. For
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example, along the first continuum of personal and mechanical
control structures, Woodward stated that administrative
procedures were needed to link planning with executing. Along
the second continuum of integration and fragmentation of control
systems, Woodward suggested that the differences in control
criteria would lead to political conflict and the need to somehow
resolve that conflict. Despite the obvious contextual
limitations of manufacturing organizations and the typology's
lack of specificity with regard to managerial control mechanisms
(Lawler & Rhode, 1976), Woodward contributed evidence of the
relationships between structural variables with administrative
procedures and political conflict.
The origins of Thompson's (1967) control typology began with
a logic of open systems and a political understanding of the
potential for conflict in decision-making. Thompson recognized
the incompatibility of direct control within complex
organizational structures. Complexity creates not only a limited
ability to personally and directly control, but also the
inability to comprehend all the possible decision-making
contingencies. Despite the differences among organizational
levels, however, political conflict could be significantly
reduced at the lower, technical core.
Thompson's typology categorized technology in three ways: as
sequential relationships, as pooled relationships, and as
reciprocal relationships. These relationships hold an
organization together by linking individuals to structures. The
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distinguishing feature among these relationships is the degree of
dependency needed to perform specific, work tasks. For example,
in sequential technology, individuals are dependent upon the
completion of some previous task; in pooled technology, only
certain aspects of organizational tasks are affected by other
tasks; while reciprocal relationships, individuals require the
greatest degree of coordination in order to complete a task.
These linkages of technology determine (a) to what extent the
organizational structure will be vertical or horizontal, and (b)
the mechanisms of control: rules and directives for highly
dependent tasks, or meetings and committees for more
discretionary tasks.
A decade later, Mahoney & Frost (1977) attempted to
operationalize Thompson's typology. They, too, assumed that
technology was a causal variable of organizational structure and
behaviors. Whereas Thompson had categorized technologies by
their dependency, Mahoney & Frost assigned its opposite,
discretion, as their principal measure. With reciprocal
technology, they hypothesized that standards are ambiguous, and
so, social reference groups with high discretion are used to
measure effectiveness; with pooled technology linkages, there is
incomplete certainty of cause and effect, and, therefore,
instrumental assessments (mediated discretion) are used to
measure if goals are achieved; while with sequential technology,
the beliefs of cause and effect relationships and outcome
preferences are most certain, efficiency tests with no discretion
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are used to assess organizational effectiveness.
Mahoney and Frost (1977) reported finding significant
differences in the kinds of controls used for each type of
technology relationship. Supervisory control was found most
often in sequential technologies and least often in reciprocal
technologies; staff development and training were used most often
with reciprocal technologies. Although not conclusive, findings
were also reported on the relationships of managerial functions
and the different technology categories. For example, planning
was found to be more important for sequential technology than for
reciprocal. In sequential relationships, output results were
more significant than in either pooled or reciprocal
relationships. While in reciprocal technology, cooperation and
staff development made large contributions. Mahoney and Frost
(1977) concluded that technology is important, although not fully
determinant of organizational structure, behavior, or
effectiveness.
In other technology-control typologies, tasks have been
commonly distinguished as routine or non-routine (Dornbusch &
Scott, 1975; Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1978). Routine tasks are
defined as programmable and predictable; non-routine tasks are
not programmable and uncertain. Dornbusch and Scott (1975)
referred to these tasks as "inert" and "active" respectively.
The controls over routine tasks are basically standard operating
procedures, while control over active, less predictable tasks
require sufficient autonomy to respond to uncertainty. According
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to Dornbusch and Scott (1975, p. 348), active task controls use
fewer rules, less minute specialization of personnel, and less
centralized decision-making. These implications are basically
consistent with the hypotheses and findings of Thompson (1967)
and Mahoney & Frost (1977).
Given the same task distinctions, Ouchi (1978) hypothesized
and tested a dual control model of behavior controls versus
output controls. Behavior controls are flexible and subtle,
allowing for local variations; output controls are quantified and
used as organization-wide control mechanisms. Both control
categories are measurable depending on the information
characteristics of the tasks (Eisenhardt, 1985),
The Ouchi model proposed four measurable hypotheses: (1) if
the task can be programmed, the behaviors are easily measured;
(2) if the task is not programmed, behaviors are more difficult
to measure, therefore, control is measured by outcomes; (3) if
the goals are clearly stated, the outcomes can be measured and
evaluated; and (4) if both the behaviors and outcomes can be
measured, then either control measure, behavior or output, may be
used (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1978).
With respect to non-routine tasks, Ouchi's second hypothesis
departs significantly from Thompson's typology. According to
Ouchi, complex, unprogrammable tasks ought to use outcome
measures; whereas for Thompson, complex, reciprocal tasks require
cooperation, meetings, and staff development. It was only for
sequential or programmable tasks that Mahoney and Frost (1977)
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found a strong reliance on output results, rather than behavioral
measures. Moreover, when the goals of a task are ambiguous,
discretion in the use of effectiveness measures (i.e., behavior
controls) is more likely than output measures (Thompson, 1967).
Eisenhardt (1985) analyzed Ouchi's model and added other
variables to performance measures, namely, the effects of
rewards, costs, information systems, and environment.
Eisenhardt's study concluded that the Ouchi framework ignored
uncertainty found in the organizational environment and too
strictly limited the role of information to tasks. Both
criticisms were raised previously by Patz and Rowe (1977) with
respect to contingency theory, the framework within which Ouchi's
model may be said to belong.
Eisenhardt (1985) also noted that both her model and Ouchi's
deliberately omitted "social control" measures from the analyses.
Social controls would be employed to minimize the divergence of
preferences and, along with information systems, could compensate
for high outcome uncertainty.(Eisenhardt, 1985).
In every instance, the structural-technical control
typologies reviewed here noted the effects of a significant
number of "mediating" political, social, and psychological
variables. It is precisely these residual findings that need
further systematic consideration. However, before turning to
this task, it is essential to review the literature of school
control itself in order to confirm whether similar mediating
variables also emerged from school structural analyses.
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School Hierarchical Control
District-school control.
Hannaway & Sproull (1978-79) asked the question, "to what
extent is administrative or managerial behavior related to
teaching and learning?" In seeking an answer, they assumed that
informal verbal communications most accurately reflected the
pattern of school influence between the district central office
and individual schools (i.e., principals). Based on the
frequency of informal verbal communications, Hannaway and Sproull
found little influence between the two levels, such that
"discussions about how well school or classroom units or
individual teachers were performing, or how 'production' could be
improved, were virtually non-existent."
In 1981, Sproull reanalyzed the data reported in his study
with Hannaway. Their initial emphasis had been on the
communication time devoted solely to curricular matters (only two
and one-half percent of the time). Here, Sproull examined the
total time interaction (20 percent) between managers (principals)
and the larger bureaucratic environment (district level). Even
with this larger percentage of interaction, Sproull noted the
inadequacy of the bureaucratic model, particularly: (a) the
impracticality of planning, (b) the paradox of supervision
(monitoring and evaluating) versus organizational morale, and (c)
the mythology of written regulations. Although none of the
implications is tested further, Sproull suggested that school
managers (i.e., principals) should adopt the role of information
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processors, an implication not unlike the mediating variables
offered above.
Deal & Cellotti (1980) also asked, "how much influence do
(and can) educational administrators have on classrooms?" Using
a panel design over a three year period, superintendents,
principals, and teachers were asked to describe their perceptions
of how formal policies and administrative practices affect
classroom organization and instruction. The authors found a lack
of consensus among the three organizational levels which led to
the conclusion that "instructional activities do not seem to be
effectively coordinated through formal channels."
Meyer, Scott, and Deal (1983) reported findings from survey
data that was collected in 1975 from 30 superintendents, 103
elementary school principals, and from 469 teachers in the San
Francisco Bay area - a sample similar to the one analyzed by Deal
and Cellotti (1980). The respondents were asked to what extent
they perceived the presence of explicit school-wide policies in
several substantive (curricular, administrative, and
instructional) areas. The researchers were not interested in the
implementation or control of the policies, simply the perceptions
of policies. The authors reported finding a "compelling
consensus" among superintendents, principals, and teachers
concerning the presence and explicit distinctions of formal
policies. The authors proposed two possible explanations for the
high level of consensus: (1) close organizational interactions
and relationships within schools and districts; or (2)
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institutional or cultural understanding of the roles and norms in
education throughout society.
Using tests of analysis of variances, the amount of variance
explained by the within organizational interactions was very low
in contrast to the percentages of consensus among the 30
districts. Meyer, Scott, and Deal (1983) concluded that school
organizations conform, not to formal structural-organizational
patterns, but rather to broader institutional rules which define
education throughout society.
Rowan's (1982) review of survey and ethnological literature
on instructional control also concluded that there was a
"weakness of control exercised by administrators (district and
school-level) over the teaching and learning process." Rowan
tested the loose-coupling model by studying the historical
staffing patterns within district administrative staffs. He
found that while business management personnel increased
dramatically from 10 percent in 1930 to 83 percent by 1970,
district curriculum managers increased by only 20 percent, from
10 percent to 30 percent, over the same 40 year period. The
percentage increase for district instructional managers was
somewhat higher, 37 percent, from 6 percent in 1930 to 43 percent
by 1970. Although the study ignored historical changes in
school-level roles, Rowan (1982) suggested that with highly
uncertain technology, such as curriculum and instruction, control
is best in the hands of teachers. While this view presently
receives increasing support in the literature (Floden, Porter,
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Alford, Freeman, Irwin, Schmidt, & Schwille, 1988; Griffin, 1988;
Kerr, 1987) and in collective bargaining negotiations, the
empirical data to support this implication is limited.
Each of the school control studies cited so far tends to
support the model of loosely coupled educational systems (Weick,
1976; 1985). Yet, each study raises a question as to the
validity of the findings in that in each study only a single
measure of control was used to analyze district-school
relationships. Deal and Cellotti (1980) limited their
investigation to the frequency of formal communications; Meyer,
Scott, and Deal (1983) counted the perceptions of formal
policies; Rowan (1982) analyzed job titles. Neither regular
informal organizational patterns nor the quality of the
interactions were included in these analyses.
Similarly, the studies conducted by Hannaway and Sproull
(1978-79) and Sproull (1981), which looked only at the frequency
of informal communications, also did not find tight controls.
Thus, when control has been defined by a single measure, formal
or informal communication frequencies, perceptions of formal
policies, or job titles, there is little evidence to support
school organizational control.
Yet, each study has offered far-reaching implications based
on its limited findings. Given the lack of formal interactions,
Deal and Cellotti (1980) suggested that informal communications
may offer an alternative explanation - a finding not supported by
Hannaway and Sproull (1978-79). Both Sproull (1981) and Meyer,
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Scott, and Deal (1983) rejected the organizational-bureaucratic
model. The implication drawn by Sproull was that principals
should adopt a new role as information processors. The
implication drawn by Meyer, Scott, and Deal (1983) is perhaps,
the most ambitious of all. The authors reconceptualized
organizational control as institutional and cultural influence.
What is troubling is that the empirical data on which all of the
implications have been based, including the institutional
paradigm, are weak. The complexity of organizational
interactions need to be identified within a research design using
more than a single measure.
The most comprehensive empirical study to date on district-
school-level control was conducted by Peterson (1984). The
study offers a literature review of organizational control
theories and empirical tests for the presence of multiple control
mechanisms between districts and schools. The primary objective
of the study was to provide rich, descriptive pictures of six
administrative control mechanisms by measuring central tendencies
and the distribution of the responses from interview data
collected from 21 principals and 17 superintendents using closed
and open-ended questions.
Peterson (1984) listed four determinants of organizational
control: (1) technology, (2) organizational goals and outputs,
(3) organizational environment, and (4) organizational structure.
Based primarily on the ideas and findings of Dornbusch & Scott
(1975) and Ouchi (1978), Peterson made the following assumptions:
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that tasks influence the types of control (Ouchi, 1978; Thompson,
1967); that ambiguous goals need multiple controls; that the
environment influences controls (Pfeffer, 1978a); and that
organizational structure (specifically size) creates a potential
for control loss.
Peterson (1984) categorized six control mechanisms under two
broad categories: hierarchical and non-hierarchical. He
identified four hierarchical control mechanisms: supervision,
input control, behavior control, and output control. And, he
identified two non-hierarchical control mechanisms: personnel
selection and socialization and environmental factors. Work
fragmentation of principals and the complexity of school and
program goals characterized hierarchical control. Both tended to
reduce the effectiveness of district supervision as a control
mechanism. Therefore, the other hierarchical control mechanisms
were used to complement or replace close supervision.
Input controls were found to be important particularly with
respect to the administrative use of discretionary and
contingency funds. Peterson also reported a relatively low use
of behavior control and output controls at the principal level.
One exception was in the area of teacher evaluation where the
district instituted strict behavior controls over principals.
The low use of output controls was especially true for criterion-
referenced tests, although even standardized achievement tests
was limited to only 50 percent of Peterson's sample.
The findings related to non-hierarchical control reported
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that most of the principals hired were insiders who conformed to
district norms. Environmental controls had to do with the
sources of information which have the greatest effect on the
superintendent's assessment of principals. The responses placed
community views as the most influential control, followed by the
superintendents' own views, and then those of teachers, and other
central office personnel.
From the empirical data, Peterson formulated a number of
hypotheses: (a) in considering the multiplicity of controls,
Peterson suggested that principals spend more time on tasks that
are more tightly coupled and more hierarchically controlled and
less time on instructional management; (b) considering both
organizational and managerial complexity of schools, Peterson
hypothesized that there are areas or zones of "substantial
autonomy" particularly in the instructional domain; (c) the size
of the district (structure) had a significant effect on controls;
for example, the larger the district, the more hierarchical
controls.
Peterson (1984) suggested that further school control
research seek to link the concepts of school control with daily
behaviors as well as with productivity. The latter issue was
addressed subsequently in a study by Peterson, Murphy, &
Hallinger (1987). Using Peterson's (1984) control categories to
study the presence of control within "effective" districts
(N=12), the authors obtained data from open-ended interviews with
the superintendents only. The study listed three assumptions:
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(1) multiple controls operate, in combination as a "web" of
control, between the district-level and schools, none of which
predominate; (2) behavior controls direct instruction, while
output controls are used in evaluation; and (3) controls should
employ "success criteria."
In contrast to other studies which reported "weak" control
between districts and schools, Peterson, Murphy, & Hallinger
(1987) found tight linkages between managerial levels and the
technical instructional and curricular core. Seven of the 12
superintendents reported that their districts had long
established methods of instruction and numerous mechanisms to
insure that the methods were being used in the classroom. Eleven
of 12 superintendents reported systematic, district-wide staff
development programs. Teacher evaluation was tightly structured
and consistent with state law. On the other hand, a relatively
low percentage of districts used student achievement tests (33
percent) and only a third of the districts assisted schools in
the dismissal of incompetent teachers. The authors never
questioned their sole use of superintendent responses as the
measure of hierarchical control. It is likely that
superintendents would be inclined to report tighter, more
frequent, and substantive interactions with school building
administrators.
Generally speaking, at higher levels of school
organizations, the tendency has been to centralize policy domains
and establish greater uniformity (Darling-Hammond & Wise, 1985;
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Meyer, 1983). Ironically, "the indices of control become less
significant and less useful at progressively higher levels"
(Vickers, 1967, p. 29). In practice, what this has meant is that
(a) one set of criteria (of success) is applied to higher
organizational levels than at lower levels (Goldman, 1983, p.
339), (b) higher level "soft" controls and formal policies may
not be relevant to lower levels, and (c) control of technology is
best addressed at levels below the district-school relationship.
The specific curricular controls reported by Peterson,
Murphy, & Hallinger (1987) included district course guidelines
(42 percent), district standards, and textbook adoption laws. On
the other hand, no clear control pattern was found in the hiring
and transfer of teachers. The authors concluded that there was
still a research need to "disentangle the relative importance of
the technical and cultural features of these [control] activities
and to demonstrate their causal linkages to student performance"
(p. 93).
Principal-teacher control.
The same questions have been asked at the principal-teacher
level, namely, which structures or activities can control teacher
behaviors. Wellisch, et al., (1978) reported that there was more
coordination between principals and teachers at successful
schools than at less successful schools. The independent
variables were all managerial processes: (a) how strongly the
administration felt about instruction; (b) whether they
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communicated their ideas (coordination); and (c) the extent to
which they assumed responsibility for learning (academic
standards). Case study principal and survey teacher responses
were combined and analyzed. Wellisch, et al. (1978) reported
that each of these variables were positively correlated with each
other and significant differences were found between successful
and non-successful schools. This is essentially the findings
supported by effective school research (Edmonds, 1979) and
effective school leadership (Andrews, 1987).
Cohen, Deal, Meyer & Scott (1979) tested the Thompson (1967)
hypothesis that complex instructional technology generates
complex organizational structures. The evidence found was
limited specifically to the classroom level, rather than to
either the principal or district levels. Thus, the authors
concluded that the effects of technology were best studied at the
classroom teacher level.
Cohen & Miller (1980) examined the specific nature of
organizational and technological complexity. The study did not
find that as complexity in classroom technology increased, there
was any corresponding increase in coordination or control. In
fact, the latter processes were not reported to be even the most
important predictors of decision-making effectiveness. Rather,
two other "alternative" managerial activities, praise and
resource provider, were more closely associated with compliance.
Not only did their findings suggest that a social "exchange
process" existed between principals and teachers, but that the
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concepts of control and coordination were really distinct
processes. Yet, as with the 'mediating' variables reported by
organizational theorists, these social control findings were not
tested directly.
Whereas Anderson and Brown (1971) attributed positive
influence directly to the frequency of principal-teacher
interactions, Astuto and Clark (1985) argued that frequency may
not be the discriminating factor in the relationship. The
latter's coupling taxonomy proposed a second, qualitative
dimension, in addition to quantitative frequency, in order to
better explain principal-teacher interactions. The four specific
principal activities relating to successful schools offered by
Andrews (1987) included aspects of both frequency and social
controls. Based on teacher perceptions, Andrews (1987)
identified the following principal behaviors: (1) a visible
presence, (2) clear communication, (3) resource provision, and
(4) instructional leadership. A visible presence is foremost a
matter of frequency. The role of communicator encompasses
vision, clarity, and consistency (Andrews, 1987; Greenfield,
1987; Hallinger & Murphy, 1987; Wilson & Firestone, 1987).
Although Bossert (1985) found no evidence in effective school
literature for a single leadership style, he noted two
commonalities: (a) systematic visibility and (b) clear
articulation (p. 46).
It is difficult to assign valid quantitative measures to
qualitative behaviors. Yet, in order to disentangle structural
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variables from social, political, and subjective variables, that
is precisely what is needed (Deal, 1987; Wilson & Firestone,
1987). Moreover, Hallinger and Murphy (1987) concluded that
context was critical in understanding control since the
qualitative behavioral impact of managerial activities - as well
as culture (Sergiovanni, 1987) and leadership (Vroom, 1984) -
differs from organization to organization.
Bossert, et al. (1982) has called attention to the fact that
in many previous studies of school principals, so-called
qualitative behaviors have been repeatedly found to be positively
associated with effective principal performance. Among the most
potent qualitative behaviors were the exchange of information,
maintaining good relationships, encouragement, high expectations,
and support. The managerial functions which were reported to
complement these qualitative behaviors were preparation, goal-
setting, and establishing performance standards. Bossert, et al.
(1982) concluded that more data on daily managerial processes
must be collected and analyzed to learn the impact on
instruction.
Bossert, et al. (1982) also pointed to the literature on
change and innovation for specific school managerial behaviors as
a starting point for further research on coordination and
control. In developing their list of behaviors, the following
were included:
1. direction of funds associated with instruction
2. control of scheduling staff meetings
3. appointment of staff to specific committees
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4. public rewards
5. protection of teachers
6. public acceptance of a program
7. control of the flow of program information inside and
outside the school
8. limit competition between programs
9. lobbying for administrative support for program
10. promotion of programs outside school
Such a list of daily activities is a significant
contribution to the literature on instructional influencing
activities, for it moves beyond the broad conceptual categories
and formal bureaucratic policies towards specific, managerial
tasks related to curriculum and instruction. Bossert, et al.
(1982) further argued that principals should not perform these
managerial activities in a random fashion or on an ad hoc basis,
but rather in a systematic manner towards a desired goal of
improving curriculum and instruction. This suggests that
researchers need to analyze both the long and short-term effects
of structure on each of these activities.
Summary and Implications of Hierarchical Control
The review of the structural analyses has revealed, however
unintentionally, alternative managerial processes and qualitative
behaviors. Ironically, these untested, "qualitative" influences
of specific managerial processes signal the most far-reaching
contribution of structural analyses. As yet, none of the
findings of "mediating" variables such as tenure (Applewhite,
1965), informal verbal communications (Hannaway & Sproull, 1978-
79, Sproull, 1981), information processors (Sproull, 1981), the
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institutional model (Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983), "exchange
processes" (Cohen & Miller, 1980), or social control (Eisenhardt,
1985), among others, was found to be empirically tested within
school settings. Each of these variables emerged as alternative
or complementary explanations after the original hypothesized
structure was found to be inadequate. These implied, residual
variables were then incorporated into a revised conception, often
resulting in a new dichotomy between the structural-frequency
measures and qualitative variables. In short, the empirical and
subjective reality of control, as with organizations themselves,
turned out to be far more complex than could be measured by using
formal structures alone.
At present, support for qualitative behaviors and their
control effect is more intuitive than empirical. Even where
empirical evidence has been reported, the linkages between theory
and data must be considered weak. Social control is said to
minimize preferences among organizational members (Eisenhardt,
1985; Scott & Scott, 1971). The concept lends support for the
institutional paradigm over a managerial model (Meyer, Scott &
Deal, 1983). Through social control, organizational members
cooperate towards achieving organizational goals because they
understand and have internalized these goals (Eisenhardt, 1985).
According to Crowson & Morris (1985) and Tannenbaum, et al.,
(1974), even hierarchical controls parallel norms of
organizational loyalty and identification, placing a premium on
mutual trust, individual initiative, and socialization. It is
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this shared belief system as well as the structural relationships
which seem to characterize school controls (Etzioni, 1965; Scott,
1983; Wilson & Firestone, 1987).
Managerial research strongly suggests that control processes
operate on the level of technology as "a guide to action"
(Vickers, 1967, p. 29). Support for classroom teacher level data
sources was found in many of the studies, particularly in Andrews
(1987) and in Cohen, Deal, Meyer, & Scott (1979). Wellisch, et
al. (1978) combined principal with teacher responses. Although
the perspectives of superordinates and subordinates differ within
organizations (Abbott, 1975; Deal & Cellotti, 1980; Duke, 1982),
the substantive, as well as methodological, issues of combining
data sources is unresolved. Nevertheless, more consideration
ought to be given to empirical findings which include, rather
than ignore, classroom teacher data.
There are some major difficulties in synthesizing control
research, particularly the limitations of measures relating
performance to both structural and qualitative behaviors, and the
idiosyncratic use of organizational process terms. In most of
the studies cited, the findings resulted from evidence based on a
single structural entity defined as a causal indicator of
control. Although these limitations are not unique to the
concept of control, the close association of control with formal
organizational structures increases the likelihood of further
continuing this confusion.
The most frequent request for further investigations echoes
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the need to specify the nature and structure of daily managerial
processes (Bossert, et al., 1982; Cawelti, 1987a; 1987b; Ogawa &
Hart, 1985; Pfeffer, 1978a). Koontz (1971) understood this need
for specificity. In his managerial control framework, control
mechanisms were to be tailored to jobs, plans, individuals and
organizational needs (p. 84). Bossert et al. (1982) concluded
that "informal controls by network peers and by the
organization's culture as well as incentive systems related to
promotions and evaluation can shape principal behavior" (p. 53).
In narrowing the scope of control, however, care must be
taken not to focus exclusively on those tasks where control can
be established, thereby diverting attention away from other
important organizational processes (Vickers, 1967, p. 28-29).
The effect of this diversion would limit (1) the behavioral
impact of the information on both the decision-makers and other
organizational participants, (2) the relative distribution of
information, specialization, and expertise within professional
organizations, and (3) the interrelationship between control over
information and other organizational control mechanisms, such as
standards, evaluations, and incentives. Within school buildings,
the same individual must often play the roles of both controller
and decision-maker. Thus, the formal separation of control
functions from organizational processes is too artificial -
especially within the active task domain of curriculum and
instruction. In short, any narrowing of the technical conception
of control would tend to ignore the function of decision-making
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as a pragmatic organizational necessity (Hofstede, 1978) and as
an individual need (E. Langer, 1983).
Pfeffer (1978a) noted that the structuralists started out
with a rational, normative view of organizational control and
with the belief that those organizations which deviated least
from the norm were the most effective. What their own research
studies found, however, were variations based on size,
technology, and stability which contributed to a revised view of
organizations as more complex than originally thought. Many
organizational researchers have still continued to ignore the
implications of complexity by remaining bound to rational
prototypes and normative prescriptions (Deal, 1987). Deal (1987)
and others have called for the systematic use of nonrational,
political, and cultural findings in order to better understand
the nature of organizations and organizational behavior (Bolman &
Deal, 1984; Patterson, Purkey, & Parker, 1986). Before that task
can be successfully accomplished, however, a broader review of
social science literature is needed to further substantiate the
behavioral control indicators which influence school-level
performance.
Review of Related Literature: Part II
Beyond Structure: Disciplns TersadClure
From the review of organizational structure, it is evident
that the concept of control extends beyond structural variables.
Ironically, most of the control factors which are analyzed within
social science discussions of control have been reported under
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the conclusions or implications of structural analyses.
Unfortunately, the segmenting of control theories across academic
disciplines has created substantive and methodological
difficulties for a synthesis. No single comprehensive framework
emerges. As a result, the various discipline-directed models,
based on natural sciences, seem to be evolving into diagnostic
(M. Harrison, 1987) and ethnographic descriptions of
organizations and organizational behaviors (Lincoln, 1985).
In effect, the search for meaning has taken precedence over
the reporting of statistical significance (Kirk & Miller, 1986).
Today, organizational research has become both an art form as
well as rigorous methodology. New directions are not only
derivative of previous investigations, but, in the minds of some,
represent a new beginning (Lincoln, 1985). This new cultural and
symbolic emphasis has the tone of high drama and adventure with
its imaginative metaphors and literary style (Lightfoot, 1986).
There has been a perceptible shift in language, tone, and
frameworks away from closed systems' models and theories towards
increased references to open, institutional frameworks based on
subjective, qualitative, and cultural aspects of behavior and
thinking (Ames & Ames, 1987; Astuto & Clark; 1985, Deal, 1987;
Erickson, 1988; M. Harrison, 1987; Sergiovanni, 1987; Wilson &
Firestone, 1987). Rather than predicting outcomes, the focus is
on rich descriptions and meanings (Patterson, Purkey, & Parker,
1986).
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The shift from social scientific models to systematic
cultural analyses suggests that there exist certain underlying
and meaningful qualities, more fundamental than those revealed
through structural analysis. The goal, ultimately, is to
integrate cultural diversity, nonrational political descriptions,
and work fragmentation with practical and specific control
indicators in order to improve understanding and managerial
performance.
Political Control
Political discussions offer a number of potent alternative
explanations which complement the study of power within formal
authority structures (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982; Baldridge, 1971;
Dornbusch & Scott, 1975). Whereas organizational structures
tended to foster closed systems' thinking, political perspectives
impose an open systems' logic (Baldrigde, 1971; R. Campbell, et
al., 1985; Thompson, 1967; Wirt & Kirst, 1982). "A political
approach to organizations implies a multidirectional image of
power, and this means an emphasis on influence apart from, as
well as in the context of, the authority structure" (Bacharach &
Lawler, 1982, p. 42).
R. Campbell, et al., (1985) have developed a complex,
political typology to analyze school control. Their framework
includes seven interrelated control elements:
(1) demographic control elements which describe the number,
character, and cultural values of participants;
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(2) legal control elements that describe the role of state
and federal levels;
(3) structural control elements which include the levels of
organization and formal roles;
(4) ideation control elements which reflect concepts and
purposes;
(5) knowledge control elements based on information and
expertise;
(6) financial control elements which analyze the resources
(local, state, and federal); and,
(7) network control elements that discuss the relationships
among each of the above elements.
The control elements "reside both in the institution - a
school or school district - and in the environment in which the
institution exists. The many interactions between institution
and environment, make the open systems concept a useful one" (pp.
445-446). In particular, network control provides vertical and
horizontal perspectives within which all the control elements
"evolve into countless combinations and variations" (p. 443).
The nature of political control is linked to three expansive
dynamics: (1) the concept of influence, (2) incremental decision-
making, and (3) the interactions among organizational actors and
groups. What differentiates these expansive views from the
constrained closed systems' perspective is their relationship to
the larger institutional environment (R. Campbell, et al., 1985;
Meyer & Scott, 1983; Pfeffer, 1978a).
The concept ,of influence.
The abstract concepts, power and influence, have been of
keen interest to observers of organizational behavior (Bacharach
& Lawler, 1982; Cartwright, 1965; Etzioni, 1965; Lerbinger, 1965;
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Pfeffer, 1978a). Unfortunately, the definitions in use of these
concepts are so unclear as to preclude valid comparisons across
different studies and settings (Cartwright, 1965; Krislov, 1983,
p. 57). In ordinary, common usage, the distinction between power
and influence appears to be quite simple. The former reflects
the role or position of an individual in an organization. Thus,
holders of public office and those in positions with formal line
authority are said to hold power. Others who are not in offices
with formal authority, but who offer ideas and advice may be said
to exert influence. Power is, therefore, directly associated
with formal authority structures; influence with other
organizational patterns, such as informal structures (Bacharch,
1981, p. 34; Cartwright, 1965; Lerbinger, 1965).
Structural analyses focused on formal authority structures.
Within this circumscribed, and often normative, framework, power
was viewed as a function of the formal organizational hierarchy
and unambiguously written into the rules and polices of the
organization (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982, pp. 38-39; Cartwright,
1965, p. 2). However, when organizations have been perceived
through a political framework, the dynamics of power and
influence are considered more complex than simply formal
authority and hierarchy (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982, p. 7). Within
the political framework, the concept of influence emerges as
something not found in the rules or directives from superiors
(Cartwright, 1965, p. 2).
According to Lerbinger (1965), influence is a better concept
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than power; it is "a powerful sentiment, an idea, a code that is
honored and valued; it is an intangible that can result in
tangible performance; it is a rich concept invested with a heavy
burden" (p. 255). Influence is also persuasive, which implies
voluntary submission (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982, p. 12). Based on
previous studies, Cartwright (1965) reported five types of
influence. Of the five, persuasion was ranked highest, followed
by manipulation. This peculiar juxtaposition of persuasion and
manipulation would seem to highlight much of the confusion
associated with the concept of political influence. Namely,
unlike pejoratively used terms, such as manipulation or control,
persuasion holds a "special moral status" (Burnell & Reeve,
1984).
Power, of course, has been defined more broadly than just
formal authority, hierarchical relationships, and coercion.
French & Raven (1978) defined power in terms of its influence on
individual actions or change. Their now classical bases of power
identified reward, coercion, legitimacy, reference, and
expertise. In empirical studies, French & Raven reported
evidence that both reward and coercive power were highly
dependent upon others within the organization: rewards tended to
increase attraction between individuals on different
organizational levels, lowering the resistance to change;
coercion had the opposite effects, especially when not perceived
as legitimate, that is, it decreased attraction among
individuals, increasing the resistance to change. Of the five
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bases, referent power, defined as the identification and mutual
admiration of individuals on different levels, had the broadest
range since it could potentially erase gaps between
organizational actors. Alternatively, Bachman, et al. (1968)
reported that expert power was most positively related to
Tannenbaum's global definition of "total control."
A limitation of the French & Raven framework was that it
delimited the definition of power strictly to forces resulting in
change. "By this definition, the influence of 0 (social agent)
does not include P's (person) own forces nor the forces induced
by other social agents" (French & Raven, 1978, p. 199). This not
only raises a question of observable change versus psychological
change, but it also ignores a tactical problem whereby "the most
effective strategy may not always be able to pull the trigger"
(Hakel, et al., 1985, p. 46.). Cartwright (1965) described a
restricted view of power where one just looks at the effects upon
overt behavior while ignoring the effects upon attitudes,
beliefs, and motives (p. 24). In contrast, the permissive view
not only accommodates overt change, but it also permits analyses
of internal and attitudinal preconditions for change.
Bacharach & Lawler (1982) further criticized French &
Raven's model as being more closely aligned with authority and
hierarchy than with the broader, dynamic concept of influence
(pp. 36-44). They viewed French & Raven's emphasis to be on
intra-organizational dynamics, while totally ignoring influence
patterns originating at institutional levels. Even with the
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inclusion of information, as a sixth base of power (Bacharach &
Lawler, 1982, p. 33), the French & Raven analysis of the bases of
power was said to confuse 'causes' of power relationships with
characteristics of power holders (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982, p.
34)
Bacharach & Lawler (1982) have offered an alternative
framework based on four sources of power: office or structural
position, personal characteristics (charisma, leadership),
expertise, and opportunity (p. 35). In their conception,
authority was based solely on position, while influence was to be
found within the other three sources (pp. 36-37). In short, the
focus of political analyses shifted from closed authority
structures to the expansive realm of influence (Bacharach &
Lawler, 1982, p. 44).
A different conceptualization of power was suggested by
Pfeffer (1978a; 1978b). In his scheme, power was based on (1)
the possession of or ability to control critical resources, (2)
the control of or access to information and information channels,
(3) the ability to cope with uncertainty, and (4) organizational
size. Elsewhere, Pfeffer (1978b) added formal authority to his
list of power determinants (p. 16). Pfeffer also identified
internal and external political variables, such as laws,
socialization, and selection procedures (Pfeffer, 1978a, p.
48ff).
Etzioni (1965) offered yet another approach to the
conceptions of power and influence. He categorized organizations
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according to three power structures, while viewing structure as a
function of control. Thus, within certain organizations,
coercive power (i.e., the threat of physical sanctions)
predominated; in others, remunerative power (i.e., control of
material resources and rewards) predominated; and, in still other
organizations, normative power (i.e., control of symbolic rewards
and individuals' identification with the organization)
predominated (p. 651). This typology subsumed formal, authority
structures primarily within coercive and remunerative type
organizations, whereas influence was most widely utilized within
identitive organizations (p. 659). Further, Etzioni's typology
linked compliance more closely to formal control structure rather
than to influence and informal structures. From such linkages,
however, it might be implied that compliance ought to occur less
often in identitive organizations than in either coercive or
remunerative type organizations. What is more likely, however,
is that interactive political dynamics (e.g., compromise,
negotiations, and bargaining) are more visible in identitive
organizations. Organizational complexity can be seen more
clearly in such organizations. Therefore, the use of measures of
deviation between standards and performance are less precise and
more problematic.
Political analysts explicitly state that limiting the issue
to organizational structural components is too simplistic
(Baldridge, 1971). Thus, it is through their empirical
descriptions that the political analyses have made their major
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contributions to organizational theory. Nevertheless, political
scientists offer little empirical data to support their
distinctions between power, control, and influence (Krislov,
1983, p. 57). Many political analysts stress the need for
clearer understanding and more consistent use of socio-political
concepts (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982; Pfeffer, 1978a). In a recent
multi-state study of school control and autonomy, the authors
linked authority with persuasion, while the definition of power
was delimited to only those actions followed by either rewards or
punishments (Floden, et al., 1988). Such idiosyncratic
definitions make it nearly impossible to judge the validity of
research findings.
Decision-making.
Decision-making has been given special prominence in
organizational analyses (Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1957). Empirical
research on decision-making revealed a distinction between
normative, rational, closed systems models and descriptive
processes. There is convincing evidence to support the view that
decision-makers rely on incomplete knowledge and information
(Lindblom, 1959), rather than on perfect and complete information
based on unlimited resources (Dye, 1984, p. 32).
The alternative decision-making model has been labelled
incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959). The incremental model arises
out of conflict and the consideration of contingencies, two
pivotal political dynamics. Although the distinction between
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mental and action phases (Mann, 1975; Mintzberg, et al., 1976)
are still maintained, incremental processes hold that only some,
not all, alternatives and consequences need to be considered.
Relatively few policy alternatives are outlined. The analytical
process of incrementalism is comparative, pragmatic, and
systematic, not theoretically dependent. And, instead of making
all possible comparisons, the incremental model compares
alternatives based on past experience before making a selection.
Moreover, most social values are disregarded and are not ranked
by priority. Lastly, characteristic of all human processes, the
incremental model "expects to repeat endlessly the sequence just
described" (Lindblom, 1959).
Parallel concepts to the increment model may be found within
early control theories, particularly Frank's (1958-59) analysis
of conflicting standards and selective enforcement found within
Soviet industry. Frank replaced the notion of formal rationality
(i.e., rational calculation) with substantive rationality (i.e.,
referring to the achievement of a task, regardless of the means
employed). Instead of directives and close supervision, Frank
defined control in terms of "sensitivity and responsiveness to
superiors' objectives." Similarly, Miles & Vergin (1966)
suggested an alternative to the normative, "absolute levels of
performance" called variance control, which measured the
"variation of performance from period to period." This measure
would permit individuals to gauge performance within an
acceptable range, or mean level of performance. It would also
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allow organizational members some freedom to set their own
performance goals within limits. Control variance further
recognized that there are situations beyond one's control for
which decisions and judgments are made. This loose coupling
measure provided room for a freedom to fail (Miles & Vergin,
1966).
Indeed, within a political framework, all organizational
processes are limited by constraints (Katz & Kahn, 1978) as well
as by dynamic factors, such as timing, scheduling, and feedback
(Mintzberg, et al., 1976). The ideal, optimum conditions posited
by rational theory or sterile conditions created only in
laboratory settings cannot be applied with confidence to actual
organizational processes. Thus, a valid theory of control cannot
be purely rational (i.e., perfect or complete) or purely
scientific (i.e., certain and objective). Rather, the theory and
practice of control must be based on probability limits (Patz &
Rowe, 1977, p. 269), flexibility (Patz & Rowe, 1977, pp. 66-73),
tentative assumptions (Vickers, 1967) and uncertainty.
Ultimately, decision-making is an active process in which
"authority, power, and influence interact with the encouragement
of dissenting views to achieve the degree of control that is
needed" (Clark, 1988, p. 191).
Key actors andgroups and their linkages,
According to Pfeffer (1978a), the study of organizational
politics revolves around key actors and their interaction across
83
the hierarchy. It is the political framework that directs
attention outward from the technical core to encompass the
general public, interest groups, political leaders, textbook
publishers, standardized test publishers, the media, university
professors, professional organizations, school boards and
superintendents, as well as school-level administrators and
teacher groups (Clark, 1988, 179ff; Wirt & Kirst, 1982; Kirst,
1984)
The identification and description of these key actors
occupy a central focus in political analyses. Unfortunately, the
description is not a straightforward task since it is difficult
to separate objective analysis from a discussion of the relative
influence among actors. The very notions of fluid participation
(Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) and intra-organizational coalitions
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1982) as well as the more common political
concepts of conflict, bargaining, and negotiations (Baldridge,
1971) seem to imply that the descriptions of actors cannot be
drawn in fixed, structural terms.
A number of theorists have proposed models of interacting
and autonomous zones (Hanson, 1981; Hoy & Miskel, 1982, p. 280ff;
Lortie, 1965). At the school-building level, Hanson (1981) tried
to unravel the complexities originally described by Lortie's
(1965) interactive school control typology. Hanson's objective
was to study the interplay of semi-professional teachers and
school bureaucracy. Bidwell (1965), Lortie (1969), Etzioni
(1965), and Dornbusch & Scott (1975) have all agreed that
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teachers are semi-professional in that they are subordinate to
the administrative framework and have less autonomy than
professionals who participate in deciding entry and selection
criteria.
Hanson's (1981) findings of interconnecting zones were based
on a small sample of five schools in which he compared
hierarchical control with collegial control by looking at common
school processes. Using intensive interview data, Hanson
described a model of interacting spheres among administrators and
teachers. In all the schools sampled, he found three zones: an
administrative zone, a teachers' zone, and an overlapping
contested zone. Within each of the three zones was (a)
structured and unstructured controls, (b) formal and informal
processes, (c) subcoalitions, and (d) autonomy. Each zone was
constrained by externally imposed limits: for example, the
administrative zone was constrained by state legislatures,
courts, and school boards; the teacher zone was constrained by
principals and school rules; while the contested zone was
constrained by the interaction of administrators and teachers.
Charters (1981) defined control structure as the
relationship between those individuals who have formal authority
for a decision with those individuals whose behavior is affected
by that formal authority. Even though the units of analysis are
population groups (input and output populations), the definition
of control is fundamentally structural, and not concerned with
processes, efficiency, or compliance. When members of the input
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population were also members of the output population, then the
decision was participatory; if only teachers were involved with
both populations, the decision was collegial. Discretion was not
part of control structure since it entailed neither interpersonal
processes nor organizational provisions.
Charters (1981) reported that the populations involved in
core technology tasks varied by tasks, substantive issues, and
time. For example, lesson planning and the choice of materials
were in the hands of teachers; principals determined class
grouping; and, school-wide or district-wide personnel selected
texts. Over time, Charters found that collegial decisions
increased, whereas principal and shared decisions decreased. An
exception was that principal decisions were higher at larger
schools. Although Charters concluded that controls differed by
levels (p. 309), the whole system was affected (loosely or
otherwise) by the shifts in control populations (p. 308).
Some school organizational theorists and political analysts
have suggested that building level analysis is the most
significant for managerial control (Bossert et al., 1982; Clark,
1988). Hanson (1981) stated that "[t]he principal is the one who
usually interprets the directives and constraints coming down
from the central office, the state legislature, the community and
so on" (p. 255). Moreover, according to Hanson (1981), the
principals' use of informal management tactics can enhance the
teachers' concept of professionalism since administrators are
"keepers of intrinsic rewards" (p. 268). Bacharach (1981)
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defined work processes as "patterns of behavior associated with
the conduct of organizational work. Essentially work process
variables depict behavior of an actor in various aspects of his
work" (p. 28). Bacharach & Lawler (1982) focused on intra-
organizational coalitions as the key unit of political analysis.
The description of key actors and groups eventually arrives
at the question of their relative influence. "In a very real
sense, it makes little difference what the secretary of education
says works, what the governor includes in his program, or what
the school board adopts for the district administration to
implement, if (author's emphasis) none of these actions affects
what happens between the teacher and the student" (Clark, 1988,
pp. 178-79). "[A]lthough the district level of leadership is
important for thinking about policy, providing support for
curriculum improvement, ensuring material support for school-
level work, and monitoring the process of school change, the work
of curriculum change is logically the work of teachers and
administrators in schools and classrooms (Griffin, 1988, p. 244).
The boundaries of organizational influence invariably
stretch beyond the technical core levels of the organization out
to the managerial and institutional levels (Thompson, 1967).
By extending the boundaries of organizations, the political open-
systems' model increases the complexity (R. Campbell, et al.,
1985) and, invariably, the level of conflict within the
organizational environment. For some, the conflicts among
organizational levels are considered to be irreconcilable
87
(Goldman, 1983, p. 337). Most political ideologies, however,
accept the dynamics of shared beliefs (Scott, 1983, p. 14),
bargaining, and negotiations (Baldridge, 1971) which underlie
organizational structures. Meyer, Scott & Deal (1983, p. 45)
reported high levels of satisfaction among teachers and between
teachers and school administrators across districts. The level
of satisfaction, however, dropped dramatically with respect to
processes of evaluation, instruction, communication, and
participation (p. 57).
Principals face an obvious dilemma. Boundary-spanning
activities such as information acquisition, physical input
control, and interface (Jemison, 1984) increase principals'
influence over strategic decisions (Jemison, 1984) and teacher
loyalty (Johnston & Venable, 1986). Yet, at the same time,
boundary-spanning activities have been found to detract from the
managerial functions of principals (Leiter, 1983). Hills (1963)
and Leiter (1983) found that principals who represented their
schools' interests to higher organizational levels pay a price in
terms of their perceived managerial (within-building)
performance. What may account for the high correlation with
teacher loyalty (Johnston & Venable, 1986) is that in these
external interactions, principals are expected and perceived to
support and protect teachers and pupils from the environmental
network.
Hills (1963) analyzed the representative leadership role
using two measures: the procurement of funds and resources from
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above and the disposal of resources. Not surprisingly, the
results showed a positive correlation between disposal with total
procurement. Hills then asked how this correlation affected
perceptions relating to (a) teacher morale, (b) principal's
effectiveness, (c) teacher satisfaction, (d) teacher confidence
in leadership of principal, and (e) supervisors rating of
principals' effectiveness. Based on a non-random, self-selected
sample of 53 principals and 872 elementary school teachers, the
results indicated tentative support for the hypothesis that
representative functions take away from managerial functions.
In a more definitive manner, Leiter (1983) reported that the
principal's boundary spanning activities resulted in teacher
dissatisfaction and disruption at the technical core levels.
Thus, there are findings of conflict as well as consensus
among key school actors which have led theorists to support
different organizational paradigms. Whereas Meyer & Rowan (1977)
hypothesized that formal structure and technical core activity
were loosely coupled, Leiter (1983) argued that teachers have not
sufficiently mastered the technology of teaching to permit solo
practice. If the latter view is even partially correct, the need
for improving managerial control is essential.
Summary and i mlications of poiticlonr.
A major debt is owed political theorists for their
identification and description of an empirical reality left
hidden by normative, rational theories of organizations,
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processes, and participants. Joining the notions of cooperation
and harmony are the political dynamics of struggle, conflict, and
negotiations (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982, p. 5). The shift in
analyses from formal structures of power to influence dynamics
presents an organizational reality that is complex, interactive,
non-linear, and multidirectional (R. Campbell, et al., 1985).
Yet empirical investigations of power and influence are still
lacking (Krislov, 1983).
Political theorists have offered diverse research units of
analysis, ranging from informal groups (Cartwright, 1965) and
interest groups, to coalitions (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982,
Pfeffer, 1978a) and institutional-environmental factors (R.
Campbell, et al., 1985; Meyer & Scott, 1983). Organizational
processes such as information, communication, and evaluation
(Pfeffer, 1978a,b), and incremental decision-making (Lindblom,
1959, Thompson, 1967) have been offered to explain the complexity
of the interactions.
The acknowledgement that politics is important, however,
does not make everything worthy of political investigation.
Typically, complex political typologies leave unresolved the
issue of relative influence among the institutional and
environmental control elements (R. Campbell, et al., 1985, p.
446), particularly at the technical core level on which
management functions. The lack of discriminant criteria for
inclusion of variables places significant limitations on future
theory-building. Multiple, discrete factors are difficult to
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organize and interpret. Moreover, the dynamic processes of
political analyses are often too general to apply to specific day
to day factors (Pfeffer, 1978a).
The control-autonomy dichotomy itself, an implicit
assumption of many control theories, may not be appropriate to
curriculum and instruction or instructional leadership (Floden,
et al., 1988). That is, the complexity of these technological
relationships may preclude either total control or autonomy for
either building administrators or teachers. As early as 1971,
Eye, Netzer, and Krey had proposed alternative measures of
operational patterns (i.e., interpersonal relations). They
recognized, as had Charters (1981), that pure autonomy/discretion
was not control, rather that control was one aspect of the larger
managerial process. As alternative control measures, Eye, et al.
(1971) suggested the following: regular, continuing,
systematized, and scheduled scrutiny of curricula (p. 322);
standardized procedures for selecting, organizing, and proceeding
with known recurring tasks such as textbook selection (p. 323);
standard operating procedures for coordinating school and non-
school programs; functional knowledge of instructional aids and
materials; evidence of long range plans for evaluation of
curricular and design for change (p. 324). These interpersonal
characteristics of consistency, regularity, and clarity, however,
were presented as alternative mediating variables, and still
await further empirical testing.
Descriptions of complex external phenomena are necessary,
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but do not suffice. Bacharach (1981) has called for the merging
of the broader political realm with the more confined
organizational or administrative domain. He argued that "we
need to examine the mechanisms of linkage between these various
levels of government and the processes of policy transference,
policy supervision, and the institutionalization of federal and
state mandates by local districts (p. 26)."
This view was advanced further by Bacharach and Lawler
(1982) who have taken the political realities of struggle,
conflict, and lack of consensus (p. 5) and applied them to a
micro-level, intra-organizational analysis. This shift towards
micro-level analysis is certainly consistent with numerous other
bodies of research on effective schools, implementation theory,
and cultural and symbolic leadership.
Descriptive analysis of complex tasks such as curriculum and
instruction need to incorporate political personhood. Whereas
political analysis has opened the door to non-normative
heuristics, the next step should be to address daily managerial
interactions and a concern for workers' general well-being
(Argyris & Schon, 1982; Tannenbaum, et al., 1974).
Organizational work life is not just a matter of hierarchy and
authority. Western thought places a high value on the subjective
aspect of personal development and growth in the analyses of
controls (Myers, 1981; Patz & Rowe, 1977; Schein, 1972; Scott &
Scott, 1971; Skinner, 1966; Vickers, 1967). Thus, from the
external realities of politics have come managerial processes
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Miles & Vergin, 1966), communication and on-going assessment (Eye,
et al., 1971), and, information and evaluation systems (Pfeffer,
1978a, Sproull, 1981). The investigation can now proceed towards
the internalization of social norms (Coser, 1982, p.18) to self-
control (E. Langer, 1983) as a completion of the internalization
process.
Social Control
The concept of social control has its roots in sociological
theories emerging at the turn of the century (Coser, 1982). As a
normative concept, social control seeks to maintain the structure
of society. In this respect, it constitutes conservative
mechanisms which a society uses over individuals to enforce
conformity to norms and values (Schein, Schneier, & Barker, 1961;
Coser, 1982, p. 13). As sociological analyses have evolved,
social controls, such as laws and rules, have shed their limited
external (i.e., political) status by entering the realm of human
nature. The new social control descriptions based on internal,
unobservable constructs, however, have been beset by imprecise
language, methodological problems, and "unexplained phenomena"
(Coser, 1982, p. 14). Nevertheless, through social experiences,
a reflexive concept of self has emerged (p. 15) as the external
world merges with the human psyche (p. 14) to form a socio-
psychological dimension.
The internalization process begins in social experiences.
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The social context and behaviors of others act as forces of
conformity. The strength of social controls varies depending
upon many factors, among them formal structures, socialization
processes, and rewards and punishments. Each of these factors
has the potential to elevate or lower individual performance,
depending, in turn, upon the values, ideas, and behaviors of
others. Sociologists are then faced with the question of whether
the effects of these factors contribute to a normative concept of
what ought to be or whether they should simply describe the
factors and their effects in ethically neutral terms (Meier,
1982).
In structural analysis, behavior is predominantly a function
of the organizations' authority structure. More specifically, it
views hierarchy and the demands of technology as the principal
causes of behavior. Political analysts broadened the causal
factors beyond the formal structures and technical core
boundaries by identifying institutional processes, key
participants, and environmental influences. But neither
structural analysis nor the political dynamics were comprehensive
enough, if not perhaps always appropriate for educational
institutions (Etzioni, 1965; Scott & Scott, 1971, p. 216). Both
formal mechanisms of authority and power relationships excluded
references to the internalization processes, viz., social
control. Moreover, the structural and political reliance on
empirical, observable phenomena prevented them from directly
analyzing internal, subjective, and qualitative variables.
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All social controls have external determinants and, in this
sense, are empirical. In organizational settings, the
determinants manifest themselves in collective, group situations
that occur within social relationships, customs, work habits, and
roles (Scott & Scott, 1971, pp. 191-224). Their evolvement into
social control functions may be linked primarily to two
organizational processes: participation (Smith & Tannenbaum,
1963; Coch & French, 1978) and interaction (Argyris & Schon,
1982, pp. 206-207 notes; Bacharach & Lawler, 1982, p. 16). Both
processes can affect behavior: for example, participation is said
to lower resistance to change (Coch & French, 1978), whereas
interactions affect perceptions of others, self, and situations
(Argyris & Schon, 1982, p. 207 note). Participation and
interaction have quantitative measures related to their frequency
and regularity as well as qualitative measures related to their
behavioral impact on attitudes and beliefs. In order to
understand the relationship between external and internal
determinants of social control, we first need to focus on two
issues: (1) the general theory of sociological influence (i.e.,
the concept of social control itself) and (2) social control
processes which contribute to the internalization of externally
imposed controls.
The term social control is often used as a general category
in which non-observable, non-structural (Eisenhardt, 1985), non-
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legal (Lortie, 1969), non-genetic (Burnstein, 1982), and other
problematic explanations of behavior have all been
indistinguishably grouped together. Obviously, the greater the
internalization, the less observable are its measures (French &
Raven, 1978). Strict empiricists, logical positivists, and
behavioral psychologists have all rejected internal constructs
which they pejoratively label as "metaphysical" (Ayer, 1952;
Ryle, 1969; Skinner, 1966; Quine, 1961). Some sociologists
attempt to escape from metaphysics by linking social control only
to observable phenomena, such as organizational effectiveness
(Meier, 1982). In so doing, psychological evidence of prior
conditions for individual acceptance (Black, 1970; French &
Raven, 1978; Locke, 1977) are ignored.
Although the term social control appears frequently in
diverse research literatures, it is often used inconsistently
(Coser, 1982) or, simply left undefined (Eisenhardt, 1985).
Scott and Scott (1971) stated that all social control is
experienced within social relationships (p. 197). The authors
further defined social control as "positive interstimulation" not
just a "restriction of action" (p. x). They traced six sources
of social control: (1) political and economic power dynamics, (2)
genetics, (3) language, (4) relationships, (5) role differences,
and (6) collective roles. Except for genetic factors, such as
ability and adaptability, each of these sources emphasized the
mutuality inherent in social control (p. 1, 210).
Scott and Scott (1971) were aware of the limitations of
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their definition, both as a sociological concept apart from
psychology, and also as it relates to change and development.
For example, they noted that collective roles as a source of
social control were less emotionally satisfying than unique roles
in meeting an individual's subjective needs (p. 197). As regards
to social control as a change strategy, the authors found
empirical evidence for generational change which occurs over a
long period of time (pp. 205-207) as opposed to short-term
changes. Moreover, the mutuality which is central to social
control conflicts with the notion of impersonal, organizational
control, resulting in a paradox. That is, there is more freedom
in impersonal control (e.g., freedom from close supervision) than
in mutual control; but, that impersonal controls lead to feelings
of alienation and powerlessness (pp. 211-213). Thus, social
control raises a practical, administrative problem, namely, how
to provide maximum feelings of satisfaction along with maximum
effectiveness (p. 215).
An innovation in the conceptual definition of social control
was offered by Gibbs (1982). He wrote that "social control is an
attempt by one or more individuals (the first party in either
case) to manipulate the behavior of one or more other party
individuals (the second party in either case) through still
another individual or individuals (the third party in either
case) by means other than a chain of command" (p. 86). Gibbs'
definition excludes direct interactive control and organizational
hierarchy from social control. Although the definition seems to
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include intentionality (i.e., manipulate), the issues of overt
behavior and change are subsumed under the "attempt,"
Gibbs' definition raises a number of other questions
pertaining to the means by which social control influence people.
The deliberate absence of any reference to standards (p. 88)
would seen to permit either coercion or persuasion to be
considered as legitimate means of social control. There is also
no mention of whether the social control effort must be effective
(i.e., successful) or not. The necessary role of a third party
further complicates the relationship of social control to
cultural norms and deeply held individual values.
In spite of these unresolved questions, there still appear
to be some characteristics common to most definitions of social
control. First, it is used as a cohesive force that minimizes
diverse, political preferences within a system (Eisenhardt, 1985;
Gibbs, 1982). Secondly, the mutual aspect of social control
tends to steer the concept between the extreme views of total
freedom or total control. Total freedom implies no social
control whatsoever, while total control eliminates the mutual
dependence and interaction between individuals. Thirdly, since
norms and values are relatively stable and difficult to change,
social control mechanisms are tilted in a conservative direction.
Conversely, social control has been thought to have proactive
qualities which encourage restructuring, programmatic innovation,
political and social dynamics, and personal growth, learning, and
development (Black, 1970; Lawler & Rhode, 1976; Lortie, 1969;
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Patz & Rowe, 1977; Vickers, 1967).
Support for any of these common characteristics of social
control has been stronger suppositionally than empirically. In
fact, empirical support comes primarily from research studies
which have identified the limitations of structural and
organizational explanations and models (Eisenhardt, 1985; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983). The implications of
social control, however, have been based in part on the use of a
single factor or variable, such as formal policy in order to
explain residual behaviors. Since a single entity cannot fully
explain behaviors, cohesive explanations, such as "small
societies" (Elmore, 1987), and institutional frameworks (Meyer,
Scott, & Deal, 1983) have been offered, with empirical
measurement support originating within group behaviors and norms.
Social control: Processes.
A review of managerial processes associated with social
control is obviously hampered by the lack of conceptual
specificity. Nonetheless, managerial behaviors which relate to
the common characteristics (cohesion, moderation, conservatism,
innovation, and personal growth) of social control should offer
some insight to its operational indicators. What distinguishes
social control from either structural or political control is the
transformation from external mechanisms to internally accepted
means of control.
Bidwell (1965) noted that in school organizations,
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bureaucratic elements were of a "rudimentary nature" (p. 974)
and, hence, provided, at best "a partial solution to the problems
of internal coordination." Therefore, he added the concept
"control with communication" as a central organizational process
(p. 1014). He agreed with Blau & Scott (1962, pp. 51-56) that
professional norms and collegiality conflicted with legal-
bureaucratic functions of schools (Bidwell, 1965, p. 1012); thus,
there was a need to increase professional discretion and
judgment, particularly in the non-routine areas of curriculum and
instruction (pp. 976, 1004).
Lortie (1969), too, developed a social control typology.
Lortie added to the organization's hierarchy both teacher
autonomy and collegiality as determinants of behavior. In
addition, he considered selection-socialization processes as
subtle social control mechanisms used in education (p. 10).
Lortie (1969) distinguished between two kinds of rules, hard
and soft. He linked the use of soft rules (e.g., suggestions,
not commands or orders) to the areas of curriculum and
instruction. These soft rules would replace close or frequent
supervision. Etzioni (1965) found that the more effective
socialization and goal congruence, the less need for supervision.
Yet the reliance on socialization could be reduced with greater
emphasis given to selectivity (pp. 655, 657).
Similar findings had emerged from the structural analysis of
technology. Mahoney & Frost (1977) reported that for reciprocal
tasks i. ., complex, interdependent tasks such as in curriculum
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and instruction) committees and staff development activities were
preferable to supervision. Meyer and Rowan (1977) even argued
that formal evaluation procedures reduced the trust and
confidence of educators, and therefore, did not serve social
control purposes at all.
Lortie (1969) also linked control to the unique reward
system in education wherein neither salary nor promotion was
controlled by school administrators. Since the social status of
educators rests outside the reward system, it is necessary for
administrators to understand what rewards teachers do enjoy.
Included in this category are work security, a comfortable work
schedule, and intrinsic rewards (Lortie, 1969). It is from their
students, not administrators, that they derive many of the
rewards of the teaching profession (Lortie, 1969). Mitchell's
(1987) study of teacher incentives reported that "there is
virtually unanimous agreement in the literature on rewards that
teachers are more powerfully affected by intrinsic rewards,
particularly their sense of responsibility for student learning
and their enjoyment of warm social relationships" (p. 207).
As a semi-professional field (Etzioni, 1965; Hanson, 1981;
Lortie, 1969), education requires a commitment to professional
norms; but, it has also tolerated ill-prepared and inept
practitioners. Although pre-service training actually begins
with one's own classroom education, the in-service socialization
mechanisms are not particularly lengthy or very stringent.
According to Scott & Scott (1971), "educational systems have for
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the most part ineffective means for producing change in codes of
behavior, and they are organized in such interlocking ways that
it is virtually impossible to produce changes except in a very
slow fashion or by setting up entirely new institutions (p. 204).
Together with professional discretion and soft rules, the subtle
social controls of socialization may, indeed, be inadequate.
Bidwell (1965) and Lortie (1969) established the foundation
on which Meyer and Rowan (1977) and others have built their
institutional and loosely coupled models. Schools are public
organizations which must follow state legislative and local
school board directives. Yet, the political authority frameworks
and organization models cannot account for the gap between
centralized policy-making and local, managerial implementation.
Social control provides an alternative explanation to
organizational relationships in accounting for the consensus and
conformity found within schools (Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983).
Yet, it also contributes to the problem of measuring
accountability, since its mechanisms are slow to take affect,
subtle, and often informal. Instead of formal policies, social
control measures are found within mutual acceptance (Lawler &
Rhode, 1976, p. 69; Locke, 1977) and belief systems (Mitchell,
1987). Meyer & Rowan (1977) ascribed a legitimizing function to
bureaucratic, formal mechanisms by which society is able to
measure accountability - distinct from the technology and
processes which occur daily within schools.
School building managers are continuously faced with the
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choice of whether to address social control processes to groups
of individuals (i.e., interest groups, organizational levels,
coalitions) on the one hand, or to specific individuals directly.
Gibbs' (1982) conceptualization of third party social control
simply adds another managerial alternative to consider. Marzano,
et al. (1988) noted the difficulty faced by individuals who seek
to break away from group norms in order to engage in creative
activities. The conservatizing and moderating strength of the
group may inhibit much of the dynamic quality of creative
actions. Moderation is increased by the control exerted through
collective roles, since, as noted above, this dynamic is less
emotionally satisfying than when expressed through unique
individual needs towards the fulfillment of whole person (Scott
and Scott, 1971, p. 197). Dunn (1985) concluded that the most
important dependent variable is not instrumental rationality or
even collective learning capacities, but emancipation (p. 242).
On the other hand, it is from group dynamics that
individuals develop feelings of community spirit, togetherness,
and harmony. These feelings strengthen, if not ennoble,
individual effort, permitting some individuals to perform at
levels beyond their individual capacity or motivation. Many of
these felt qualities which can result from group effort are not
possible from individual actions performed by and for the
individual. The community effect is literally more than the sum
of its individual parts. "Although power is used by individuals,
in the organizational context it is used by individuals as
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members of specific organizational subgroups" (Bacharach &
Lawler, 1982, p.17). Therefore, the individual is not
independent of an organization. The subjective needs and wants
of individuals (i.e., motivation) as both individuals and as
organizational members (e.g., teachers within a system) need to
be met (House & Mitchell, 1974).
One of the responsibilities of school managers is to instill
professional standards in teachers and to hold themselves and
others accountable for success. Managers do not give up
responsibility even when fostering empowerment, autonomy, or
teacher professionalism. Given the present structure of
socialization and training of teachers, such laissez-faire
behavior would be irresponsible (Leiter, 1983). Without a strong
knowledge base, individual behaviors rely primarily on past
experiences and norms (Argyris & Schon, 1982). Few believe that
teachers, presently, have the knowledge base on which to work
independently (Leiter, 1983; Sieber, 1981), or that teachers are
willing to manage all functions of schools. Thus, school
administrators cannot legally or ethically ignore teachers or
even permit them to act as they please, even though, for most of
the day, teachers are isolated away from their colleagues and
supervisors (Lortie, 1969) and exercise broad discretion within
the classroom (Eye, et al., 1971).
Summar and implications o soal strolr
The internalization of rules and standards dpnsmore on
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the salient qualities of social control mechanisms, rather than
on organizational structure or power politics. The quality of
social control processes, however, are mediated by collective
influences, values, and stable norms, thus, creating a
conservative environment in which to implement change. once
accepted, social control standards may be said to preserve order,
not provide a vision of a new order. Standards lay the
groundwork for measuring deviance. Without standards, there is
no way of knowing about success or failure (Vickers, 1967).
According to Meier (1982), the issue of standards in social
control is whether they are to be defined normatively or whether
the concept is ethically neutral. Trends within the social
sciences have favored empirical descriptions, i.e., ethical
neutrality. Contributing to this view is the assumption that
normative ideas are immutable and hold absolute truths. Yet,
social science standards are more likely to be tentative
hypotheses (Argyris & Schon, 1982; Vickers, 1967), requiring
repeated testing - not unlike Lindblom's (1959) endless
repetition process. The major contribution of social control
theory ought to be the recognition of mutually interactive
standards, not the acceptance or denial of standards based on
methodology alone.
Linked to standards is the question of whether social
controls can help to support challenging educational standards
(e.g., high expectations), or are they limited to collectively
acceptable (e.g., minimal standards) mean levels of performance
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(Miles & Vergin, 1966). Educators need visions and goals if they
hope to raise the level of performance (Greenfield, 1987). Yet,
collective norms may reduce performance standards and act as
negative inducements of social control. Can social control
provide individuals with the opportunity to break away from
relatively low group norms while also building collective
strength to raise the level of individual performance?
Presently, social norms by themselves do not ensure the
professionalism of teachers. Educational socialization processes
are uneven at each level of training and service, from the
university classroom to in-school opportunities. Given the total
institutional influences within a single school environment
(Sergiovanni, 1987), teachers tend to view the world of education
from within the school in which they work. Thus, individual
building-level social control mechanisms establish standards of
their own distinct from larger institutional or societal systems.
The professionalism of teachers may be enhanced by the
increased knowledge from organizational and management theories.
However, Sieber (1981) has noted that the social costs of
knowledge utilization presently exceeds the benefits (p. 162).
Teacher incentives are not based on problem-solving (p. 163).
Thus, school organizations permit both principals and teachers to
act as if they are not aware of outstanding performance or
personnel (see Chapter Three). As a result, weak social control
mechanisms contribute to the underlying motivations found within
individual needs (Mitchell, 1987; Sieber, 1981, p. 163)
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In sum, intentionality and individual acceptance of
standards give meaning to the distribution of incentives. The
next stage in the synthesis is a review of conscious thought
processes leading to self-control.
Psychological Coo
Social control theories focus on conformity to group social
values and standards (Burnstein, 1982, pp.23-24), yet in many of
the conceptualizations, social control failed to address
individual intentionality (Meier, 1982). It is, therefore, left
to psychological control theories to address how values,
standards, and rules are internalized to attain a measure of
self-control.
In reality, "not all action is 'controllable.' The more
important it is, the less controllable it is likely to be. This
is, unhappily, inherent in the nature of control" (Vickers, 1967,
p. 30). Experimental evidence has reported finding perceptions
of control even in instances which are uncontrollable (E. Langer,
1983). Thus, "when control is viewed as process, there cannot be
a situation in which absolutely no control is available to the
person" (p. 20). From the psychological perspective of the
actor, there are inner motivational qualities which provide
reasons why people hold particular attitudes (Katz, 1965) and
which create illusory control perceptions (E. Langer, 1983; R.
Harrison, 1985). Questions persist as to the specific behavioral
and cognitive determinants which create these perceptions - real
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and illusory - of control.
Different orientations in psychology offer competing
theories as to how this internalization process actually occurs,
whether behaviorally, cognitively, or developmentally. In
contrast to the contingencies found within structural, political,
and social situations, self-control is conceived as a single
internal process (E. Langer, 1983) supported either by
reinforcement (Skinner, 1966), personal acceptance (Locke, 1977),
participation (Coch & French, 1978), or by effort and commitment
(Marzano, Brandt, Hughes, Jones, Presseisen, Rankin, & Suhor,
1988).
The conclusions drawn from psychological and social-
psychological evidence indicated that there are two dynamic
processes of managerial control: (1) the internalization of
standards, values, and rules, and (2) incentive systems which
fuel intentional activities. The control mechanisms varied
according to the perceived sources of control: culture and
environment as in behaviorism; rational ideas as in cognitive
theories, and maturation as in developmental schemes.
There are two obvious responses to the question of
internalization. The first is to deny consciousness and mental
processes from the analysis of control (Skinner, 1966). For
example, within behaviorism, only verifiable, empirical matters
are worthy of concern. The second response is to develop a model
which links inner qualities to actions (Bruner, 1962; Schein, et
al, 1961; Schein, 1972). These linkages have tended to follow
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one of three paths: (1) a subjective, individualistic path, as in
creative thinking (Marzano, et al., 1988) and subjective
motivations (House & Mitchell, 1974); (2) a uniform, linear,
developmental path as proposed by developmental theorists such as
Piaget and Kohlberg (Burnstein, 1982), or (3) an integrative path
that studies both the individual and the organization (Argyris &
Schon, 1982; Herzberg, 1978; Mintzberg, et al., 1976; Schein,
1972).
A critical point of departure in the analyses of these three
paths revolve around the priority ascribed to changing
consciousness versus changing situations. Illich's (1973)
learning theories suggested that by changing consciousness, real
social changes could be achieved. On the other hand, M. Greene
(1973) argued that perceptual changes were insufficient; that is,
there must be changes in society as well. The primary objective
in controlling overt behavior, even through a restructuring of
social situations as in behavioral psychology, however, is to
create a change in the perceptions of man. According to Schein,
et al. (1961, p. 79), one could dispense with coercive control if
one could create a "new man." In this sense, the control of
thought is considered by cognitive theorists more fundamental
than the control of overt behavior (Schein, et al., 1961, p. 80).
The distinct control mechanisms within each branch of psychology
differ depending on where and how to channel incentives for
change.
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Behaviorism.
Behaviorism is closely aligned with the physical and
cultural environment (Skinner, 1966, p. 11). Emphasis is placed
on observable and manipulable factors rather than on inner
qualities (p. 19). Behavioristic control occurs through the
structuring of external factors which are manipulated using
scientific principals of cultural engineering. It is through the
use of external forces (pp. 13ff.) that man learns to better
control himself (p. 11).
According to Skinner, behaviorism holds human freedom and
democracy in high esteem. Thus, the use of coercive, political
power, punishment, or threats is termed "inept control," making
"reluctant slaves of those who submit" (p. 14). Within a
democracy, the techniques of control are reciprocal, fostered
through education, moral discourse, and persuasion (p. 14).
Each of these techniques, however, is capable of
degenerating into its own perversions, such as propaganda,
demagoguery, and seduction respectively (p. 14). Thus,
behaviorism presents a hierarchy of controls which ascends from
threats (e.g., commands and coercion), to "appeals to reason"
(self-control), and to "opportunities for action" (disguised
control) (pp. 14-15). Democratic systems link ethics and
aesthetics to the concept of control (Bruner, 1962). Thus,
coercion, brainwashing, and monopolistic control are
inconsistent with democratic political systems and with higher
levels of human development. Nevertheless, through social
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science research, "control need no longer be imposed. It can be
encouraged to come from within" (Baritz, 1974, p. 210). It may
not always be so clear, however, if managerial control techniques
are exploitative (p. 209).
Skinner (1966) admitted that there is less understanding of
the higher levels of control, in part, because both culture and
environmental factors determine the type(s) of control techniques
(p. 15). By ignoring mental processes as does behaviorism,
however, a great deal that cannot be reduced to sensory
perceptions and empirical observation including logical forms,
value systems (Zaner, 1970, p. 38), and emotion (S. Langer, 1951)
cannot be adequately addressed.
Cognitive tereaninvdulcreativity.
A key concept within the cognitive framework is called
"locus of control," which refers to the psychological view in
which man can or cannot shape the world around him. Certain
individuals are generally inclined to believe in internal
causation, while others ascribe causation to external factors
(Burnstein, 1982, p. 43). In cognitive psychology, the
assumption is made that the thoughts about a task greatly affect
how we approach the task. Studies have suggested that this
feeling of control often translates into successful performance
(Berliner, 1984).
In place of cultural engineering, cognitive self-control is
driven by a tripartite model of human behavior: attitudes,
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emotions, and actions (Marzano, et al., 1988, p. 10). "People
commonly attribute success to one of four causes: ability,
effort, other people, or to luck" (p. 11). Some theorists have
stated that the most useful attribution is effort - "the belief
that intense, extended effort will generally lead to success" (p.
11). Other theorists specifically identified commitment as a
determinant of successful performance. People choose to be
committed to their work, or they choose not to be committed (p.
10).
The concept of motivation is, obviously, closely related to
effort, commitment, and creative behavior. Schein, et al.'s
(1961) definition of control stated that a well-motivated worker
was one who is obedient, yet "able to apply the party line
independently and creatively in new and unanticipated situations"
(p. 54).
Underlying creative people's ability to take risks is
trust in their own standards of evaluation. Creative
individuals look inwardly to themselves rather than
outwardly to their peers to judge the validity of their
work. Therefore, the creative person tolerates and
often consciously fosters working in isolation,
creating a buffer zone that keeps the individual
somewhat insulated from standard norms and practices.
Not surprisingly, many creative people are not
initially well received by their contemporaries
(Marzano, et al., p. 25).
Assuming that creativity is a higher order need, motivating
factors would center more on intrinsic rewards rather than on
extrinsic rewards. Intrinsic motivation manifests specific
behaviors and attitudes: avowed dedication, long hours, concern
with craft, and inolvement with ideas (Marzano, et al., 1988, p.
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25). According to Marzano, et a1. (1988), there is considerable
evidence to indicate that strong extrinsic motivation undermines
intrinsic motivation (p. 25). On the other hand, Burnstein
(1982, p. pp. 30-31) and Marzano, et al., (1988) have noted that
other studies identified a "resistance to distraction by
extrinsic rewards such as higher income for a less creative kind
of work (Narzano, et al., p. 25).
"The distinction made between reward and punishment is one
of the more important contributions of learning theory to the
analysis of control" (Burnstein, 1982, p. 27). This proposition
is based on the assumptions that (1) rewards and punishments "cut
across all the other conditions" (Schein, et al., 1961, p.181),
and that (2) people strive to maximize rewards and minimize
punishment (Katz, 1965, p. 279). As a result, consequences are
more salient to learning than the frequency of a purposive act
(Burnstein, 1982, p. 27).
"It is [also] a well-known principle of learning that the
efficacy of reward and punishment decreases as the time lag
between the response and the administration of reward or
punishment increases" (Schein, et al., 1961, p. 181).
Effectiveness depends on the rapidity with which rewards and
punishments are administered (p. 182), and on the clarity,
consistency, and nearness of rewards and punishments (Katz, 1965,
p. 280). The use of effective information-gathering channels
insures a minimum time lag (p. 181), but does not necessarily
increase predictability (E. Langer, 1983). "Social psychology is
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replete with examples of how people tend to seek out information
that supports their hypotheses" (p. 24).
Conflicting motives may create a cognitive dissonance within
an individual (Festinger, 1978). Adams (1978) broadened the
potential conflict by replacing cognitions with perceptions, but
the theory remained the same, that is, people seek to reduce
inequity, real or imagined. The shift from cognitions to
perceptions was, of course, significant in that the psychology
rested upon an individuals' subjective needs, rather than on a
hierarchical model of uniform human needs (Maslow, 1978).
This subjective focus formed the basis for expectancy
theory, originally proposed by Vroom (J. Campbell, Dunnette,
Lawler, Weick, 1978). Individuals have different preferences for
a particular outcome and, therefore, pursue that outcome through
diverse means. In subsequent, hybrid transformations, the
expectancy motivation path has incorporated task goals (J.
Campbell, et al., 1978), not unlike the two-factor model proposed
by Herzberg (Herzberg, 1978; May & Decker, 1988). Yet,
prominently lacking in most motivational theories was the ability
to predict behavior. Towards that objective, T. Mitchell (1982)
identified four variables to predict behavior: (1) knowledge of
what is required, (2) the ability to do what is required, (3)
motivation, and (4) a suitable work environment. Perry and
Porter (1982) identified four similar variables: (1) individual
needs, (2) the job tasks, (3) the work environment, and (4) the
external environment. These contingency analyses tend to
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overlap, except for the variables of individual ability and the
external environment. Thus far, the results of experimental
psychological studies in motivation have shown highly variable
findings (Locke, 1977). What motivational research has
identified are instrumental paths and subjective goals and
perceptions by which individuals behave differently. At the very
least, these findings suggested limitations in generalizing
results across organizational settings and cultures.
Opportunities and exposure to new learning unlocks human
capabilities (Bruner, 1962). Deciding whether a rule is good and
ought to be followed is a cognitive issue that demands knowledge.
Information processing through language, myth, affiliation, and
rejection shape our conception of reality and knowledge (Bruner,
1962). According to Black (1970) and E. Langer (1983), rule
acceptance is easier if it "seems obvious" or is familiar. "The
harder it is to formulate the rule, the more reluctant the agent
is to receive it" (Black, 1970, p. 50). Therefore, data must be
compressed and structured to be assimilated, remembered as well
as used "in practice" (Black, 1970). On the other hand, any
actions which are performed automatically, i.e., without thought,
are not controlled actions, but mindless and mechanical (E.
Langer, 1983, p. 20).
Learning theory has been described as amorphous and circular
(Schein, et al., 1961) because it tends to explain too little and
too much. The same criticism can be made of other control
theories as well. Just as decision-making and implementation are
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not synonymous processes (Fullan, 1982), neither is it true that
observation and learning of a model means that it will be
followed (Burnstein, 1982, p. 30).
Developmental stages.
Internalization viewed through developmental stages implies
that "identification is fostered by the consistent use of
psychological or love-oriented rearing practices rather than
physical reward and punishment" (Burnstein, 1982, p. 26).
Burnstein described Kohlberg's model as an example of a moral
development model (p. 32) that linked cognitive concepts with
behavior. The moral development of man occurs in six stages: the
first stage was called heteronomous morality in which compliance
is based on power alone; stage two focused on individualism,
instrumental purpose, and exchange as man seeks to accomplish
personal goals; stage three established mutual interpersonal
expectations, relationships, and conformity whereby the group
benefits through such feelings as loyalty; with stage four, a
social system and conscience emerged wherein individuals seek
social approval; stage five was based on a social contract
between society and the individual protecting the rights and
duties of each; and, finally, in stage six, behavior was based on
universal ethical principles (pp. 32-34).
Kohlberg believed that these stages were grounded in
empirical reality paralleling the development of moral reasoning
skills (Burnstein, 1982, n. 34). Whether they are developmental,
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universal, or empirical, however, is still to be decided.
Integrative theories: Social-psycholo..
Bruner (1962) wanted to avoid what he called the
"psychological fallacy," i.e., speaking of the psychology of
control without reference to its implementation. He, therefore,
made the distinction between manifest controls, i.e., deliberate
controls manifested by laws and regulations, and latent controls,
i.e., "inconspicuous influences" permeating culture through myths
and values. The two types of control corresponded to two
strategies of control: one based on power and dependency, the
other on cognition. The former utilized rewards and punishments
(coercion and seduction), while, cognitive control was
accomplished by shaping the conception of the world, and then
leaving individuals to act or not out of intrinsic, self-
control. "It is no exaggeration to say that the role given to
each of these forms of control is a hallmark of any political
theory of the state and, by the same token, it is the single most
telling feature of any psychological theory about the nature of
man - whether one envisions man as ultimately captive of the
shaping forces of his environment or as competent to shape a
world of his own" (Bruner, 1962, p. 133).
Control is not a matter of obtaining "maximum or even
optimum control of human behavior (Bruner, 1962). Rather, the
matter turns, in a democracy, on how to obtain needed control
"while preserving the necessary variability that permits change,
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innovation, zest, and a lively sense that the invention of new
alternatives is more important than the suppression of ones that
may prove ugly" (p. 148). Thus, control techniques go beyond
laws and regulations, touching on social, psychological,
learning, and behavioral variables, such as language, myth,
affiliative pressure, anticipation of rejection and isolation,
limitation of opportunity, and variable compensation (Bruner,
1962).
Schein (1972) conceived of a "psychological contract" as the
mutual interaction between the individual and the organization
based on two aspects: (1) a match between the degree to which an
individual's expectation of what the organization will provide
him and what he owes the organization, and (2) an exchange, e.g.,
work for money, satisfaction for loyalty, self-actualization for
high productivity and creativity. "Most theories of influence
limit themselves to a consideration of the conditions under which
opinion changes will or will not occur.... [I]f we are going to
consider influence processes which go deeper, .... must consider
not only the conditions of change but also the nature of the new
integration which the change produces" (Schein, et al., 1961, p.
268). Schein's (1972) psychological contract involved a three
step process: (1) mutuality, relationality, and interaction, (2)
agreement on expectations or standards, and (3) an exchange. The
assumption which guided this analysis was the recognition of a
complex, interactive man, rather than assumptions of rational-
economic man, social man, or even self-actualizing man.
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A third social-psychological integration has been proposed
by Heilbroner (1975). Psychology explains the subjective
foundation for man's behavior (p. 24). There are two traits
which dictate social-psychological behavior: (1) the trait of
obedience (p. 105), and (2) the capacity for identification (p.
110). According to Heilbroner, obedience was a "latent function"
which provides a sense of psychological security arising from the
early developmental periods of man's helplessness. Although
Heilbroner stressed biopsychological underpinnings, he did not
deny the presence or importance of political elements, such as
power (p. 106). But, unlike political theorists who found the
bases of power in organizational relationships, Heilbroner saw
man's submission to power as having reality within man himself
(p. 107).
The second psychological underpinning identified by
Heilbroner was the capacity for identification with others. This
identification, however, has cultural limitations whereby certain
groups were perceived as "within" and others "without" (pp. 110-
111). Heilbroner held that many of the answers about man's
future would be determined by the capacity and willingness of man
to form a bond of identity with others, especially those of
future generations (p. 115). Two processes were also identified
which contributed to the development of these two critical
traits: communication and mutually shared concepts (Burnstein,
1982, p. 35; Heilbroner, 1975, p. 162).
However essential the processes of communication and
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mutually shared concepts might be, social-psychologists have
struggled to incorporate social and cultural contexts into their
theories of control (Schein, et al,, 1961). Bruner (1962),
Hielbroner (1975), and Bacharach and Lawler (1982) have each
attempted to link psychology to the reality and complexity of
social organizations. Although the inclusion of cultural
contexts into the internalization process appears to be
essential, its integration is by no means assured, particularly
within democratic systems which strive for a congruency between
manifest and latent controls (Bruner, 1962): a congruency between
dynamic political and social mechanisms on the one hand and
individual psychological determinants on the other. "For the
psychologist, the problem of control arises when an individual
plan is incompatible with the collective one" (Burnstein, 1982,
p. 23). Whereas organizational, social, and political theories
defined control as many things, the psychology of control is
viewed as an internal process. Context and culture within the
former theories always seemed to arrive at situational
contingencies. How psychologists intend to avoid this trap and
still maintain generalizability remains unclear. Individuals
express certain needs that are incongruent with the demands of
formal organizations (Argyris, 1978). Nevertheless, there seem
to be specific school organizational processes which do
contribute to an inner sense of control and greater organization-
self integration. Among these processes are participation in
decision-making (Ashton, 1984), group support (Lortie, 1975), and
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team organization (Berliner, 1984).
S r i
Psychological control processes seek to gain control over
both overt behavior and private beliefs. It is the latter which
comprises an individuals' value system (Katz, 1965, p. 277) and
which guides people in their daily activities (Bruner, 1962;
Heilbroner, 1975, p. 137). There is a need, however, to create a
theory based on a wide range of observed data (Schein, 1972, p.
196) that is applicable to diverse social and cultural influences
(Schein, et al., 1961) while incorporating internal, social-
psychological dynamics (Coser, 1982, p. 19). Psychological
processes appear for the most part as logical, developmental, and
uniform, but managerial behaviors are said to be fragmented,
irrational, and complex (Mintzberg, 1971).
This descriptive managerial reality does not contradict the
view that people "act on the basis of these [stable]
expectations, unless and until they are destroyed by further
experience. This stability is precondition of effective,
collective action over a long span of time" (Vickers, 1967, p.
39). Evidence that control is stable or not emanates from the
focus of one's perspective, reference points, and the measures
used in analyzing the construct (E. Langer, 1983, p. 26). One
dimensional explanations are important for specificity, but
insufficient (Katz, 1965, p. 278; Pfeffer, 1978a; Schein, et al.,
1961, p. 196).
121
There are psychological consequences of regular activities,
even if some of these consequences are not well understood
(Bruner, 1962; Skinner, 1966). Even structural variables have
subjective consequences. In an area so richly studied as
technology, Dornbusch & Scott (1975) have identified the
significant differences among tasks as "subjective beliefs of
participants rather than on the objective characteristics of the
tasks themselves" (p. 348).
Choices of action lead to a self-monitoring system based on
an individual's own standards (Burnstein, 1982, p. 31). Yet,
standards are reinforced by other significant individuals and
groups (p. 31). If control standards are not a question of
maximum or optimum performance (Bruner, 1962), but reflect
processes of change and creativity, then ownership of standards
is needed to overcome resistance (Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 101)
and incorporate implementation. Another way to persuade people
to change is "to make the new more familiar and to increase
involvement and participation" (E. Langer, 1983, p. 87). E.
Langer (1983) recognized that these processes had already been
identified within organizational research. What was new,
however, was the findings that perceptions of control did not
depend upon "distributing real control" but, rather, from
"inducing an illusion of control through the introduction of
control-related but outcome-independent factors" (p. 87). These
factors included (a) skill in making choices, (b) thinking about
tasks and strategies, (c) effort exerted, (d) familiarization
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with materials and responses, and (e) competition with others (p.
45).
The critical link to self-control is the relationship
between cultural standards and individual, subjective incentives.
Within schools, intrinsic motivation is generally seen as more
highly valued than extrinsic rewards (D. Mitchell, 1987; D.
Mitchell & Peters, 1988). This occurrence is particularly
relevant to building managers who must integrate external policy
directives and community expectations into school-level standards
of performance despite their lacking structural mechanisms to
control three dominant motivating factors: pay, promotion, and
student learning (Bidwell, 1965; Lawler & Rhode, 1976; Lortie,
1969). School building administrators do, however, exercise
incentive control with the distribution of discretionary funds,
staff development opportunities, and praise (Bossert, et al.,
1982; Cohen & Miller, 1980). In terms of importance, Lawler and
Rhodes (1976) ranked pay, promotion, and dismissal as higher
extrinsic motivating factors than praise, in non-school settings.
Since the cost of praise is very low, it is used far more
frequently than either promotion or dismissal (p. 59).
Therefore, the theory of managerial control is concerned not only
with the intrinsic qualitative values, but also with the
stability, regularity, and frequency of behaviors - which have
bo structural and qualitative meanings for individuals.
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Synthesis of Social Science Control Theories
Within the different social science literatures, much
attention has been focused on the meaning of control. Yet, even
within disciplines, the definitions of control are clearly
idiosyncratic, offering, at best, incomplete explanations of the
concept of control. In a global terms, control was defined as
any process which influences behaviors (Smith & Tannenbaum,
1963). In reviewing the related literatures on control theory
literatures, the most significant differences refer to their
units of analyses.
Table 1 highlights the distinctions among concepts, units of
analyses, and variables. The predominant model in classical
organizational theory has been rational, bureaucracy. The unit
of structural analysis is the organization, more specifically the
variables of size, levels, and technology. From the political
concept of control, two theories predominate: the process of
incremental decision-making and the descriptive organizational
metaphor of loose coupling. Political control extends the unit
of analyses to interactions between organizations, members, and
their environments. Societal institutions are even broader
organizational conceptualizations within which social control
influences behaviors. The primary unit of analysis is the group
(e.g., peers, society) which establishes values, norms, and
culture that may be internalized by individuals. In psychology,
competing theories explain the processes by which control is
completely internalized by the individual.
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Table 1
Concept: Organizational Political Social Self-
Control Control Control Control
Model: Rational Loose Institutions Behaviorism
Bureaucracy Coupling Cognitive
Incrementalism Developmental
Unit of Organization Environment Groups Individual
Analyses: Power/Influence
Key Actors
Variables: Structure: Interactions: Values, Internali
size, levels, uncertainty & norms & ization &
& technology multidirections culture motivation
The study of managerial control makes two assumptions based on
a synthesis of social science literatures: (1) that aspects from
each of the disciplinary theories presented must be incorporated
into a general theory of managerial control, and (2) that the
concepts and variables presented by discipline-oriented research
need to be operationalized within a contextual managerial setting
and, then, empirically tested.
Although aspects of rational bureaucracy continue to influence
organizational thinking (Johnston, 1985), there is increasing
evidence to support other organizational and behavioral
explanations. From the structural analyses, we concluded that
structural bureaucratic processes such as supervising, directing,
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and evaluating were weak or inappropriate, especially within
school organizations. The conclusions reached from single
entity, quantitative measures, ironically, redirected attention
away from the organization itself towards a broader
institutional- environmental framework with cultural implications
(Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983). Unfortunately, the residual
findings from structural analyses offered administrators few, if
any, guidelines for managing organizations (Bossert, et al.,
1982; Fullan, 1982; Fullan & Pomfret, 1977; Pfeffer, 1978a). The
alternative explanations, such as politics, information,
communication, coordination, participation, collegiality, and
shared decision-making were variously suggested in order to
extend the meanings of control.
Education is largely a public, institutional system with
environmental influences which affect the behaviors of
individuals working at all levels of the organization (Bidwell,
1965). To some extent the technical core within the organization
can be protected from the other institutional levels (Thompson,
1967), but never fully (Pfeffer, 1978a). Cultural factors, such
as social and professional values, influence managerial control
processes, permeate schools, and establish standards by which
success is measured (e.g., organizational effectiveness). But,
the literature clearly reports that standards differ from culture
to culture (Tannenbaum, et al., 1974) and from school to school
(Sergiovanni, 1987).
This variability raises a research question as to the choice
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of dependent variables, particularly the meaning of curricular
and instructional effectiveness. Even if organizational or
educational theorists could agree on a suitable definition of
effectiveness (Cameron & Whetton, 1983), there would still be
left unresolved the question of causal direction between control
and effectiveness (Staw, 1975). Organization theory employs
hypothesized variables which can be either independent variables
of performance, dependent variables of effects, covariates of
third variables, or elements in a web of mutual causality (Staw,
1975).
The most often repeated research finding was that managerial
activities and individual behaviors were mediated by structural,
political, social, and psychological factors. The results
indicated that activities and behaviors were influenced by
"something else" not directly studied or being measured.
The issue no longer was whether the bureaucratic structural model
was adequate to explain the complex dynamics and determinants of
control. It is not. Whereas authority is static, "influence is
the fulcrum of change" (Bacharach & Lawler, 1982, p. 42).
Lorange & Morton (1977) summarized the contributions of
structural analysis into three emerging issues: (1)
organizational complexity, (2) non-measurable dependent variables
and (3) the linkages between planning and control.
Bacharach & Lawler (1982) agreed that "objective conditions of
dependence have subjective meaning to parties in a conflict
setting" (p. 23).
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Under the political framework, a wider range of variables were
analyzed, thus, providing greater descriptive validity. The
political model was thus born as a open system in which all
organizational dynamics and processes could be described as
political. The political units of analyses broadened the search
for key behavioral variables beyond the technical core and
managerial relationships. The external focus of the political
analyses, however, created a gap between environmental influences
and intra-organizational behaviors. Moreover, the headlong rush
for empirical validity tended towards a somewhat indiscriminant
acceptance of descriptive data.
Sociological studies directed attention back to influential
interactions among individuals within organizations. Yet similar
to the political models' concept of multidirectionality,
sociological approaches analyzed influential diversity of
cultures and roles. This approach, too, failed to provide a
comprehensive organizational framework by which variables of
interest could be ranked in order of their relative influence.
The place of social standards was taken by a position of ethical
neutrality.
Psychological research of control revealed a paradox between
subjective individual idiosyncracy and common, basic human needs.
Whereas the former requires managerial activities to acknowledge
the subjective needs of each individual, common, basic needs of
individuals are viewed as so fundamental that they underlie all
social and political activities.
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As a result of these inconclusive and inconsistent
disciplinary findings, confidence in their definitions of control
is understandably weak. Therefore, a new integrative perspective
is needed, one that is significantly different from merely
applying the different disciplinary frameworks successively to a
given situation (Bolman & Deal, 1984). Ultimately, understanding
behavior is not a matter of alternating lenses which reveal
different perspectives, but rather of integrating perspectives.
The question is how to achieve this synthesis at the
managerial action level on which control operates, while still
maintaining institutional, cultural, subjective, and
epistemological truths. The task involves reorganizing
quantitative and qualitative measures along managerial control
processes. It is principally a matter of identifying common
technological characteristics which operate across diverse,
problematic, cultural circumstances. The central question of
this investigation is, thus, how to reconcile a uniform,
systematic framework with the empirical findings of
organizational complexity, fragmentation of activities, and non-
rational behaviors.
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CHAPTER THREE
A Preliminary Study
of School Managerial Context:
Curriculum and Instruction
Introduction
Empirical data should be anchored in an organization's
context in order to validate the meanings of managerial concepts
(Hughes, Price, & Marrs, 1986). This is particularly true for
the concept of managerial control which operates on the "level
where action is taken" (Vickers, 1967, p. 29). Yet, a synthesis
of control theories within social science literatures offered
surprisingly little data about the managerial context. The
conceptualizations of control which emerged were theoretically
abstract, such that the terms power, authority, influence, and
social control were difficult to distinguish and often used
idiosyncratically. As a result, generalized findings from
control theory research have been inconsistent and incorrect.
Nonetheless, the different social science disciplines have
contributed unique findings which may be integrated into a more
general, valid theory of managerial control. From structural
analyses of organizations, the most conclusive finding was that
single structural variables offered only partial explanations for
individual behaviors. Thus, researchers variously implied that
political, social, and psychological processes need further
direct empirical consideration (Cohen & Miller, 1980; Eisenhardt,
1985; Woodward, 1970).
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Political dynamics have suggested that information and
evaluation systems may be as important, if not more so, than
structural explanations (Pfeffer, 1978a). Social control studies
have also dismissed structural-organizational explanations (Meyer
& Rowan, 1977; Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983), replacing
organizational variables with institutional and professional
norms and values as standards of performance. Psychological
research has focused on the notion of self-control which in
certain theories are independent of external contingencies (E.
Langer, 1983). Although there are organizational and individual
factors that influence the internalization of self-control
behavior, the postulating of a subjective, internal reality
suggested that behaviors were governed by internal standards,
perceptions of rewards and punishments, and their distribution
system. Only when viewed integratively do the social science
disciplines offer a heuristic framework within which to
categorize contextual data.
The four logical processes to have emerged from the social
science theories of control reflect a complex reality of
managerial standards, information, assessment, and incentives.
Table 2 depicts the matrix between disciplinary conceptions of
control and managerial control processes, along with their
mediating factors.
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Table 2
MatixofAcademic Disciplines adMngra oto rcse
Academic Disciplines: Political Science Sociology Psychology
organizational Interactions Group values, Internali-
Dynamics: norms, & zation &
culture motivation
Managerial Control Information Standards Standards
Processes: Assessments Incentives
As a preliminary step towards the validation of a school
managerial control model, empirical data about what school
building administrators actually do within the domain of
curriculum and instruction are needed (Bossert, et al, 1982).
Because context and culture are so critical to school managerial
control (Hallinger & Murphy, 1987), data from non-school
organizational studies or even from external building levels are
ill-suited for practical managerial purposes.
Unfortunately, there are no simple, straightforward measures
by which contextual analyses, especially within complex
organizations such as schools, are revealed (Bacharach & Lawler,
1982; Miles, 1981). In complex settings, rich descriptions
convey many meanings because highly abstract words are used to
designate both entities and qualities (Huxley, 1971, p. 161).
The qualitative dimension of organizational control theory has
had strong support for over twenty-five years (Astuto & Clark,
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1985; Etzioni, 1965; Frank, 1958-59; Koontz, 1971; Miles &
Vergin, 1966; Patz & Rowe, 1977; Tannenbaum, et al., 1974;
Turcotte, 1974; Vickers, 1967). Yet, its direct empirical study
has been anything but systematic.
The qualitative dimension is not the only conceptual and
measurement obstacle confronting educational researchers. There
are at least two other concerns which must be addressed: (a)
determining the appropriate cultural unit of analyses, whether
societal institutions, school districts, schools, or individual
classrooms (Sergiovanni, 1987; Stephenson & Levine, 1987), and
(b) grasping the reality that school administrators are often
faced with the dilemmas of having "a choice between two goods"
(Miles, 1981; Clark & Astuto, 1988). There exist within school
contextual settings empirical evidence to support contrary
findings (e.g., diversity versus uniformity, coordination versus
flexibility, centralized authority versus shared influence, and
change versus stability).
School-level managerial activities involve specific
expertise of curricular and instructional technology (Cawelti,
1987a, 1987b), but are not limited to it (Griffin, 1988;
Sergiovanni, 1984). There are managerial processes, behaviors,
and skills which control these curricular and instructional
activities across diverse tasks (Apple, 1982; Hall, Jr., 1956).
It is towards a better understanding of these managerial
processes within school buildings that this preliminary study was
directed.
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Statement ofPurpose
There were two purposes for conducting the preliminary
study: (1) to describe systematically the context of school-
level managerial control processes for curricular and
instructional tasks, and (2) to use the findings in the
development of a valid instrument to measure school-building
control.
Obiective
The primary objective was to categorize school
administrative behaviors related to curriculum and instruction
under each of the four managerial control processes: standards,
information, assessment, and incentives.
Procedures and Methods
Subiects
At the school-building level, principals have been judged to
be the key actor in terms of managerial control activities. "The
standards place the principal squarely in charge of the
effectiveness of his/her school, and demand that the principal
assume responsibility for instructional leadership at the
building level" (Doud & Montgomery, 1985). "In fact, they were
frequently the only individuals within the school who had the
overall perspective to enable them to [have an institutional
focus]" (Martin & Willower, 1981).
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A small number of principals was nominated by their
district's central office supervisors as being curriculum-
oriented or instructional leaders (Appendix A). From these
nominations, six principals, representing two elementary schools,
two junior-high/middle schools, and two senior-high schools were
selected. When one senior high school principal declined to
participate, an alternative senior high school principal was
selected from the nomination list, Table 3 presents
characteristics of the six schools in the preliminary study.
All of the principals had experience in at least two
schools, with total tenure ranging from six and one-half years to
fourteen years.
At the same time that each principal was initially
contacted, he or she was asked to designate an individual at his
or her school who would also be interviewed regarding curricular
and instructional control at the school. The purposes of having
informant responses at the school level were to provide a second
viewpoint on school curricular and instructional control from a
different organizational level and to elicit specific managerial
behaviors.
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Table 3
School Characteristics of Principal Sample Population
No. of Assistant No. of Student
Interview Level Principals Faculty Enrollment
1 Elementary 1 32 689
2 Elementary 1 42 934
3 Junior 3 65 1609
4 Middle 3 62 1307
S Senior 4 115 2444
6 Senior 3 134 2808
Instrument
A standardized interview guide was used for all interviews
of principals and informants (Appendix B). An initial format was
pre-tested with a volunteer principal. Under each of the four
managerial control processes, the principal was asked to discuss
how the tasks of teacher evaluation, staff development,
curricular development, and selection of textbooks and
instructional materials were managed. During this pre-testing,
general open-ended questions were asked about the principal's
activities. This format tended to elicit only vague, non-
specific responses without further prompting. The interview
format was, therefore, revised so that principals were prompted
to discuss managerial activities under each of the four
hypothesized managerial control processes for each task
separately. The order of the questions followed a logical
progression beginning with goals and objectives (standards and
information) and proceeded to implementation processes
(evaluation and incentives).
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Data lcollection procedures
All school principal and informant interviews were conducted
in private at the six school-sites and lasted from 45 minutes to
over one hour. The first 45 minutes were audio tape recorded.
After 45 minutes, hand written notes were taken. Both the tapes
and notes were transcribed and summarized.
Limitations
The study's small sample size, the reliance on self-
reporting measures, and the lack of dependent variables might all
be viewed as limitations. There is ample evidence, however, to
demonstrate that none of these factors has invalidated the
reported findings.
The six principals interviewed were selected specifically
for their career long involvement in curricular and instructional
affairs. In fact, their own perceptions of the time allocated to
curricular and instructional activities were much higher than
what has been reported in the literature on instructional
leadership. The mean average percentage of time devoted to
curricular and instructional activities reported by this sample
was approximately 45 percent (versus, for example, 17.4 percent
measured by Martin & Willower, 1981); the remaining time was
ascribed to administrative areas. The list of managerial
activities compiled here is quite comprehensive and compares
favorably with other similar school management studies (Bossert,
et al., 1982). The systematic analysis of these managerial
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activities into the four hypothesized managerial control
processes does not, in any way, delimit other conceptualizations
of managerial control. Rather, to establish validity of any
managerial control process requires the systematic analysis of
specific behaviors within a particular task context.
In any empirical study, the use of self-report data is not
without limitations and bias; however, the recognition of
qualitative attributes of managerial concepts and tasks
(Dornbusch & Scott, 1975, p. 348; Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 169)
suggests that the "only reality is perceived reality" (Andrews,
1987, p. 10). "[I]n the last analyses the content of a
particular individual's goals and intentions must be inferred
from his verbal report (based on his introspection)" (Locke,
1977, p. 183). The consistency of the interview format and
administration, along with the inclusion of informants contribute
to the confidence in the principals' responses.
The nature of managerial control research, from Dornbusch &
Scott (1975) to Sproull (1981) to Peterson (1984), has been
exploratory, that is, the reporting of findings and statistics
rather than testing hypotheses. There are severe measurement
problems linked with control studies (Koontz, 1971; Lorange &
Morton, 1977), such that many of the independent and dependent
variables are not meaningful to participants or clearly defined.
Although a number of studies have measured the influence of
instructional leadership (Ogawa & Hart, 1985), the evidence has
hardly been persuasive. With respect to dependent variables,
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"the standardized achievement tests generally used as criteria
for multivariate school effectiveness studies provide only a
crude and often misleading measure of learning in classrooms"
(Stephenson & Levine, 1987, p. 33). As for independent
variables, Martin and Willower (1981) reported that
"[principals'] instructional leadership role component did not
include active instructional or curricular involvement. Although
the principals retained final authority over these matters, they
chose to exercise it in a passive fashion" (author's emphasis).
Thus, the research has yet to adequately operationalize these
passive activities or independent variables. The purpose of this
study is to collect and categorize data of managerial control
activities as measured by nominal data, with no implication as to
their effect on a dependent variable, such as achievement. The
testing of that hypothesis cannot be derived solely from self-
report data from principals (Andrews, 1987).
Data Findings
The reported managerial behaviors were elicited from the
principals [and informants] during the interview sessions. The
behaviors have been categorized under each of the four managerial
control processes: standards, information, assessment, and
incentives. Although the assumption regarding managerial control
is that the processes and behaviors are similar for distinct
tasks within a domain such as curriculum and instruction, the
purpose of contextual analyses is always to present the data in
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their most discrete setting. Therefore the data have been
further categorized under the distinct curricular and
instructional tasks of teacher evaluation, staff development,
curriculum development, and the selection of textbooks and
instructional materials (Cawelti & Adkisson, 1986; Cawelti,
1987a).
In some cases, judgment as to the placement of a managerial
behavior might appear arbitrary in that the behavior fits as well
elsewhere. Given the interrelationship among the four processes
as part of a larger, single construct, i.e., managerial control,
such redundancy is to be expected. Neither the control process
categories nor the curricular and instructional tasks are
mutually exclusive or unique.
The rather long list of curricular and instructional
managerial behaviors, over one hundred and fifty reported here
(Tables 4 through 7), suggests that, for some principals at
least, curricular and instructional activities are an important
part of their responsibilities and that the curricular and
instructional role itself is extremely complex. On the other
hand, neither the number nor diversity of these managerial
control behaviors indicates the frequency or competency with
which these managerial tasks are performed. Those particular
questions will be explored in the subsequent chapters.
The discussion of each managerial control process begins
with the objectives of the interview questions concerning that
process. Following some of the managerial behaviors, there is a
140
number in parenthesis which refers to a specific principal's
unique response not echoed by the other respondents. If no
number is indicated, it means that a majority of the respondents
expressed similar views. Lastly, the managerial behaviors have
been separated by a broken line, indicating the distinction
between the formal structural behaviors and the principals'
discretionary actions.
Standards
The specific questions on standards attempted to elicit the
principals' views concerning state, district, and school
policies, goals, and procedures for four different curricular and
instructional tasks: teacher evaluation, staff development,
curriculum development, and the selection of textbooks and
instructional materials. The principals were asked whether they
also attempted to exceed formal policies and procedures, and if
so, how. The managerial activities relating to standards and
reported by principals and informants are categorized by tasks in
Table 4.
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Table 4
Mrized of
Standards
Teacher Evaluation Standards
1. Formal district instrument
2. Straightforward, impersonal, and clear
3. Specific teaching behaviors
4. A helping instrument for improving instruction
5. Collective bargaining contract requires that
principals observe beginning and annual
contract teachers
6. Optimum performance (5)
7. New teachers know when they will be observed:
so they can be at their best (2)
8. Priorities assigned to the teaching behaviors
9. A classroom where children are happy and free
to learn (1)
10. Would I want my child sitting there? (3)
11. We try to exceed the minimum requirements (6)
12. Work with all students in the class (5)
13. Hiring and staffing criteria within centralized
district procedures (2,4,6)
Staff Development Standards
1. District workshops and district priorities
2. Redress prescriptions from classroom observations
3. Collective bargaining contract constraints on
the number of monthly staff meetings
4. Limited budget for out-of-town conferences (6)
5. Voluntary participation
6. School-designed workshops: school priorities
(1,2,4,5)
7. A "we can improve" attitude (1)
8. Assignments of assistant principals and
department heads (3,5,6)
Curricular Development Standards
1. District/State objectives (to do more and more
(2,5,6)] and testing (6)
2. A balanced curriculum (1,2)
3. We give everybody the same thing: classic
mistake (5)
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Table 4 continued
4. Legitimate and reasonable (3)
5. Our job is to put students in the right place
in order to help them learn (1)
6. School innovations: on the cutting edge of
curriculum (4,5)
7. Redesign on the bases of readability, scope
and sequence (5)
Selection of Texts and Instructional Materials' Standards
1. State/District lists of textbooks and schedule
of adoptions
2. Budget allows limited flexibility (4,5)
3. Grade level/departmental consensus (2,4,6)
4. Teacher-developed materials (5)
5. Readability (3,5) and published tests (2)
6. Pride and professionalism of faculty (2),
department heads (6), and assistant principals
(1,2,4,5)
Summary of Standards
Principals' responses on curricular and instructional
standards appeared to fall into two distinct categories: (a) the
clear, yet perhaps minimal standards that are part of the formal
directive, rules, procedures, schedules, and instruments, and (b)
the personal or intangible qualities, not stated or directed by
policies or measured by an instrument, that principals want to
have in their schools. The latter reflected the individual
school's unique mission or cultural standards and the
discretionary managerial behaviors reserved to school building
administrators.
Principals expressed curricular and instructional standards
in general, expressive terms: "school is a place of learning"
(2), and often used the vocabulary of the effective school
literature, e.g., high expectations. Although each principal
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stated that he/she strictly followed Board policies when it came
to the formal state and district procedures, they did not limit
their comments to the formal procedures or scheduled
requirements. For each task, they offered unique, discretionary,
and informal standards. The principals sought the most
appropriate use of the discretionary latitude they all felt they
had within each task.
Information
The questions relating to the information system referred to
the flow of communications from administrators downward in
sharing information among the instructional staff, and the
transmittal and use of information from teachers to
administrators. The principals were asked about the structural
channels for communications and the informal, qualitative sharing
of information. Managerial activities relating to information
are categorized by tasks in Table 5.
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Table 5
Information
Teacher Evaluation Information
1. Annual orientation workshop
2. Consistency checks with assistant principal(s) (3)
3. Schedule of observations
4. Collective bargaining schedule
5. Pre and post observation conferences
6. Formal observation as a basis for discussion (5); a
point of departure (2)
7. Informal walks through the classrooms (2)
8. We talk about what is expected, about what
a good lesson should look like (2)
9. Not just one meeting, but a number of
meetings
10. No written negatives: face to face for
negative comments
11. Prioritize deficiencies
12. Faith in the ability of other administrators
to see what teachers are doing in the
classroom (2,4)
B. Staff Development Information
1. District schedule posted in each school: no
in-school schedule (1,3,5)
2. Teacher representative to district
3. Administrative announcements (4),
4. At faculty meetings, so it becomes compulsory
5. Block grade-level planning meetings (1,2)
6. Department meetings with department heads (3,6)
7. Physical structure: office and classrooms of a
department are located nearby (5)
8. weekly bulletin (2),
9. curriculum council (6)
10. Evolves as the year progresses (1,5)
11. Invite others to work with faculty: district
curriculum specialists, university
professors, publishing house representatives
12. Encourage sharing, not required, (e.g., happens
naturally): no formal mechanism
13. Voluntary basis: emphasize need for it (4)
14. "I think this would be good for you" (6)
15. "Those that need information, seek it" (5)
16. Visits to other schools
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Table 5 continued
Curricular Development Information
1. State directives and district guidelines
2. Build a process and provide access (5)
3. Delegation of responsibility to department
heads and/or teacher(s)
4. Scope and sequence development (2,3)
5. Cabinet meetings among trusted aides
6. Brainstorming around ideas and faculty
interests (encourage innovations)
7. Provide baseline data and organize a system (5)
8. Keep results in front of teachers: "you are
part of a good school" (4)
9. "Beg, borrow, steal, find and bring it together
and unify it to make it uniform so that
everyone uses it" (5)
D. Selection of Texts and Instructional Materials' Infor-
mation
1. State textbook adoption list
2. Grade level consensus on instructional goals
3. Publishers' visits
4. Faculty meetings
5. No records on instructional materials in stock (1)
SumaryofInformation
The flow of information reflects both formal state and
district-school communications as well as specific intraschool-
level policies instituted by principals. A large amount of
information appears to be free-flowing and based on the trust of
certain individuals with the hope and expectation that the
information will be professionally used and shared.
Assessment
Principals were asked whether formal evaluations were
conducted for each of the curricular and instructional tasks.
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The principals were also asked to explain their own criteria of
assessment in addition to formal policies and procedures. Their
responses are categorized in Table 6.
Table 6
anaera Aciite Ctgrized by Tasks Under the Process of
Assessment
Teacher Evaluation Assessment
1. Compliance with state, district, and collective
bargaining agreement contract
2. Consistency check and philosophical agreement with
assistant principals (1,2,3) (see Information)
3. Fair and impersonal (3)
4. To improve instruction (see Standards)
5. Prescriptions, resources, further diagnoses:
follow-up through observations (5)
6. Summative decision-making: prescription and
termination (6) (see Incentives)
7. "I do not use formal observations first" (1);
Sit down informally and say, "Tell me
what's happening" (1)
8. Talk about positive things and the things that
need improvement: on-going (2)
9. Positive is very, very important (2) (see
Incentives)
10. Optimum performance from each teacher (5)
11. "I think generally you know who the better
teachers are" (5); "but I am not sure I know
who all of my better teachers are" (6)
12. "Look for what we think the problem is and then
we prioritize and work on one or two aspects"
(5); "I think [the instrument] leaves us some
discretion" (2)
13. Negatives are better to say face to face
because [teachers] read into something
negative that maybe is not there (2)
14. Union contract protects incompetent people (6)
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Table 6 continued
Staff Development Assessment
1. No procedures or records kept except with regard
to district workshops in which faculty earn
credits
2. Department heads fill out a form about what
they would like to accomplish (6)
3. Need to develop pride and professionalism (2)
4. Teachers who need information, will seek it (5)
C. Curricular Development Assessment
1. Test scores: nationally normed and state
assessments
2. Use project managers from the district area
office to help me objectively look at what's
going on (3)
3. Periodically attend grade level meetings (2)
4. Review mid-period reports and seek samples of
pupil's work (2)
5. No formal evaluations; not worth the time to do pre
-post tests (5)
6. RE: Reading: listen to children read, see how often
they pick up a book, see if it is fun (1)
7. RE: Reading and Math: Along more traditional lines:
we're using MacMillan Reading tests and Harcourt
Brace math tests (2)
8. RE: Humanities: everyone seems to like it; if we
have a demand for it next year, it is
successful (3)
9. RE: Computers: initial feedback from the students
and teachers has been very positive (4)
10. RE: Media Center: students not sitting idle,
programming, not playing games, log of
classes that use center (6)
11. RE: Magnet Program: formal evaluation, which was
not done by the district, to find out how we
were doing; we pulled together a committee
of people from the university and specialists
to review our curriculum (4)
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Table 6 continued
Selection of Textbooks and Instructional Materials' Assessment
1. State adopted textbook list
2. In faculty grade groups, we meet to evaluate
texts (1)
3. "I do not ask department heads how evaluations
are done" (6)
4. We have certain criteria that we establish to
evaluate instructional material: e.g. concentrates
more on reading, goals, thinking, a good
testing program (2,3)
5. Criteria are not written down, but they
are discussed enough
6. Hopefully faculty is doing a reading analysis (3,5)
7. Readability is the key barometer (5)
8. Grade level consensus, or, in the case of
reading texts, school-wide agreement
Summary of Assessment
The assessment of curricular and instructional tasks seems
to follow the same formal-informal dichotomy noted above, whereby
formal assessments are prescribed by the state or district or
collective bargaining contract and informal evaluations reflect
the perceptions, judgment, and managerial discretion of
principals. The line between the two dimensions is often blurred
as principals are able to "piggy-back" idiosyncratic criteria and
goals onto the formal assessment procedures. For example, with
the use of the teacher evaluation instrument or in curricular
assessments, principals have their own lists of meaningful,
priorities and criteria for judgment. At times, the formal and
informal mechanisms are at odds: formative improvement of
teaching and innovative programs versus summative decision-
making; professional development as measured by specific needs of
faculty versus earning credits for certification.
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Sole reliance on formal mechanisms such as test scores was
not evident. "Teachers can become complacent when they don't
have a right to be and others could become very upset, when
perhaps they have been doing an excellent job teaching, but for
some reason the scores at that level do not reflect what has
actually gone on" (1). Ironically, the evaluative school-level
criteria employed by principals are very explicit and easily
measured; yet, they have not received sufficient organizational
support to establish their legitimacy or public testing.
Incentives
Incentives are the planned and controlled distribution of
rewards (Mitchell, 1987; Mitchell & Peters, 1988). School-
building administrators face a unique organizational situation
whereby the most meaningful rewards to teachers do not come from
principals. The emphasis on intrinsic rewards distinguishes
school organizations from most other capitalistic/profit making
enterprises (Gevirtz, 1984). Intrinsic rewards are derived from
teaching students and in sharing with teacher colleagues.
Moreover, building administrators play almost no role in the
extrinsic rewards defined by salary and promotions (Bidwell,
1965; Lortie, 1969; Mitchell, 1987).
In the interviews, principals were asked about the kinds of
rewards, recognition, and negative sanctions, as well as the way
in which rewards, if any, were distributed. Their responses are
categorized in Table 7.
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Table 7
2 V1Ma iiisCtgrized by Tasks Under the Process of
Incentives
Teacher Evaluation Incentives
1. Teachers rated as "acceptable" or
"unacceptable" on formal instrument
2. On formal instrument, little room for comments (3)
3. Follow-up conference with teachers
4. Formal prescriptive procedures
5. Pressure to retire (6)
6. Transferring of teachers
7. Termination: "I have no teachers on prescription
right now. Last year, maybe one to three" (6); for
the last two years, no teachers have been judged
"unacceptable" (1)
8. No tangible rewards
9. Pat on back (6); verbal "I like what you are doing"
10. Note or memo in teacher's mailbox or in staff
bulletin
11. Positive is very, very important (2); encouragement
(6)
12. Annual letters (4)
13. Teacher of the year (4)
14. "Let's sit down and talk [informally] about [a
problem]" (3)
15. Let teachers [who need help] observe others, use
video equipment for self-improvement (1)
16. Give attention to teachers who are in need of
help (4)
Staff Development Incentives
1. Academic or certification credit for staff
development
2. Self improvement is a reward in itself (1,6)
3. Collective bargaining contract limits the number
of staff meetings
---------------------- 
- ------
4. Use of staff meeting time or workday for credit
5. Released time and class coverage with substitutes
6. Teachers help plan workshops (5)
7. Workshops on specific teacher needs, not just
generic skills (5)
8. Spend money out of school's budget
9. Schedule of staff development negotiated with
faculty: "knowing that [a workshop] will take more
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Table 7 continued
than an hour, I would say, 'there will be no other
meetings this month" (4)
10. Positive feedback if I see something from a workshop
implemented
11. Letters in personnel file
12. Attend out-of-building workshop or conference
Curricular Development Incentives
1. State is requiring a lot more curricular objectives
without giving budgetary support (1,2,5,6)
2. Encourage faculty interest
3. Use of released time and substitutes for teachers
and department heads: to write scope and sequence;
to plan new courses; to visit other schools (3)
4. Send teachers to conferences
5. Use in-house, school resources (5)
6. Cautious not to reward or recognize an individual,
department or grade level over another
7. Publicize test scores for each class (1)
8. "I don't see programs as being less or more success-
ful; I see certain teachers, certain grade levels,
certain students, but I don't see a whole program
in my school as unsuccessful" (1)
9. "I think that each of the individual teachers, where
they are being successful, know they're
successful; and those who are not as successful,
know that we are trying to help them" (4)
Selection of Textbooks and Instructional Materials' Incentives
1. A small school hurts for money for materials; a
large school has greater opportunities (1,2,3)
2. Assign responsibility to teachers
3. "Nobody is given a budget. You turn in what you
need. What are your requests? I figure it is my
responsibility to meet those requests. I've
always been able to get people what they wanted"
(3)
4. "If something is not on the state adoption list and
we want it, I'll purchase it some other way,
rather than go through textbook monies" (6)
5. "I use [our two xerox machines] all day long and all
night long for running off instructional
materials" (5)
6. "I don't think I have said no to a teacher for
anything" (5)
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summary-of Incentives
The formal structure for the distribution of rewards
minimized opportunities for principals to recognize outstanding
performance within their schools. In teacher evaluation, an
"acceptable" rating was the highest recognition on the formal
instrument. Principals, therefore, found ways to acknowledge
good work through written and verbal announcements and informal
pats-on-the-back. Negative sanctions are, indeed, rare - with
few teachers on prescription to improve a particular skill and
hardly anyone terminated for lack of competency.
The incentives for staff development were restricted
primarily by the responsibilities of classroom teaching.
Principals negotiated with faculty to use workday time and staff
meetings for workshops as well as buy released time and classroom
substitutes. With little or no formal requirements, other than
for prescriptive mode teachers, or records, principals relied on
persuasive techniques to encourage staff development.
State and district course requirements severely limited
school-level innovations. New programs were developed primarily
through mutual principal-teacher initiatives. Yet principals
seemed overly concerned about distributing recognition equitably
across grades and departments.
In the area of instructional materials, principals stated
that they went out of their way to say yes to teacher requests.
At the same time, with textbooks, they required a faculty
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consensus before taking action.
In sum, principals distributed praise, facilitate
professional credit for maintenance or advancement, tempered
internal competition, buffered external criticisms, and provided
resources through regular budgeted or discretionary funds.
Conclusions
For each of the four managerial control processes,
principals carefully followed externally prescribed policies,
guidelines, and structural arrangements. This so-called
structural dimension established constraints on their managerial
activities, yet it was also seen by principals as points of
departure and a basis on which to go beyond the structures.
While many of the informal managerial activities have been so
routinized as to be indistinguishable from structural constraints
(Crowson & Morris, 1985), there was clearly a category of
managerial activities that reflected opportunities for
discretionary behavior (Morris, Crowson, Porter-Guthrie, &
Hurwitz, 1984). The latter dimension is predicated on the
individual principal's views concerning education in general and
the unique circumstances of their schools in particular.
Through the words spoken here, each principal exercised a
wide range of discretionary managerial behaviors which defined
the schools' criteria for standards, information, assessments,
and incentives, all within the framework of prescribed practice.
Although the principals publicly espoused school-wide goals, they
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placed a great deal of emphasis on trusting certain individuals
to professionally perform their curricular and instructional
tasks. This trust was translated into mutual activities and
school policies regarding good teaching, programmatic
innovations, staff development opportunities, and teacher
resources. Neither the criteria nor the practice in this
dimension were formally expressed, yet principals based their
judgments in teacher evaluation, curriculum, and instructional
materials on this personal, school-level criteria, rather than on
formal procedures and evaluations. Within this qualitative
managerial dimension, school-level priorities were established.
As a result, many school-level priorities and whatever risks of
decision-making they entail, specifically in programmatic
innovations, were protected from public scrutiny. In addition,
principals proceeded with caution when it came to setting
instrumental standards, evaluating teachers, and distributing
rewards and sanctions.
It is from the collective voices of our sample principal
population that data have been analyzed. In addition, the use of
a standard interview guideline permits the collection and tally
of nominal data as broad parameters of managerial behaviors.
Thus, we can summarize the diversity of responses under
standards, information, assessments, and incentives and for the
different curricular and instructional tasks. Again, these data
make no reference to the frequency or efficacy of the managerial
behaviors.
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From the summary of interview transcripts, a total of 156
managerial behaviors were recorded: 53 behaviors were defined as
formally prescribed or structurally determined; 103 defined as
discretionary or qualitative behaviors.
Table 8 shows the nominal rank order of all managerial
behaviors, both structural and qualitative. Incentives ranked
just ahead of information, with assessments and standards having
the least number of activities.
Table 8
Nominal RnOreofManaerial Activities by Control Process
Number of
Control Process Activities
Incentives 43
Information 42
Assessments 37
Standards 34
Total: 156
In Table 9, the responses were categorized by tasks across
all four control processes. The number of managerial teacher
evaluation activities were more than double the textbook and
instructional materials' selection behaviors, indicating that
principals exercised a wider variety of activities in teacher
evaluation than in the other curricular and instructional tasks.
Given contractual responsibilities for annual teacher evaluation
observations, the high rank might suggest the influence of
external directives on in-school managerial behaviors.
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Table 9
InstructionalTak
Curricular and Number of
Instructional Tasks Activities
Teacher Evaluation 55
Staff Development 40
Curriculum Development 36
Selection of Texts 25
Total: 156
Table 10 presents the number of activities of tasks by
control processes. Teacher evaluation incentives and staff
development information ranked highest followed by teacher
evaluation assessments and standards.
Table 10
Rank Order of Maaeia Activities Categorized by Tasks Within
Control Processes
Number of
Tasks/Process Activities
Teacher Evaluation Incentives 16
Staff Development Information 16
Teacher Evaluation Assessments 14
Teacher Evaluation Standards 13
Total: 59
Table 11 indicates the numerical differences between the
structurally required tasks and discretionary or qualitative
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managerial activities. The data support the view that there are
a wider variety of discretionary activities within curriculum and
instruction than formal mechanisms available to school
administrators, especially when it comes to assessments and
incentives. With respect to assessments, principals articulated
their own criteria of success, particularly for teacher
evaluation and curriculum development. Regarding incentives, the
difference is more likely to be attributable to the limited
formal or extrinsic incentives provided by school-level
administrators to teachers. What may account for the large
difference in textbook selection and staff development is the
relatively few formal procedures pertaining to curriculum and
instruction established either at the state, district, or school
levels (Tulley & Farr, 1985).
Table 11
Selected Differences Between the Two Dimensions of Structure and
Discretion
Structural Discretionary
Tasks/Process Activities Activities
Curriculum Development Assessment 2 9
Curriculum Development Incentives 1 8
Selection of Texts Assessments 1 7
Staff Development Incentives 3 9
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Implications
There are basically two ways to approach the implications
from a preliminary study such as this. The first approach is to
use the data in order to further test (i.e., validate) the
original findings concerning school managerial control processes.
The data provide specific behaviors in which to establish the
meaning of the four control processes as they relate to school-
level management of curriculum and instruction.
The second direction is to examine the data and generate a
list of hypotheses about managerial control of curricular and
instructional tasks.
The findings in general confirm that principals and school-
building administrators are engaged in managerial activities
related to curriculum and instruction across diverse tasks and
along four control processes. These managerial activities are
further categorized by structural constraints and discretionary
or qualitative behaviors. Thus, a conceptual model of curricular
and instructional school managerial control is offered in Figure
1 as follows:
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Figure_1. Curricular and instructional school managerial
control model
MANAGERIAL BEHAVIORS
STRUCTURE S
DISCRETION C E
S U L
P T T R
R STANDARDS E A R T
0 A F E
C C F D X
E INFORMATION H E T
S D V
S E E
E ASSESSMENTS V V
INCENTIVES TASKS' CONTEXT
The construct validation path is not well travelled
within the literature of educational administration.
Nevertheless, it is critical to the advancement in the
understanding of complex managerial activities within complex
organizations (Hughes, Price, & Marrs, 1986). At the same time,
the advancement of knowledge is also served by hypothesizing and
hypothesis testing. This preliminary study may also be helpful
along these lines as well.
There are numerous hypotheses (or characteristics) suggested
by the interview data from these curriculum-oriented principals.
Several are listed here in no particular order of priority.
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1. Curriculum-oriented principals tend to estimate their
percentage involvement with curricular and instructional tasks
higher than do typical principals as reported in the literature
on principals.
a. They tend to use language from effective
school research, particularly high expectations
and time on task.
b. They have had principaling experience at
a least one previous school.
2. Curriculum-oriented principals are aware of their
school's unique character and specific needs.
a. They initiate or support innovative projects
which they publicly label "successful."
3. Curriculum-oriented principals go beyond the parameters
of externally directed policies (formal structures), yet are
careful to demonstrate that policies are followed.
a. They are "critically accepting" of external
policies and formal structures. (e.g., the
formal teacher evaluation instrument, state
legislation and directives, collective
bargaining contract, district staff
development priorities).
b. They tend to believe that the criteria used in
their own evaluations have less to do with
formal performance appraisal systems than with
other principal behaviors (i.e., community
support, school climate, and problem-solving
ability); they defined accountability in terms
of their clients and themselves, rather than
for their area director.
c. They tend to rely initially on informal
structure and behaviors before proceeding to
formal structures and policies, but utilize
both in completing tasks.
d. They all have faith and confidence in the
performance of certain members of their
immediate staff (assistant principals,
department heads, or trusted teachers).
e. They all articulate good teaching criteria
above and beyond the formal instrument for
evaluating teachers.
f. They all exercise extreme care and caution when
it comes to rewards and recognition of
individual teachers and instructional programs.
g. They minimize the role of formal evaluation of
programs, hardware, and materials in favor of
personal school-building objectives.
4 Curriculum-oriented principals utilize formal structures
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to facilitate and encourage communication and professionalism
among teachers and staff (e.g., planning by grade levels in the
elementary school, scheduling inservice and staff development at
faculty meetings).
a. They devise strategies to overcome constraints
of policy, budget, and contract (e.g., use of
discretionary budget account and
negotiating
with faculty over the schedule of staff
meetings).
5. Curriculum-oriented principals readily acknowledge that
teachers play a major role, if not the major role, in the
implementation of curriculum and in the selection of
instructional materials.
a. They rank affective classroom or
organizational qualities higher than subject
area knowledge in selecting teachers.
b. They are aware of their limitations in
controlling instruction and, therefore, come to
rely on selling ideas and beliefs, increasing
participation, and demonstrating administrative
care.
6. The behaviors described by curriculum-oriented
principals do not confirm the validity of standards, information,
assessment, or incentives. Other systematic frameworks for
analysis need to be hypothesized and tested.
Summary
To give meaning and contextual understanding to the four
managerial control processes identified by social science
research, in-depth interviews were conducted with six curriculum-
oriented school principals. The large number of responses
suggested that the curricular and instructional role of
principals was complex. In order to analyze the data, the
responses were categorized under each control process across
diverse curricular and instructional tasks. A managerial control
model was presented, reflecting both structural and discretionary
managerial activities. As a preliminary study, the data from the
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interviews were used to further test and measure the model in a
subsequent study. In addition, the data were quantified in order
to indicate broad parameters of school-building managerial
behaviors and to generate a number of hypotheses for further
empirical testing.
The next steps in the construct validation process call for
operationalizing the definitions of the managerial control
processes, which are themselves abstract concepts. A clearer
description of the interrelationship between the three
hypothesized dimensions (see Figure 1) is presented along with
literature references to support the choices of salient,
observable indicators. Together with the findings from the
preliminary study, the indicators were used to develop survey
items for further data collection and analyses.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Operational Measures of Managerial Control
Introduction
An explicit description of the managerial control process
model is a necessary step in theory development. From the
literature reviews of social science control theories (Chapter
Two) emerged the four managerial processes: standards,
information, assessments, and incentives. These managerial
control processes were then placed within the context of school
building managerial activities inside the domain of curricular
and instructional tasks. The preliminary empirical study
(Chapter Three) suggested that each of these rational control
processes had, at least, two dimensions of behavioral indicators
for managerial control behaviors: structural and discretionary.
The next step in articulating the model is to operationalize and
measure both the processes and their behavioral indicators.
Towards that end, the entire chapter is devoted to operational
definitions and to the identification of salient, observable
indicators.
Dimensions of Manaerial Control
The topic of dimensionality is relevant to both substantive
as well as statistical analyses (Kruskal & Wish, 1978, p. 48).
Technically, dimensionality refers to "the number of coordinate
values used to locate a point in the space. This is basically
the same notion as the number of factors in factor analysis" (p.
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48). Other meanings of the term refer to a direction of
particular interest or an underlying characteristic of an object
under study (p. 48). Statistical analyses, however, may not
always reveal direction or characteristics; thus, dimensionality
is ultimately a matter of interpretation.
Philosophical Foundations of Processes and Behavioral Indicators
Although the social science literature reviews have
contributed to an understanding of control as a practical
administrative science, they do not offer a comprehensive
framework for understanding the theoretical construct. Still
lacking are the categories [logical, empirical, or symbolic] in
which to confidently organize empirical data.
In traditional Western philosophy, there have been two paths
by which epistemological confidence has been attained: along the
first path, knowledge proceeds directly through intuition and
logical categories of judgment to understanding; along the second
path, knowledge begins in experience before arriving at an
understanding of physical reality. Despite intellectual efforts
to reconcile these two paths, epistemology has remained a matter
of drawing a line between logical judgments and the physical
reality of things.
Aristotle was the first Western philosopher to attempt to
combine logical form with physical matter by giving material
meaning to ideal (i.e., platonic) forms and by establishing
formal, logical rules to underlie changing circumstances and
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situations (McKeon, 1970, pp. 7ff.). Form and matter could be
united through the essential attribute(s) of things (p. 9).
Aristotle constructed a model of logical categories
underlying matter and experience (pp. 15-28). The model
consisted of three logical categories: quantity, relative, and
quality. Quantity was defined as discrete or continuous,
divisible in number, and existing in time and space. When
something is defined as quantitative, it is known "only by
reference to something external" (p. 16).
The second logical category, relative, comes into existence
simultaneously, that is, "it is impossible to know that a thing
is relative, unless we know that to which it is relative" (p. 4).
The third logical category is called quality, "in virtue of
which people [or things] are said to be such and such" (p. 23).
Qualitative aspects include habits, customs, and dispositions.
Today, the term organizational culture has been affixed to this
logical category. Most qualities have contraries and can have
varying degrees. Hence, there are cultural differences.
The 18th century empiricist, Hume, took exception to
Aristotle's model of logical categories. Hume held that there
can be "no idea of substance [i.e., essential attributes] apart
from a collection of particular qualities" (Copleston, 1964, p.
71). Two significant implications emerged from the empirical
framework: (1) that causality was nothing more than the
continuous association of "simple ideas" which occur immediately
to us over time and space, and (2) that learning was not a matter
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of definitions or words alone, but rather of providing
impressions or empirical examples.
These empirical implications, in turn, deeply troubled
Immanuel Kant, an 18th century rationalist, since Hume's
empiricism would seem to limit all knowledge to experience
(Smith, 1965, p. 127) and rule out the possibility of there being
certain knowledge of physical things. Kant opened his renowned
Criti ue of Pure Reason with the statement that, "[t]here can be
no doubt that all knowledge begins with experience" (p. 41).
Yet, while "all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not
follow that it all arises out of experience" (p. 41). Thus,
Kant, as had Aristotle before him, sought to link the two paths
of human knowledge: sensibility and understanding (p. 61).
The Kantian model assumed that objects must conform to our
knowledge; i.e., "determining something in regard to them prior
to their being given" (p. 22). Kant reduced human understanding
to the concept of judgments (p. 106) through two taxonomies: one
of judgments, and a second, arising from the first, of intuition.
It was this derived relationship between the judgment and
intuition which, according to Kant, distinguished his complete
system from Aristotle's "haphazard search" (p. 114). Both
Kantian taxonomies contained four categories of knowledge:
quantity, quality, relation, and, a new category, called
modality. Modality was defined as having three logical [not
objective] functions: problematic [the possible], assertoric [the
real or rue], and apoditic [the necessary]. "[I]nasmuch as we
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first judge something problematically, then maintain its truth
assertorically, and finally affirm it as inseparably united with
the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictic - we are
justified in regarding these three functions of modality as so
many moments of thought" (p. 110).
In the derived Table of Intuition (p. 113) all four
categories of knowledge are included. Yet, it is the
interrelationship of the categories which is important. To know
a physical entity is to know each of its essential aspects, i.e.,
its quantity, quality, relation, and modality; for, separate and
apart, the categories offer only incomplete explanations.
To Hegel, who dominated rational philosophy in the 19th
century, the definitions and labels of the logical categories
were of no real concern (Baillie, 1967). Instead, Hegel focused
on the method and unity of reason, a totality so all encompassing
and absolute that plurality, endless and finite variations, and
individuality were part of the system (pp. 45-47). The unifying
principle of subject and object was thought (p. 48). The higher
the level of awareness, the more unified the relationship (p.
48). Yet, even at the pinnacle of rational knowledge, experience
was still considered the raw material of knowledge. Experience
and history needed to be understood through logical categories,
but not as isolated incidents and details (p. 57).
In the pragmaticism espoused by James (1968), the criteria
for how and where to draw the line between knowledge of physical
objects and understanding, between matter and form, and between
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experience and reason became an issue of human temperament (p.
7). In philosophical pragmaticism, the tough-minded empiricist
and the tender-minded rationalist (p. 9) can walk down the path
of knowledge together. "[T]he one thing that has counted so far
in philosophy is that a man should see things, see them straight
in his own peculiar way, and be dissatisfied with any opposite
way of seeing them" (author's emphasis, p. 7). The focus of
attention is on practical consequences, not on alternative
explanations. Instead of looking at categories and principles,
the pragmatist looks at facts and consequences (p. 27). "The
pragmatist clings to facts and concreteness, observes truth at
its work in particular cases, and generalizes" (p. 33). Whatever
hypothesis proves itself to be good, no matter the source,
rational or empirical, is accepted as true (pp. 37-38). The
pragmatic method can thus be applied to questions of substance,
categories, attributes, unity, and plurality asking always for
the practical consequences of alternative views.
The pragmatic solution, of course, did not satisfy everyone.
Modern philosophers have continued the debate between rational
and empirical traditions. For example, Russell (1970) agreed
with Kant vis a vis the priority of a theory [i.e., necessary
truths grasped by the mind] of knowledge (pp. 82-90). On the
other hand, Russell held that laws of thought were beliefs about
things, not just about thoughts. They are "fact[s] concerning
the things in the world" (author's emphasis, p. 89). Ayer (1952)
divided propositions into two classes: ideas and matters of fact
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(p. 31), He believed that metaphysical statements concerning
consciousness were nonsense. To Quine (1961), the distinction
between analytic and synthetic was imaginary. All things are
matters of fact; the only differences are in degree (pp. 44-46).
Although the philosophy of phenomenology accepted empiricism
as its starting point, holding that direct encounters are better
than no contact or indirect contact (Zaner, 1970. p. 37), it
distinguishes itself from empiricism in stating that the problem
of knowing is more complex than observing sense objects (p. 38)
and having perceptions based on these objects. That is, "...our
experience is far richer than empiricism could admit" (p. 38).
"Not only are there different ways of experiencing the same thing
- sense perceptually (in different modes), remembering,
imagining, depicting, expecting, and still others - but some
things are not at all accessible or reducible to sensory
perception- for example, one's own mind and mental processes..."
(p. 38). Phenomenology, therefore, resurrected essences and
universals given in pure intuition [i.e., direct awareness]:
reducing objects to their universals.
Husserl, a central figure in 20th century phenomenology, was
interested in processes, not in the existence or non-existence of
objects (Nakhnikian, 1964, p. xiii). The world is constituted by
the intentional acts of the transcendental ego. Intentionality
characterizes judgments, beliefs, meanings, values, and desires.
Phenomenology accepts the relativism of individuals and cultures
by acknowledging the problematic character of philosophy (Zaner,
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1970, p. 22). The philosophic method is to look for the best
obtainable evidence (p. 39).
An alternative view of knowledge was offered by S. Langer
(1952). She wrote that one result of a two dimensional approach
to knowledge i.e., rationalism and empiricism, is a "peculiar
hybrid of concept and precept, the given 'fact'" (p. 231). "A
philosophy that knows only deductive or inductive logic as
reason, and classes all other human functions as 'emotive,'
irrational, and animalian, can see only regression to a
prelogical state in the present passionate and unscientific
ideologies.... They are residues, emotional disturbances,.... But
a theory of mind whose keynote is the symbolic function,...is not
obliged to draw that bifurcating line between science and folly"
(p. 246). "New conceptual forms are crowding out the traditional
empirical-rational duality, but these conceptions are themselves
just only at the mythological phase..." (p. 246).
The recent emergence of organizational and leadership
culture (Deal, 1987; Sergiovanni, 1987) and the symbolic
framework (Bolman & Deal, 1984) may be understood within both S.
Langer's symbolic transformation as well as in the problematic
methods of phenomenology. The acceptance that real meanings lie
within residual concepts has given rise to cultural and
qualitative explanations within social scientific hypotheses.
The residual findings reported by structural analysts support S.
Langer's (1952) view that epistemology is not "discursive
reasoning about well-conceived problems" (p. 246). Political,
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social, and psychological dynamics express the need to organize
and decipher interactive data into meaning (Bacharach & Lawler,
1982).
"The problem caused by the intrusion of subjective values
into its inquiries has always troubled social science, which has
struggled, without too much success, to attain the presumed
'value-free' objectivity of the natural sciences" (Heilbroner,
1975, p. 22). The challenge rightly falls to philosophy to frame
the parameters of this new journey which travels beyond social
scientific restrictions. Of all the academic disciplines, only
philosophy, with its intentional skepticism and critical
attitude, seems prepared to withstand being shipwrecked on the
shoals of non-reason or non-empiricism (Jaspers, 1955, p. 119).
Neither empirical evidence nor proposed a priori definitions have
been able to prove that the thing itself - e.g., the construct of
managerial control - existed. It is fitting that Aristotle
provided the most heuristic guidelines for establishing construct
validity: "In establishing a definition by division, one should
keep three objects in view: (1) the admission only of elements in
the definable form, (2) the arrangement of these in the right
order, (3) the omission of no such elements" (McKeon, 1970, pp.
175ff.).
The concept of managerial control is a charged linguistic
symbol: neither purely technical, nor purely utilitarian. It has
multiple meanings, some of which are beyond empirical
interactions or purposive acts. "Our perception organizes it,
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giving it an individual definite Gestalt" (S. Langer, 1952, p.
240). "...[W]e control each other's merely incipient behavior
with fantasies of force. We employ sanctions, threaten vague
penalties, and try to forestall offenses by merely exhibiting the
symbols of their consequences.... (T)he power of symbols enables
us not only to limit each other's actions, but to command them;
not only to restrain one another, but to constrain" (author's
emphasis, p. 241).
Clearly, the qualitative, cultural, and symbolic metaphors
have emerged to challenge the rational-empirical dichotomy in
organizational analyses. These concepts represent a new
beginning; but the failure of structural analyses to produce a
comprehensive theory with descriptive validity does not justify
total disbandonment. The logical categories derived from
philosophical analyses represent different dimensions of
knowledge. Kant and Arististole offered us quantity, quality,
and relativity. The fourth logical category, modality, is a
process, perhaps Hegelian, or pragmatic, or phenomenological, or
even symbolic. The categories and processes are inextricably
linked such that analyses of only one aspect at a time cannot
solve the problems of knowledge.
The model of managerial control proposed at the conclusion
of Chapter Three (see Figure 1) can be redrawn in philosophical
terms. Thus, Figure 2 below depicts the modality of processes,
the managerial behaviors of quantity and quality, and the
relational context. Alternative explanations for the meanings of
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each philosophic term have been offered. Processes may be
rational, pragmatic, or even symbolic (Meyer & Rowan, 1977);
likewise, the tasks by which context is fully known are a
combination of objective technology and subjective beliefs
(Dornbusch & Scott, 1971). Moreover, both logical categories of
managerial behaviors, quantity (e.g., structure) as well as
quality (e.g., discretion and culture) must be part of the
measurement construct.
Figure_2. Theoretical model of construct validation for
managerial concepts
CATEGORIES
MANAGERIALBEHAVIORS
RELATIONAL
MODALITY
CONTEXT
PROCESSES
_Structure and Meng ofMngrilBhvors
Organizationally, there is a structure within which regular
patterns of observable managerial behaviors operate. It is known
to us by reference to something external, whether formal or
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informal. From the literature reviews came numerous examples of
the quantitative-structural referents:
1. formal authority structure (Lang)
a. organizational levels (Blau & Scott)
b. supervisory control (Duke; Mahoney & Frost;
Turcotte)
c. prescribed roles (Child; Rowan; Scott & Scott)
d. legitimate power (French & Raven; Pfeffer)
e. size (Applewhite; Child; Elmore; Peterson)
2. technology and work processes (Bacharach; Cohen &
Miller; Dornbusch & Scott; Eisenhardt;
Koontz; Mahoney & Frost; Ouchi; Pfeffer;
Thompson)
3. tenure (Applewhite; Etzioni)
4. standards (Koontz; Mahoney & Frost)
a. organizational goals (Peterson; Bossert)
b. performance standards (Bossert; Doud &
Montgomery; Koontz; Ouchi; Vickers)
5. information (Applewhite; Bacharach & Lawler;
Pfeffer; Sproull)
a. information systems (Eisenhardt; Pfeffer;
Schein)
b. information processors (Sproull)
c. exchange of information (Bossert; Cohen &
Miller)
d. control of flow (Bossert)
e. expertise (French & Raven)
f. staff development (Mahoney & Frost)
h. committees (Mahoney & Frost)
6. planning and preparation (Bossert; FCEM; Mahoney &
Frost)
7. output results (Blau & Scott; Mahoney & Frost;
Ouchi; Peterson)
a. evaluation systems (Dornbusch & Scott; Duke;
Ellett; Pfeffer)
b. material rewards (Etzioni; Lawler & Rhode)
8. costs (Eisenhardt; Katz & Kahn)
9. scheduling (Bossert)
10. appointments (Bossert)
11. lobbying for administrative support (Bossert)
12. selection (Etzioni; Peterson)
Likewise, organizationally, quality conveys meanings which
are associated with structure or behaviors, affecting attitudes,
beliefs, or even subsequent behaviors. Attitudes involve
evaluative judgments (i.e., beliefs). "When specific attitudes
175
are organized into a hierarchical structure, they comprise value
systems" (author's emphasis) (Katz, 1965, p.277). Here, too, the
social science literature offered numerous qualitative-
discretionary, managerial referents:
1. influence (Bacharach & Lawler; Lerbinger)
a. environmental interdependence (R. Campbell, et
al.; Eisenhardt; Peterson; Pfeffer)
b. processes (Bossert; Pfeffer; Wellisch)
c. ideas and advice (Cartwright)
d. informal structure (Bacharach; Cartwright;
Lerbinger)
e. sentiment (Lerbinger)
f. attitudes, beliefs, and motives (Cartwright;
Katz)
g. more than rules and directives (Cartwright)
h. inconspicuous (Bruner)
i. language, myths, stories (Bruner; Meyer &
Rowan)j, ideology (Johnston)
2. beliefs and preferences (Thompson)
a. self-interests (Deal; House & Mitchell)
b. illusion of control (E. Langer; R. Harrison)
3. discretion and choice (Mahoney & Frost; Thompson)
a. variance control (Miles & Vergin)
b. probability limits (Patz & Rowe)
c. discretionary use of funds (Bossert)
d. exchange process (Cohen & Miller)
e. freedom to fail (Miles & Vergin; Myers)
4. internalization of standards (Black; Locke)
a. individuals' subjective needs (J. Campbell, et
al.; Mitchell)
b. intelligibility and clarity (Bruner)
c. confusion (Elmore; Frank)
d. identitive organizations (Etzioni)
5. task conceptions i.e., beliefs (Dornbusch & Scott)
6. cooperation (Floden, et al.; Mahoney & Frost)
a. limit competition between programs (Bossert)
b. understanding and social control (Eisenhardt;
Scott & Scott)
c. identification and mutual admiration of
individuals on different levels i.e., referent
leadership (French & Raven)
d. individuals' identification (Burnstein;
Etzioni; Heilbroner)
e. affiliative trait (Bruner; Heilbroner)
7. intrinsic rewards (Eisenhardt; French & Raven;
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Mitchell)
a. praise (Cohen & Miller)
b. encouragement (Bossert)
c. public rewards (Bossert)
d. symbolic rewards (Etzioni)
e. opportunities (Bruner)
8. maintaining good relationships (Bossert)
a. protection of teachers (Bossert; Leiter;
Thompson)
b. risk propensity (Marzano, et al.)
9. high expectations (Bossert; Edmonds; Little & Bird)
a. public acceptance of a program (Bossert)
b. promote programs outside school (Bossert)
c. moral discourse (Burnell & Reeve; Skinner)
10. manipulation, coercion, and physical sanctions
(Etzioni; Gibbs; Skinner)
11. favoritism (Blase)
12. persuasiveness (Bacharach & Lawler; Burnell & Reeve;
Cartwright; Skinner)
a. voluntary submission (Bacharach)
b. commitment (Marzano, et al.)
13. satisfaction (C. Greene; Hoy & Miskel)
This conceptual duality of quantity and quality within
organizational structure and behaviors is certainly not novel.
Researchers have tested the strength, interaction effects, and
causality of all of the variables listed above. In the majority
of these studies, the qualitative variables emerged as residual
findings from structural analyses. These non-structural findings
have subsequently become the bases for political, sociological,
and psychological studies (Ames & Ames, 1987; Pfeffer, 1978a;
Scott & Scott, 1971), as well as alternative models of
organizational analyses (Astuto & Clark, 1985; M. Harrison,
1987).
Until recently, the dominant organizational paradigm has
been rational bureaucracy. Within this model, the organization
has been portrayed metaphorically as a machine. "Control
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procedures are designed to monitor the machine's performance
along a number of dimensions and to dispatch various reports to
upper level officials. Management in this model stands at the
'control panel,' alert to evidence of negative deviation from the
pre-established standards and procedures and ready to pull
switches and twist dials to enforce compliance at any point at
which deviation may occur" (Miles & Vergin, 1966). The
impersonal control mechanisms in a modern bureaucracy are (1)
rules, (2) computer mechanization, (3) performance records, (4)
recruitment and training and (5) incentives (Blau & Scott, 1962,
p. 185). Although under certain conditions or for routine tasks,
the machine metaphor may be appropriate (Hofstede, 1978), the
complexities of organizations revealed a multiplicity of control
functions as well as the necessity for overall control (Lorange &
Morton, 1977).
Cybernetic theory is related to the mechanistic model
(Hofstede, 1978), but with one significant difference: the
concept of self-regulation. Narrowly defined, the term
cybernetics refers to any self-regulating system that is amenable
to mathematical formalization; however, in its broadest, holistic
sense, cybernetics is "the general science of the control over
complex systems, information, and communications" (Dechert, 1969,
p. 70). When cybernetics incorporated social systems, both man
and society were viewed as self-regulating. The implication from
a managerial perspective was that self-regulation resulted from
sensitivity and learning, guided by perceptions of the future.
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Koontz (1971) related control systems to cybernetic theory
through: (1) the identification of deviations or the difference
between desired performance and actual performance; (2) the
analysis of the deviations, (3) a program of corrective action,
and (4) the implementation of corrections (p. 140). In order to
have such a rational process system, Koontz reasoned that it
would be necessary to teach the nature and philosophy of the
system. As a conceptual tool, cybernetics relates perceptions to
values, and values are a matter of culture (Dechert, 1969). In
practice, however, control is "largely a matter of techniques"
(Koontz, 1971, P. 140). Thus, one must study the adequacy of the
perceptions within a specific culture or context in order to
discover whether the techniques of managerial control can evoke
self-regulating responses.
In Ames and Ames (1987), the contrast between quantitative
measures and qualitative measures of motivation was made clear.
The former describes the activity, energy, and persistence
inferred from achievement levels. On the other hand, the
qualitative definition of motivation is related to the different
values or goal orientations, the different ways of processing or
attending to information, and the different cognitions
(perceptions and interpretations) about performance. Their
research findings on how specific goals and values affected
students and teacher perceptions, attributes, self-evaluations,
and beliefs about strategies of action reported differences of
perceptions based on the beliefs and values of the subjects.
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A qualitative perspective focuses on the beliefs of the
perceiver. Thus, understanding behavior is not simply a matter
of hypotheses-testing about rational information-processing
systems or issuing normative prescriptions. The reasons why
people hold particular attitudes goes to the level of
psychological motivations, a level distinct from external events
and situations (Katz, 1965, p. 279). Consequently, Ames and Ames
(1987) and Mitchell (1987) have concluded that principals needed
to be more aware of teacher belief systems.
Astuto and Clark (1985) developed an organizational taxonomy
of coupling relationships based on the distinction between
quantity and quality within structures and behaviors. The
authors used their taxonomy to conduct a meta-analysis of case
studies of effective schools to determine whether administrative-
teacher relationships supported strong bureaucratic or loosely
coupled assumptions. Fifty-nine case studies were "interviewed"
using closed-ended questions adapted from the Rand Corporation
comparative case survey technique. The measure used to determine
structure or quantitative interactions was frequency, while the
qualitative interactions were measured by the degree of
reliability, responsiveness, harmony, and dependence. Astuto and
Clark (1985) defined reliability as consistency and stability;
responsiveness as "the extent to which one (organizational)
element adjusts quickly to altered conditions of another
element." The authors further described reciprocity, harmony,
rapidity, dependence - relational interactions within the
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qualitative dimension.
The language used by Astuto and Clark (1985) to describe
qualitative interactions had already been part of the expansive
language previously used to discuss organizational control
(Frank, 1958-59; Lawler & Rhode, 1976; Patz & Rowe, 1977;
Turcotte 1974; Vickers, 1967). Each of these control theorists
found structural language too restrictive (i.e., homeostatic)
and, therefore, expressed the need to substitute expansive
language incorporating growth and maturity into the discussion.
There has not always been a clear delineation between
quantity and quality. For example, under reliability, a
qualitative measure, Astuto & Clark (1985) have grouped the
following managerial behaviors: regularly scheduled inservice,
coordination, series of information-sharing meetings, weekly
calendar, regular monitoring throughout the year with feedback,
ongoing interaction - each of which seems to be, in this
reviewer's judgment, a structural variable - with qualitative
variables such as (a) commitment to all teachers and (b) a sense
of order. The latter are beliefs and attitudes which may result
from the structural managerial activities listed above.
Astuto and Clark (1985) reported that consistency levels
under the reliability variable were high, suggesting to the
authors that principals invested schools with a sense of order,
predictability, and purpose; they also found that systematic
mechanisms were in place to facilitate effective communication.
Although the authors stated that as the coupling taxonomy was
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refined, more variables would provide more precision in the
analysis. Nevertheless, the definitions offered and their
implications are certainly worth pursuing further.
One of the major weaknesses of control systems is that
measures of qualitative factors and individual development are
more difficult to ascertain than structural mechanisms since
qualitative measures vary in completeness, objectivity, and
difficulty of influence (Lawler & Rhode, 1976, pp.42-45). For
example, regardless of the amount of feedback given employees, it
is how much they perceive they have that affects their reactions
to their jobs. (p. 80). Dornbusch and Scott (1975) reported a
similar finding with respect to technology. Their definition of
"task conceptions" was based not on the objective characteristics
of a task, but rather on subjective perceptions (p. 348).
Control systems, in general, tend to appraise performance only
and ignore quality factors (Koontz, 1971). They also tend to
overlook individual development (Patz & Rowe, 1977). It is,
therefore, important to develop measures of quality which
complement structural measures and reporting systems (Lawler &
Rhode, 1976, p. 94).
Astuto and Clark (1985) reported that the frequency of
interactions were disjointed and variable, rather than absolute
or constant. They further reported that low interactions were
rare. Others have reported that frequencies of interactions
differ since the time span should reflect the schedule needed to
complete a specific job (Koontz, 1971; Lawler & Rhode, 1976).
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What appears to be constant is the perception that frequency is a
valid control measure (Anderson & Brown, 1971; Hoy & Miskel,
1982, p. 308; Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 182), thereby, supporting
the view that principals are visible (Andrews, 1987) and active.
The evidence is unclear whether the frequency of interactions is
or is not a discriminating factor in leadership. Anderson and
Brown (1971, p. 197) along with Andrews (1987) have suggested
that it is, whereas Astuto and Clark (1985) implied otherwise.
Unlike other structural models, however, the coupling
taxonomy specified qualitative relationships within schools, and
quite predictably found evidence of their influence.
Nonetheless, as an exploratory investigation, Astuto & Clark
(1985) understandably stopped short of identifying patterns of
coupling that enhanced or impeded effectiveness.
The Processes ofManaerial Control
The evidence from social science control theory research
strongly suggests that managerial control is defined by several
dynamic organizational processes, rather than as a single formal
or informal entity. Multidirectional political dynamics
highlighted the need for information and assessment systems in
the service of managerial control; social control established
norms of performance and standards as a managerial control
process; and, psychological control identified the system of
incentives and internalized standards as control processes.
Viewed as a whole, these processes freed one from the limitations
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of (a) organizational structure, (b) single discipline
orientations, and (c) objective characteristics of specific work
tasks.
Conceptually, a process analysis is rational. That is,
processes describe common characteristics of behaviors in a
logical, although not necessarily sequential linear, progression
(Anderson, 1982). Given the complexity of school organizations
and the effects of situational and cultural differences on
learning, it may be considered impractical to hypothesize a
unified system of control processes across diverse tasks and
organizational cultures; but, that is precisely what is suggested
here, at least within a single domain of tasks such as curriculum
and instruction.
The claim that there are common characteristics of control
seemingly contradicts previous findings that controls ought to be
tailored to tasks and individuals (Charters, 1981; Koontz, 1971),
and that control differs among cultures (Tannenbaum, et al.,
1974). Since a process analysis embodies a rational perspective,
it further raises the question of whether this framework
contradicts managerial complexity (intzberg, 1971), or the non-
rationality of school organizations (Patterson, Purkey, & Parker,
1986; Sergiovanni, 1987), or the non-sequential logic of
organizational processes (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), or the
weak school organizational incentives of problem-solving
motivation (Sieber, 1981) - findings which have all been
supported by empirical evidence.
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In contrast, a unified model of managerial control suggests
that underlying observable differences in tasks, settings, and
cultures have common, essential attributes (i.e., processes and
dimensions) of control which can be identified and measured. A
unified model makes no absolute claims of a one best control
system, yet it can document discipline and order by relying on
logical categories and the qualities of human character, such as
freedom, and individual responsibility (Buber, 1967, p. 116).
Control is, fundamentally, a rational and sensible concept.
Logically, its contrary is defined as "out of control" (E.
Langer, 1986), random behavior, or, in Hobbesian terms, "a state
of war" (Hobbes, 1651/1958). These contrary positions are
irrational in that none is willingly chosen. What accounts for
differences in control definitions are the cultural and
structural differences in organizations (Vroom, 1984),
idiosyncratic a priori definitions, or the empirical measures
used to study control. Yet, within any single organizational
context, there exists a valid theory of control which identifies
the underlying unity of the concept.
The rational control processes identified here have been
defined as latent variables comprised of multiple factors. The
empirical findings of weak school control mechanisms reported in
Chapter Two, however, were not based on multiple measures. In
their designs, they also overlooked the strength of psycho-
social evidence as measured by qualitative indicators which could
identify a subjective reality underlying control systems.
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Attitudes originate at the psychological level, distinct from
"the accidents of external events and circumstances" (Katz, 1965,
p. 279). Individuals have basic needs (a) for perceiving
rational processes (Ames & Ames, 1987), (b) for perceiving their
being in control (Katz, 1965; Langer, 1983; Vickers, 1967)
regardless of empirical situations, and (c) for obeying authority
(Heilbroner, 1975).
The dichotomy between a diverse, nonrational world and the
needs for internal rationality can be reconciled through the
study of interactions between the quantitative and qualitative
measures of control along the hypothesized managerial control
processes. It is precisely this level of contextual analysis
which provides valid descriptions of organizational structure
linked with specific managerial behaviors and their associated
beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions. A logical process analysis
supported by empirical data can ultimately provide managers with
a guide to action when confronted by organizational complexity or
contradictions.
Lawler & Rhode (1976) developed a process classification
model based on common characteristics of control systems: (1)
similar structures to (a) collect, (b) store, and (c) transmit
information in a particular form and with specific frequency (pp.
5-6); (2) similar purposes to (a) influence behavior and (b)
govern human behavior towards a predictable action. How
information is collected, stored, and transmitted can affect
attitudes and behaviors which influence, if not govern, behavior.
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Thus, the Lawler and Rhode model incorporated both quantitative
and qualitative meanings of structure and behaviors.
Their hypothesized measures of control varied in
completeness, objectivity, influence, difficulty, immediacy,
continuity, and importance. Each of these measures has been
linked to a specific control process. For example, under the
first process, the nature of standards, not only is it necessary
to identify who sets the standards, but it is also important to
measure the perceived difficulty of the standards (pp. 45; 98).
If the standard is perceived as unreasonably difficult, Lawler
and Rhode (1976) predicted rigid bureaucratic behaviors, invalid
data, and resistance (p. 98). Increased participation, adequate
flow of information, and the utilization of data were all
managerial strategies suggested to overcome any dysfunctional
behaviors associated with the nature of standards (p. 101).
Communication processes are conceived as two-way channels
among individuals at different levels of the organization.
Therefore, perceptions of meaning and worth are enhanced by the
utilization and feedback of information based on the speed and
frequency of communications. Even assessments, referred to as
discrimination, is viewed as a mutual process. These activities
must be perceived as important and linked to a source of
individual motivation, intrinsic or extrinsic. Figure 3
describes the Lawler & Rhode (1976) process classification system
in terms of the four processes of managerial control proposed in
this study.
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Figure 3: Reclassification of Lawler and Rhode (1976)* behavioral
control indicators
STANDARDS INFORMATION ASSESSMENT INCENTIVE
Set by whom? By whom? By whom? Extrinsic
Difficulty Immediacy Objectivity Intrinsic
Continuous
Completeness
*See: Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 45.
Lawler and Rhode (1976) included two other very important
measures in their classification system: influence and
importance. The first measure assumes that each of the
behavioral indicators has a varying degree of influence upon
individuals. The second measure relates to the type of activity
and its perceived importance. Managers will encounter situations
in which certain tasks are easier to control than others. Some
of these tasks, however, are of less importance to performance
than are other tasks which may be more difficult to control. A
question raised by Lawler and Rhode (1976), and others (Counts,
1930/1971; Koontz, 1971; Ouchi, 1978; Peterson, 1984) is related
to the managerial decision to control less important, but easily
controllable tasks, as opposed to the control of important, but
more difficult to control tasks.
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Within the most comprehensive descriptions of control, the
discussions eventually include the topic of processes. Koontz
(1971) concluded from his management studies that the processes
of control (a) required time, (b) were linked to work-related
operations, (c) have qualities that were clear and objective, and
(d) were related to meaningful incentives (Chapter 7). It is a
system that must be learned. Thus, control has been described as
a function of learning theory (Bruner, 1962; Schein, et al.,
1961; Skinner, 1966) which implies metacognitive control over a
process, whereby one "must know what facts and concepts are
necessary for the task; which strategies, heuristics, or
procedures are appropriate (conditional knowledge); and how to
apply the selected strategy, procedure, or heuristic" (authors'
emphasis. Marzano, et al., 1988, p. 14).
Following the metacognitive stage, Narzano, et al. (1988)
defined "executive control" of the process, involving evaluation,
planning, and regulation. They write:
Evaluation occurs throughout an entire process and is both
the beginning and the end point for a task. It also
includes assessing whether we have the resources needed for
the task.... [E]valuation includes assessing task goals and
subgoals....
Planning involves deliberately selecting strategies to
fulfill specific goals.... [Planning occurs before the
concrete operational stage.] Regulation involves checking
our progress toward the goals and subgoals identified....
From this perspective, regulation is the process of
continually assessing how close to our goal or subgoal we
are.... Then, carrying out appropriate revisions is
critical (Marzano, et al., 1988, p. 15).
The inclusion of a metacognitive stage of control
necessitates the presence of self-control as part of the control
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processes. It implies that self-control can supplement the roles
of supervisor, disciplinarian, and authoritarian leader. Work
may be accomplished autonomously and effectively, but with others
in different and difficult situations (Marzano, et al., 1988, p.
16).
People interactions are dynamic and changing within the
workplace. From a managerial perspective, daily interactions may
best be viewed as occurring de novo in that the potential is
always there to either enhance or unhinge a previously existing
relationship. Although people who work together generally
develop a stable pattern of behavior based on previous
interactions (Baumeister & Jones, 1978) - i.e., a workplace
interpersonal history - that relationship is extremely fragile.
In a single instance, a perceived inequity can affect the
relationship negatively and permanently. Interpersonal work
relationships are continuously being evaluated on the quality of
immediate interactions (Argyris & Schon, 1982, p. 206-207 note).
Narzano, et al., (1988) also made the distinction between
skills and processes. The former are simpler cognitive
operations (e.g., oral and written communication), while the
latter are broader in scope, more macro and take a longer time to
complete (p. 32). This distinction reflects two perspectives:
technological versus managerial. Whereas the relationship
between technology and people usually reaches an objective
balance which can be measured by performance, i.e., behaviors or
outcomes, (Ouchi, 1978), managerial relationships depend on less
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substantive issues. Although managerial processes involve both
technology as well as substantive issues (Caewlti, 1987a;
Sergiovanni, 1984), managerial interactions are different (Hall,
Jr., 1956). Within schools - as professional or semi-
professional organizations (Lortie, 1969) - principals are
relatively familiar with school curricular and instructional
technologies; yet, they manage not only as technology experts
(Cawelti, 1987a), but in other, perhaps more appropriate, roles
(Deal, 1987; Sergiovanni, 1987). Both of these aspects of
control, however, technical and managerial, are essential
parameters of school managerial control (Apple, 1982, p. 141-
164). The interdisciplinary perspective of organizations
necessitates a rethinking of control functions which go beyond
words and actions such as monitoring, verifying, correcting,
inspecting, adjusting, repairing, auditing, etc. (Myers, 1981, p.
98, 106-7). Within public schools, managerial control processes
have short and long term behavioral and relational effects on
others. Almost 60 years ago, Counts (1971/1930) wrote, "in
education there can never be the separation of process and
product which is characteristic of manufacturing enterprise" (p.
149).
Despite the widespread use of the terms standards,
information, assessment, and incentives to describe the
managerial processes, there are still viewpoints which argue
against their inclusion in organizational analyses in general.
Hofstede (1978) has argued that standards may not exist,
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accomplishment may not be measurable, and feedback information
cannot be used. Other objections raised suggest that control
standards are difficult to implement or ineffective. Vickers
(1967) and Koontz (1971) have noted that (a) goals are difficult
to set, (b) goals tend to be short term, (c) goals tend to focus
attention too narrowly on fields where control can easily be
established and away from important fields where action may not
be controllable. Nevertheless, the most persuasive evidence
supports the view that in order to increase our understanding of
school managerial control, the analysis must identify general
social processes which can be described and analyzed on the level
of action (Blalock, 1984, p. 164; Koontz, 1971; Vickers, 1967)
through the study of control process relationships (Dornbusch &
Scott, 1975, p. ix), specifically with teachers perceptions
(Andrews, 1987; Cohen, et al., 1979; Kerr, 1987).
From both a rational and empirical perspective, the
investigation begins with standards. According to Argyris and
Schon (1982), individuals rely on past experiences and group
norms when standards or knowledge is limited. Since
professionalization (Lortie, 1969) and the professional norm
system for teachers are still presently weak (Leiter, 1983),
there is a definite need to initiate control through the process
of standards.
Control of Standards
In a rational order, there exists a prescribed relationship
192
between the behavior of individuals, their productivity and the
standards or goals of the organization. Standards based on a
rational decision-making process act as a guide to appropriate
behaviors and outputs (Koontz, 1971, p. 140). In this sense, the
primary criterion of success is measured by the conformity to a
given standard (Vickers, 1967, p. 27). Standards state the
expectations of what ought to occur, an "ought-to-be" (Vickers,
1967, p. 111). Under the control of standards, whenever a
standard is communicated and operationalized, there is a signal
for a process to select and initiate an apt response (Vickers,
1967, p. 113). Not only do standards initiate control processes
by acting as "a guide to action" (Vickers, 1967, p. 29), they
also serve as measures against which actions and outcomes are
judged to be successful or deficient. The normative assumption
within this model is that "those organizations which deviate
least from the optimum structure will be the most effective"
(Pfeffer, 1978a).
As rules, policies, or established patterns of behavior, the
standard is defined as structural. Rules and policies attain
legitimacy through the hierarchy in which communication flows
downward through a chain of command. The rules and policies
serve directive and regulatory functions (Charters, 1981) for
both behaviors and outcomes.
Yet, rules and policies are not the only determining factors
of performance standards. People assume standards and values of
their affiliated group members (Bruner, 1962; Heilbroner, 1975;
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Katz, 1965, p. 302). If a standard is based on the performance
of others or on an individuals' own criteria, then control of
standards is often derived from social control or self-control
dynamics. In either instance, control of standards encompasses
political, social, and psychological aspects of organizational
processes outside organizational structure. These dynamics might
include negotiated standards, socialization, selection, and
professional standards, and/or personal, subjective, motivational
standards.
The sequential order of standards as the first control
process is important not only because a known standard is needed
for intrinsic motivation (Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 75), but,
also, because standards are needed to perform the other
managerial control processes. For example, "(control) is
singularly dependent on plans since there is no possible way a
person can know whether he is going where he wants to go - the
job of control - unless some planning was done by some one to
show where it was intended to go" (Koontz, 1971, p. 140).
Likewise, incentives are a function of the goals that individuals
set in response to them; that is, goals mediate the effects of
incentives on behaviors (Locke, 1977). Both assessment and
incentives are dependent upon standards (Perry & Porter, 1982).
If goals are clearly stated, then outcomes can be measured and
evaluated (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Eisenhardt, 1985).
The linkages among standards and the other managerial
control processes do not necessarily mean that a single standard
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is needed to trigger action. Standards may have variable and
flexible meanings (Miles and Vergin, 1966), or be a matter of
choice (Tannenbaum, et al., 1974). Standards can reflect the
external environment, local cultures, ideology, or intrinsic
motivations (Hannaway & Sproull, 1978-79; Sergiovanni, 1987;
Tannenbaum et al., 1974).
Empirical organizational studies have revealed the
problematic nature of standards. Among the characteristics
identified have been (a) conflicting standards which leave the
criteria for evaluation unclear (Frank, 1958-59), (b) selective
enforcement of standards which may pose a continual threat to
subordinates (Frank, 1958-59), and (c) the possibility that an
individual may meet or miss a goal through no fault of his own,
and, therefore, may not really show performance (Koontz, 1971).
Conflicting standards may result either from ambiguous goals
or from incomplete knowledge or limited communication channels
(Frank, 1958-59). Since conflicting standards ensure that
subordinates will always fail to meet one of the selectively
enforced standards (Frank, 1958-59), it keeps a continual threat
on subordinates. Frank reported that such conflicts generated
three specific managerial responses: (1) creating margins of
safety by stockpiling materials or understating or overstating
capacity or needs, (2) fudging performance records, and (3) using
personal influence to obtain favors.
Many solutions have been offered to overcome such
dysfunctional organizational behaviors. Frank (1958-59) offered
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a substantively rational solution: i.e., managers ought to focus
on the achievement of the task regardless of the means employed.
He also suggested decentralizing decisions, enhancing
flexibility, and for subordinates to become acquainted with
superior's objectives. He introduced such qualitative terms as,
sensitivity and responsiveness to control theory.
Brown (1969, p. 84) advised managers to focus on the human
side of control. Miles & Vergin (1966) suggested a managerial
response to variable standards called "variance controls: i.e.,
"total pattern of performance rather than some preset absolute
standard... the distribution of performance measurements around
the average (mean) level of performance" (1966). Similarly,
Patz & Rowe (1977) expressed their sensitivity to change in
discussing control by setting measures attuned to "probability
limits" wherein goals are defined as hypotheses (p. 269).
In line with Lindblom's (1956) theory of incrementalism, Sproull
and Zubrow's (1981) Performance Information System measured
performance against a standard "within an acceptable range."
Patz and Rowe (1977) even argued that getting close to an
objective was preferable to exactly meeting it since the former
involved less time, effort, and data (pp. 267ff.).
Miles and Vergin (1966) found that standards were understood
and accepted... through participation and with a "freedom to
fail." The approach was not viewed as a panacea, for they
foresaw problems in defining and measuring performance. Still,
the advantage of such managerial responses was that it removed
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close and intensive supervision, and broadened the base of self-
control. Studies of control in public organizations supported
these expansive views on managerial control processes (Hall,
Jr., 1956; Lawler & Rhode, 1976; Turcotte, 1974). Mahoney and
Frost (1977) suggested that staff development and committee
meetings were alternatives to close supervisory activities for
reciprocal tasks. Etzioni (1965, p. 655) recommended screening
admission, on-the-job training, and social controls through work
groups. And, more recently, Ouchi (1978) and Eisenhardt (1985)
distinguished between behavior and outcome control mechanisms.
Despite the empirical findings of conflict, multiplicity,
and difficulty in determining standards and their measurement,
the control of standards process provides a logical starting
point for the analysis of managerial control. The results of our
preliminary study found that school principals (a) stressed
school goals over individual goals and (b) used expressive,
rather than instrumental language in articulating school goals.
For each and every curricular and instructional task, principals
offered a list of behaviors which went beyond the formal policies
and prescribed patterns of behaviors. Even within mandated
policies and directive checklists, principals considered certain
behaviors more important than others. Their discretionary ideas
and actions, however, in no way took issue with either district
or state directives, even when the latter were viewed as being
marginal or misguided. Nevertheless, they believed that school
standards were not synonymous with those of the district or
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state. In some instances, principals labelled school standards
as being higher than mandated requirements or frameworks; in
other instances, the standards were simply viewed as different,
often reflecting specific student needs and community influences.
Control ofInformation
Ideally, control is mediated by the information (Vickers,
1967, p. 20) transversing an organization through communication
channels. Communication theorists have suggested that these
channels are capable of influencing the distributions of beliefs,
values, and behaviors of people within organizations
(Krippendorff, 1986, p. 19). As such, information is linked to
the concept of power. Bacharach and Lawler (1982) noted that
later versions of the French & Raven power bases model, in fact,
included information as the sixth basis of power (p. 33). In an
organization, it is both the structural characteristics of
communication channels and the psycho-social-political dynamics
of information which influence behaviors.
Koontz (1971) stated that "[o]ne of the frustrating problems
in effective controls is to know what things to watch and how to
select those critical factors in any situation that the manager
must watch if he is to be assured that his actions are conforming
to plans (p. 84). Frank (1958-59) argued that to enhance control
there needed to be open communication channels. Yet, an open
circuit is only one of many characteristics of communication
channels within organizations (Katz & Kahn, 1978, Chapter 14).
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Within cybernetic theory, information refers specifically to
feedback information. The characteristics of a cybernetic
control system is that it (a) detects critical information, (b)
evaluates information (c) regulates and corrects behaviors, (d)
is simple and quick, and (e) is on-going (McManama, 1971). The
key concept of cybernetics is self-regulation. Hence,
information acts as a "mis-match" signal that sets-off the
control process (Vickers, 1967). In order to activate the
system, however, the feedback response has to get back to the
controller to serve as a basis for further action.
Research findings in communications' theory, political
science, and social psychology provided numerous examples of
breakdowns in cybernetic theory (Hofstede, 1978). A descriptive
political framework depicts the uncertainty of information,
complexity of issues in policy-making (Lindblom, 1959), and the
participation of numerous key actors or groups, resulting in a
non-rational theory of decision-making (Cohen, March, & Olsen,
1972). Among the more persuasive criticisms of purely rational
frameworks are: (a) entropy of messages whereby information may
be transmitted with unequal frequency or probability
(Krippendorff, 1986, p. 15); (b) difficulty of selecting,
detecting, or correcting information (Koontz, 1971); (c)
evaluation of information, since standards are cultural or
matters of choice (Hoy & Miskel, 1982, p. 359; Sergiovanni, 1987;
Tannenbaum, et al., 1974); (d) complexity and slowness of
feedback (Clark & Astuto, 1988); (e) bogus or inadequate feedback
199
(Patz & Rowe, 1977), error, and omissions (Katz & Kahn, 1978),
and, (e) difficulty of detecting or measuring information - even
if it is on-going (Cohen & Miller, 1980; Krippendorff, 1986, p.
16).
As a political mechanism, information is used in bargaining,
negotiating, and decision-making processes. As such, information
and communication variables may be as important as rules and
position (Pfeffer, 1978a). Organizations can compensate for
decreased task programmability and outcome measurability by
increasing information systems (Eisenhardt, 1985). Thus, in
complex organizations with complex technologies, information can
play an important role in maintaining behavior control as an
alternative to outcome control (Eisenhardt, 1985).
Ironically, "communication and information subsystems are
often located disadvantageously in organizations" (Katz & Kahn,
1978, p. 473). Turcotte (1974) reported that the amount of
information, for the wrong reasons does not improve performance.
Lawler & Rhode (1976) found that not all information related to
behaviors. Katz & Kahn (1978) also disputed the idea that the
amount of information per se was a problem. In fact, Shrode &
Brown (1977) found that managers spent an excessive amount of
time on information-oriented decisions as opposed to either task-
oriented or people oriented decisions. Typical of statistical
and control reports is that they "do not inform managers of what
they need to know in order to control their operations (Koontz,
1971, p. 84). Rapoport (1965) found that "far less information
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is required to describe an orderly arrangement...than a
disorderly one" (p. 236).
Social psychology research has also provided examples of how
people tend to seek out information that supports their own
hypotheses, "while innocently ignoring disconfirming evidence....
[People] typically select information to enhance their perception
of control" (E. Langer, 1983). Selective information along with
other communication breakdowns, therefore, have rendered rational
theories, such as cybernetics and the thermostat model as
inadequate (Hofstede, 1978; Sproull, 1981).
Understanding the problems inherent in organizational
communication is related to problems of measurement. The
characteristics of communication channels are structural. Within
this dimension, quantitative data, such as the frequency,
redundancy, variety, and probability of interactions provide
insights into organizational structure and patterns of behavior.
Essentially, we can measure, non-parametrically, contentless
frequencies. Yet, neither the organizational structure nor the
frequency of communication interactions is a reliable single
measure of information processes. "The 'quantity of information'
as a measure ... has no necessary (author's emphasis) relationship
to the amount of semantic information conveyed by a statement"
(Dechert, 1969, p. 70). As Rapoport (1965) succinctly stated,
the quantity of information is a "big idea" (p. 226).
On the other hand, information may also be measured by
qualitative data, such as the meaning, content, and utility,
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which cannot be understood solely through statistical analyses
(Krippendroff, 1986). The ideas and concepts surrounding the
studies of information and communication theories have become
complex. This complexity is expressed by new technical terms
used to describe communications. For example, the term, entropy,
is used to measure diversity and variety of information
(Krippendorff, 1986, p. 15). Specifically, entropy is a measure
that removes uncertainty. Regulating uncertainty is essential to
the health of an organization. Krippendorff (1986) in quoting
Ashby's law of requisite variety, i.e., "only variety can destroy
variety," held that "the survival of a system depends on its
ability to generate at least as much variety within its
boundaries as exits in the form of threatening disturbances from
its environment" (p. 19). Support for this view extends to even
the individual, whereby communication strategies are used to
reduce uncertainty so that rules and goals can be internalized
and accepted as a prerequisite for changing behaviors (Black,
1970; E. Langer, 1983).
Control of Assessment
The variables of organizational structure (e.g., size,
levels, and technology) simultaneously emphasize and constrain
such managerial behaviors as rule-making, supervising, directing,
and coordinating. At the center of these managerial behaviors is
the process of evaluation. "In a rational system, evaluation is
an indispensable process controlling task performances"
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(Dornsbusch & Scott, 1975, viii). What determines rationality is
the effect that higher evaluations ought to reflect better
performance and better effort (pp. 340ff). Evaluation is a
"fundamental process to all human interaction and specifically in
the operation of authority systems in organizations. Much that
is right and much that is wrong in current organizations can be
explained in terms of evaluation processes" (p. 358).
Accordingly, Dornbusch & Scott concluded that knowledge of
evaluation must be applied and extended in order to "control the
organizations that so often control us" (p. 358).
"The managerial function of control involves measuring and
correcting actions to assure that plans are actually being
achieved. It is the means by which the loop is closed in
managing" (Koontz, 1971, p. 140). Action should be controlled by
the observed difference between what is and what ought to be
(Vickers, 1967). Nevo (1983) reported, however, that there was
no agreement on any single best evaluation process. Evaluations
can be made on numerous variables: definition, function, process,
method, criteria, participants, among others (Nevo, 1983).
Most empirical studies of school evaluation processes seem
to agree that structural, formal, bureaucratic evaluative
features are weak or non-existent (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Meyer
& Rowan, 1977). Under an institutional model of schools (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983), a weak role for
evaluation actually enhances professional trust and the "logic of
confidence" within schools. Formal evaluations, on the other
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hand, serve only an externally directed, legitimating function.
Given the central theoretical importance that Dornbusch &
Scott (1975) have attributed to evaluation processes, on the one
hand, and the limited organizational role it plays in reality
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977), serious efforts to reformulate educational
assessments have been proposed (The Joint Committee on Standards
for Educational Evaluation, 1981). Dornbusch & Scott (1975),
however, have noted research limitations when attention was
restricted to a single task; therefore, in their own subsequent
studies, they, too, have looked at multiple tasks and focused on
the "generalized right to evaluate organizational performance."
Other alternatively proposed evaluative variables have been
formative evaluation, goal-free evaluation, process evaluation,
informal evaluation, and soft criteria of evaluation (Morris &
Taylor Fitz-Gibbon, 1978; Goldman, 1983). Much effort and
resources have been expended to instill the goal of improved
performance as the primary purpose of evaluation (Morris & Taylor
Fitz-Gibbon, 1978). Even formal instruments used in
comprehensive teacher evaluation are designed to serve two
functions: formative and summative (Ellet, 1987). Yet, in spite
of these proposed alternative theoretical efforts, and the almost
inconsequential results of summative evaluations - e.g.,
relatively few teachers are placed on prescription or judged
unacceptable, the formative-improvement function has not
generated formative-success measures that have been publicly
tested. Perhaps Vickers (1967, p. 127) was correct in stating
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that it is seldom possible to make one set of standards serve
both positive and negative control purposes.
Nevertheless, teacher evaluation systems "represent the
largest investment... that have direct implications for the
instructional supervision role of school principals" (Ellett,
1987, p. 304). The teacher evaluation model adopted by Dade
County, Florida schools follows a comprehensive system including
orientations with performance expectations, pre-observation
conferences, classroom observations, post-observation
conferences, and follow-up prescriptions for teachers if needed
(p. 320). No formal, district-wide system, however, has been
implemented for the evaluation of any of the other curricular or
instructional tasks. What appears to exist, however, are written
procedures, state directives, and frameworks to guide practice
along with informal systems developed at the school-building
level for curriculum development and the selection of textbooks
and instructional materials.
Even within the formal procedures of evaluation, there are
two systems of personnel evaluation at the school level, one for
managers and another for teachers. In Dade County, Florida,
performance appraisal systems are used for principals, while a
behavioral checklist, the Teacher Assessment and Development
System (TADS), is used for teachers. The former is indicative of
the "soft" criteria for managerial evaluation which may include
interpersonal style, whereas the latter, the "hard" assessment of
"worker productivity generally focuses on clear easily measurable
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output" (Goldman, 1983, p. 339). A hard-soft metaphor has also
been applied to school rules in general. Lortie (1969) noted
that "soft" rules were used in formulating instructional policy,
while "hard" rules were found in more easily codified areas. It
may be thought somewhat misguided that managerial performance,
instruction, and curriculum are evaluated softly, whereas
teachers who operationalize instruction and curriculum are
directed and evaluated by hard criteria.
The irony is extended by Vickers (1967) who stated that
"generally speaking, the indices of control become less
significant and less useful at progressively higher levels" (p.
29). In practice, this hypothesis reveals that there is less
precision used to judge performance of those at managerial levels
than for their subordinate workers. Likewise, the dominant
technologies within schools, curriculum and instruction, are also
guided by "soft" criteria. It is evident that a structural bias
at the subordinate teacher level has contributed to this
situation. Most certainly, the continued lack of clarity in
managerial terminology and models has fostered idiosyncratic
definitions of control, such that measures of behavior,
performance, output, and results remain confusing (Bidwell, 1965;
Cartwright, 1965; Eisenhardt, 1985; Goldman, 1983; Ouchi, 1978,
Peterson, 1984; Peterson, Murphy, & Hallinger, 1987). The
solution proposed here is to systematically integrate structural
measures with qualitative measures of behavior and to
reconceptualize managerial control as a dyadic concept apart from
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the central role of task supervision (Cohen & Miller, 1980; Katz
& Kahn, 1978; Mahoney & Frost, 1977; Miles & Vergin, 1966; Patz &
Rowe, 1977; Turcotte, 1974).
Control of Incentives
According to Etzioni (1965), "organizational control
structure is a distribution of means used by an organization to
elicit the performances it needs and to check whether the
quantities of such performances are in accord with organizational
specifications" (p. 650). In theory, organizations must
distribute sanctions on the basis of evaluations (Dornbusch &
Scott, 1975). The social-psychological assumption implied by
this relationship is that an organization's participants must
care about the rewards and punishments which are distributed.
Both the theory and assumption of incentives, however, must be
tested empirically within any organization, including public
schools.
Teachers are salaried employees, with their salaries
determined by seniority rather than by effort, outputs, or
administrative evaluations of performance (Dornbusch & Scott,
1975, p. 336; Lortie, 1969). Throughout society, in fact, only
28 percent of all U.S. workers see a direct link between job
performance and salaries (Kleiman, 1988). Nonetheless, Dornbusch
& Scott (1975) included public schools under their theoretical
framework of evaluation (p. 336), primarily because of the role
of intrinsic incentives in education - a process which Bossert,
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et al. (1982) have also identified as significant. Lortie
(1969), however, admitted that data are not available on what
principals actually do with respect to the reward system (p. 37).
There is virtually unanimous agreement in the literature on
rewards that teachers are more powerfully affected by intrinsic
rewards - particularly their sense of responsibility for student
learning and their enjoyment of various social relationships
(Mitchell, 1987; Mitchell & Peters, 1988). The subjective
rewards from students may quite likely have a greater effect on
teachers than school-level administrative rewards (Lortie, 1969).
Hanson (1981) reported that "administrators generally were
'keepers of intrinsic rewards.' By selectively praising some
teachers in open gatherings..., the administrators were
frequently able to direct others seeking such rewards in a
desired direction" (p. 268).
Mitchell (1987) has made important distinctions among three
concepts: motivation, rewards, and incentives. He has defined
the latter system as the "planned and controlled distribution of
rewards." The proper focus of control should be on the incentive
system in order to study managerial activities and their effects.
Thus, what is critical for a better understanding of what
principals do is to measure the incentive distribution system and
the meaningfulness of the specific rewards, such as praise and
discretionary funds (Bossert, et al., 1982; Cohen & Miller, 1980)
to teachers.
Vickers (1967, p. 129) has stated that there is not one best
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pattern of rewards. Yet, "the use of rewards and punishments
cuts across all the other conditions [for change]" (Katz, 1965,
p. 290). These two views are not at all contradictory. On the
one hand, expectancy theory confirms that rewards, intrinsic and
extrinsic, vary from individual to individual and from culture to
culture; on the other hand, the distribution of organizational
rewards, that is the control system of incentives has common
attributes which affect attitudes and behaviors. People "strive
to maximize the rewards in their external environment and to
minimize the penalties" (Katz, 1965. p. 279). "The clarity,
consistency and nearness of rewards and punishments, as they
relate to individual activities and goals, are important factors
in the acquisition of... [new] attitudes" (p. 280), regardless of
whether the sources are identified as human needs or job
factors.
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Indicators ofManagferial Control Behaviors
Quantitative and qualitative aspects of managerial behaviors
as well as processes of managerial control represent latent,
aggregate variables which can only be measured indirectly. On
the other hand, observable indicators of managerial control
behaviors can be measured directly within school contexts. It is
upon this empirical foundation of observable indicators that the
validity of theoretical constructs must be based.
Within organizational theory, there are a number of
empirical indicators which purportedly measure organizational
structure. Meyer, Scott, and Deal (1983) used individual
perceptions of formal policies for a variety of tasks to
demonstrate support for their hypothesized institutional model of
educational organizations. Astuto and Clark (1985) counted the
frequency of interactions as their sole measure of the quantity
or structural interactions within their organizational coupling
taxonomy. Other researches have measured structure by the
frequency of interactions with respect to formal policies (Deal &
Cellotti, 1980) or informal policies (Hannaway & Sproull, 1978-
79). Still, others have ignored process measures completely and
have simply looked at participants in decision-making (Charters,
1971) or administrative roles (Rowan, 1982).
In each of the above instances, a single measure was used to
define organizational structure. Although this study, too,
limits organizational structure to a single measure, it does so
in conjunction with other qualitative variables in order to more
210
accurately depict organizational dynamics. The single measure
which seems most applicable in defining the structure of school-
level organizations is the frequency of formal and/or informal
interactions within contextual managerial situations. In our
judgment, the distinction between formal and informal managerial
activities has not been supported by empirical findings here or
elsewhere in the literature. Katz & Kahn (1978) have reported
positive correlations between informal and formal communication
channels during normal operations. When used, the distinction
has reflected a structural bias in research designs. To avoid
this bias, the perceptual indicator of frequency or regularity of
both formal and informal activities was used to measure the
structural dimension.
In contrast to organizational structure, multiple
qualitative indicators were needed for each managerial control
process. As qualitative properties of distinct processes, the
indicators differ from process to process. Thus, qualitative
indicators for standards are different from those of information
as well as for assessments and incentives. Essentially, the
choice of the most salient behavioral indicators within the
qualitative dimension is a continuing search for meaning.
Indicators o tnad
Standards emerged as one of the managerial control processes
primarily from sociological and psychological research studies.
Group behaviors and professional roles establish norms or
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standards of performance. "By each interaction, ... teachers and
administrators confirm or erode the set of professional norms..."
(Little & Bird, 1987, p. 127). The hiring or selection process
and socialization efforts tend to also influence standards
(Etzioni, 1965). Yet, within this total social context,
individuals have idiosyncratic, subjective goals. According to
Katz (1965, p. 306), the idiosyncracy of standards makes
[organizational] attitudinal change so difficult.
At the school building-level, the principal plays the
dominant role in the control of standards across all curricular
and instructional tasks. Under the Dade County, Florida
collective bargaining contract, the principal implements the
district's formal teacher evaluation system. The individual
school's curricular innovation efforts are either initiated or
supported by the principal. The school administration schedules
faculty meetings at which in-school staff development activities
for teachers are fostered or ignored. And, while the state
directs school districts to adopt state-approved textbooks, the
curricular and instructional criteria for specific selection have
been left to the individual schools, which may supplement state-
approved texts and instructional materials.
Clarity of standards.
Clarity is both perceptual and qualitative, rather than
quantitative. That is, it is logically distinct from
quantitative attributes, such as multiplicity and diversity which
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may or may not be evident in school standards. Thus, the
conditions for there being clarity of standards can still be met
even while pointing out ambiguity (The Joint Committee, 1981, p.
38) and acknowledging differences. This distinction between
logical dimensions of quantity and quality is particularly
relevant in interpreting political and sociological findings of
organizational conflict, diverse preferences, or multiple goals
(Bidwell, 1965; Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). These reported
findings may be descriptively accurate (Charters, 1981; Miles &
Virgen, 1966; Frank, 1958-59; Hills, 1963; Hanson, 1981; Lortie,
1977), but they beg the question of clarity as it relates to
managerial control.
Dornbusch and Scott (1975) identified clarity of standards
as one of the qualities of tasks. "Clarity refers to the extent
to which the instructional process is understood and can be
specified" (Hallinger & Murphy, 1987, pp. 179-203). Clear
standards are a prerequisite for deliberate action and are the
minimum prior condition for successful implementation (Elmore,
1983). Only when standards are understood and considered
legitimate do individuals voluntarily unleash creativity and
energy (Miles & Vergin, 1966). Clarity is essential for audience
understanding, and provides for credibility and application (The
Joint Committee, 1981, p. 37). The specificity of a goal has
been found to lead to a higher level of performance than do goals
urging another to "do your best" (Locke, 1977).
Clarity is sometimes related to adequacy of contextual
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information (Rapoport, 1965, p. 230; The Joint Committee, 1981,
p. 37). On the other hand, technical terms may devolve into
statements that are empty of meaning or be so vague as not to
have a contextual meaning. Linguistically, explicit and
unencumbered statements, characterized by conciseness, logical
development, well-defined technical terms may all be indicators
of clarity (p. 37).
Context is deemed critical for control (Hallinger & Murphy,
1987, pp. 179-203). Clarity is particularly needed in school
management. Without precise knowledge, behavioral norms and past
experience tend to be substituted as the basis for action
(Argyris & Schon, 1982) - certainly not an optimum situation
since the socialization of teachers as professionals have never
been viewed as strong (Bidwell, 1965; Leiter, 1983; Lortie,
1969).
Difficut fsadrs
Under the nature of standards, the qualitative indicator of
difficulty ranges from very difficult to very easy (Lawler &
Rhode, 1976). "[W]hen dealing with objects as complex and
autonomous as persons, control is reduced to presenting a
challenge so structured that it evokes the desired response"
(Dechert, 1969, p. 77). Higher levels of performance have been
unequivocally attributed to moderately difficult goals as opposed
to easy goals (Locke, 1977).
It is not completely clear just what level of goal
difficulty is optimal with respect to motivation. As far as
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intrinsic motivation, moderately difficult goals seem
optimal.... In terms of extrinsic motivation, it is easiest
to motivate achievement of easy goals because when goals are
easy expectancy and [the relationship between effort and
performance] beliefs are high and this means that motivation
will be high if rewards are tied to good performance (Lawler
& Rhode, 1976, p. 180, 20).
If the goal is unreasonably difficult, it will lead to rigid
bureaucratic behavior, invalid data and resistance (Frank, 1958-
59; Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 98). Moreover, a history of failure
has also been negatively associated with performance (Locke,
1977; Mann, 1978; McLaughlin, 1978).
A prerequisite to optimum performance is that the goals
themselves are accepted as legitimate and some degree of
internalization (i.e., ownership) has already taken place. Thus,
it should not be surprising that top down directives, close
supervision and monitoring, and "error avoidance" control
strategies have not been generally successful within public
organizations and schools. Turcotte (1974) reported that "error
avoidance" mechanisms led to lower performance levels than did
the use of higher expectations.
In line with these findings is one of the predominant
characteristics of effective school reform, that is, high
expectations of students by their teachers (Edmonds, 1979). If
the characteristic of higher expectations is propitious for
student learning, it would make sense that its efficacy would
also be potent in teacher development and in the management of
schools. Griffin (1988) summarized Rosenholtz' findings that
teachers at the most effective schools perceived that teacher
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learning was a continuous process, whereas those teachers at less
effective schools believed one could become a good teacher in
just a few short years. Similarly, Little and Bird (1987) found
that teachers gave their highest approval to observation and
evaluation systems that were extensive and demanding, rather than
to systems that sought to detect and correct performance.
Indicators ofInformation
Information is the medium of communicative exchange. Its
preeminence emerged primarily from research findings of
organizational complexity and political dynamics. Pfeffer
(1978a) viewed information to be as important as either structure
or rules.
Katz (1965, p. 275) and E. Langer (1983) both reported that
simply increasing the flow of information did not necessarily
increase knowledge gained by information. "[N]ew information
will not modify old attitudes unless there is some inadequacy or
incompleteness or inconsistency in the existing attitude
structure as it relations to the perceptions of new structures"
(Katz, 1965, p. 284). In fact, "to increase the order of
anything means to make it describable with less information"
(Rapoport, 1965, p. 237). Thus, information systems cannot
solely be measured by structural-frequency variables.
The two qualitative indicators of information, adequacy and
utility, correspond to the sender-receiver relationship in
communication theory. Adequacy of information measured
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subordinates' beliefs as to the quality of information across
curricular and instructional tasks. Utility of information
measured subordinates' perception of the use made of the
information which they provided to school administrators across
curricular and instructional tasks.
Miles and Vergin (1966) and Koontz (1971) have described the
need for quick feedback given simply and visibly in a common
language, understandable to those who take action (Koontz, 1971,
p. 142). Similarly, Black (1970) and E. Langer (1983) called for
language to be compressed and digestible. Lawler & Rhode (1976)
reported that individuals with higher order needs, those most
influenced by intrinsic motivation, needed feedback (p. 73), but
that "supervisors tend[ed] to be poor and unreliable givers of
feedback" (p. 74).
Within schools, there are numerous opportunities for
information to be conveyed from the principal to teachers: an
annual orientation to explain the school's goals, staff meetings
devoted to improving curriculum and instruction, an annual review
of the formal teacher evaluation system, grade-level and
department meetings, the posting of schedules for in-service
training sessions, informal hallway meetings, a principal's open
door policy, public address announcements, and, arranging for
experts to inform the faculty in diverse areas from curricular
innovation to new textbook publications. The reciprocal process
of information from teachers to principals includes many of the
above forums as well as reporting documentation (e.g., student
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progress reports) and private meetings initiated by faculty to
make curricular proposals and recommendations of textbooks and
instructional materials.
Adequacy of information.
Complete information was held to be a requirement of the
rational decision-making model (Dye, 1984). Under the political
analysis of decision-making, the emphasis shifted from rational
certainty to empirical or pragmatic uncertainty. The qualitative
indicator, adequacy, reflects this transition from rationalism to
incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959) and "satisficing" (Simon, 1957).
While the content of the information is still considered
rational, the process relies on getting adequate, rather than
complete information, to people (Katz, 1965, p. 274.).
A problem with information is not that there is not enough
information (Katz & Kahn, 1978); on the contrary, there is
usually an overload which needs to be avoided (Lawler & Rhode,
1976). Putting information within a context may help in its
interpretation (The Joint Committee, 1981, p. 104).
tilityo information.
"Most individuals who maintain information and control
systems like to believe that the reports they prepared are useful
for decision-making by managers and external parties" (Lawler &
Rhode, 1976, p. 137). But, in fact some reports are prepared
only for legal reasons, and are not used.
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In a variety of organizational settings, Lawler and Rhode
(1976) and Masland (1984), among others, have recognized a need
to motivate decision-makers to use information. Certain
characteristics of information seem to increase its chances for
utilization. A short list suggests that it should be
understandable, objective, timely, practical, beneficial, and
persuasive (Lawler & Rhode, 1976; The Joint Committee, 1981, p.
13, p. 156). Of course, there is empirical evidence indicating
that informational data are not always valid (Frank, 1968-59) or
heard (E. Langer, 1983). In order to overcome these situations,
managerial control of information must rely on other control
processes, especially the assessment and incentive processes
which have relational (i.e., interpersonal) as well as contextual
(i.e., task) attributes. Although Shrode and Brown (1977) found
that lower-level managers [in business] often spent too much time
on information-oriented decisions, they would also spend
insufficient time on people-oriented decisions. The utility of
an information indicator is as much a people-oriented activity as
it is information-oriented.
nicator of Assessment
The costs of implementing managerial control systems are
high, particularly it seems when it comes to evaluation and
incentive processes. Not only are formal teacher evaluation
programs the most expensive in terms of a dollar investment with
respect to principals' supervisory duties (Ellett, 1987), but the
219
systematic assessment of all other curricular and instructional
tasks would involve substantial dollar costs as well as enormous
time and effort commitments throughout the school organization.
Regardless of the actual costs, there is a general lack of formal
evaluations conducted for curriculum development, staff
development, and school building-level selection of texts and
instructional materials. What little formal evaluation which
does take place has been generally described as superficial (see
Chapter Three).
Worth of assessment.
Evaluation has been considered a fundamental process of
organizations (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975, p. 358) and central to
the distribution of sanctions (p. 337). "People in all fields
make choices, and it is inconceivable that they should do so
without assessing the worth of or merit of options" (The Joint
Committee, 1981, p. 5).
From The Joint Committee Report, three criteria were
expressed to support a judgement of worth: (1) that the
evaluation must be comprehensive enough (p. 27); (2) that the
evaluation procedures must be practical and not just a
theoretical concept (p. 52); and, (3) that the evaluation results
would be of "little interest or use if it [were] not interpreted
against some pertinent and defensible idea of what is good and
what is bad" (p. 32).
The sentiment among the sample of school principals in the
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preliminary study seemed to be that formal evaluations were not
worth the time and effort since they would not provide the kind
of information useful to school practitioners. Eliciting teacher
judgments as to the worth of evaluations would obviously be
limited in the absence of any formal evaluation procedures or an
awareness by teachers of the criteria of evaluation.
Nevertheless, the qualitative beliefs of teachers as to the worth
of evaluations may have valid measures across even those
curricular and instructional tasks which lack formal evaluation
procedures.
Fairness of assessment.
Blase (1988) has reported on the negative effects among
teachers resulting from the perception of favoritism. Among the
results were lower motivation, a feeling of a loss of control,
and a reduction in effort. In Dade County, Florida, the primary
concerns of the teacher's union before it could support a
comprehensive teacher assessment and development system, TADS,
were (a) objectivity, (b) standardization, (c) fairness and
equity, and (d) due process (Ellett, 1987).
The rational bases for evaluation is the predictability of
the relation between task procedures and outcomes and the belief
that better performance will receive higher evaluations
(Dornbusch & Scott, 1975). Moreover, legitimate authority
systems are considered more proper than an unauthorized system of
power (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975). Thus, the qualitative indicator
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of fairness favors rational and formal authority structure.
Two other qualities related to fairness are impersonality
and objectivity. Both can be met through a fair or balanced
"presentation of strengths and weaknesses...so that strengths can
be built upon and problem areas [can be] addressed" (The Joint
Committee, 1981, p. 90). Fairness does not imply, however, an
equal number of strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, qualitative
data other than frequency counts are necessary to measure the
perceptions of fairness.
The only empirical Dade County, Florida data concerning
fairness of assessments come from teacher ratings of TADS in
which 93 percent of the teachers rated the comprehensive teacher
evaluation system as fair; 65 percent thought it would improve
quality of instruction (Ellett, 1987, p. 315).
Indicators ofIncentives
Support for the inclusion of incentives as an essential
managerial control process was found primarily within the
literature of psychology. The emphases, however, were placed on
the theories of motivation and the role of rewards (Mitchell &
Peters, 1988). The distribution of rewards, or incentives, is a
managerial function. The formal system of incentives within
schools is decidedly non-individualistic. That is, the extrinsic
rewards of salary, for example, are distributed on the basis of
seniority and roles rather than on individual performance. In
Dade County, Florida, there is a district-wide merit-school
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program, but no merit-teacher program.
Measuring educational rewards and the system of incentives
is somewhat problematic. Dornbusch and Scott (1975) have
included educational organizations in their theory of evaluation
based on findings that other, intrinsic, rewards played a big
role in the performance of educators (p. 336). Griffin (1988)
has described educational rewards as both tangible and
intangible. The former range from stipends for assuming extra
responsibility to access to resources to released time from
classroom teaching (pp. 253-255). Intangible, symbolic rewards,
however, are "remarkedly barren" (p. 254). "[W]here are the
celebrations of outstanding professional behavior and
consequences of that behavior? Where are the recognition points
in a teacher's career?" (p. 254). Sieber (1981) found that
professional knowledge utilization efforts offered teachers
compensatory incentives only under special conditions, and that
the social costs of such efforts tended to exceed the perceived
benefits (p. 162).
The managerial control process of incentives measures how
rewards are procedurally distributed as well as their subjective
valences. The qualitative indicator for implementation is
equitable distribution. The qualitative indicator measuring the
"reward-value" or the amount of satisfaction, pleasure,
fulfillment (or their opposites) that the rewards are capable of
producing is the meaningfulness of the rewards themselves.
Within the context of school building-level organizations,
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there are limited resources. To a large extent, it is left to
the managerial skills of principals to respond positively to
teachers' requests. Whereas discretionary actions characterize
the educational reward system, formal procedural guidelines and
policies seem to most often govern negative sanctions.
consequently, more school building-level reward activities are
found within the discretionary or informal sphere than within the
formal structure.
MeaninQfulness of incentives.,
The literature on motivation theory has been subdivided
between (a) the needs of individuals (e.g., Maslow, McCelland)
and (b) the subjective values which individuals ascribe to
rewards and punishments (e.g., Vroom). It is primarily through
the latter framework of expectancy theories that the
meaningfulness of rewards is essentially defined as independent
of objective reality. That is, the value placed on any reward or
punishment is an individual, subjective determination. Rewards
can be meaningful regardless of their extrinsic or intrinsic
origin (Lawler & Rhode, 1976, p. 59), and regardless of how they
may be classified, hygienic or motivational (Herzberg, 1978).
Yet, for the evaluation process to function rationally and
predictably, the rewards and penalties must be meaningful to the
organizational participants (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975, p. 336) as
a whole, not just to individuals.
Under extrinsic motivational factors, salary, promotion,
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dismissal, and interesting work rate high on importance (Lawler &
Rhode, 1976, p. 59). Praise is viewed as moderately important
and incurring low costs, while intrinsic motivation relates to
most closely to individuals with high order needs (p. 66). As
for the difference between rewards and punishments, both
demonstrate highly variable results, but praise has been
generally shown to be more effective (Locke, 1977).
Central to intrinsic motivation is that the job must be
meaningful and worthwhile to the individual (Lawler & Rhode,
1976, pp. 78-80). Ames & Ames (1987) found that teachers have a
high intrinsic motivation rewards system, rating high the
importance of teaching as a work activity, their beliefs as to
the importance of teacher competency, their enjoyment of
teaching, and the time spent with students. These high scores
indicated that teachers took more responsibility for outcomes and
had a strong belief in effort-outcome correlation.
Equitable distribution of incentives.
"It is a well known principle of learning that the efficacy
of reward and punishment decreases as the time lag between the
response and the administration of reward and punishment
increases" (Schein, et al., 1961. p. 182). In addition,
"[c]onsistency of reward and punishment also contributes to the
clarity of the instrumental object for goal attainment" (Katz,
1965, p. 280). Thus, as a general rule, the control of
incentives ought to be applied quickly and consistently (Katz,
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1965, p. 302) in order to establish a perception of equitable
distribution.
The implementation procedures of an incentive system,
therefore, evoke significant qualitative variables independent of
the content or meaning of rewards and punishments (Nacoste,
1985). Since individual teachers ascribe subjective meanings to
rewards, an incentive system which focuses on individuals is
likely to have unreliable measures and cause alienation and
favoritism (Blase, 1988; Mitchell & Peters, 1988). On the other
hand, if the emphasis of the school reward system focuses on
aggregate groups, such as programs and departments as well as
whole schools, the perception of an equitable distribution of
rewards creates a positive climate, a necessary attribute of good
schools (Mitchell & Peters, 1988). Thus, the indicator of
equitable distribution of rewards may be the foremost procedural
quality of incentives.
Summary _of _Indicators
There are phenomenological indicators belonging to each of
the managerial control processes which influence "cognitive,
affective, and behavioral aspects of the work situation" (Blase,
1988, p. 174). Although there is a conspicuous lack of data
describing daily school-level managerial activities, each of the
indicators selected have been anchored in specific managerial
behaviors. Moreover, these phenomenological influences extend
even to implementation procedures (Nacoste, 1985); that is,
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structural procedures which themselves influence a variety of
individual responses.
The appropriate evidential support for understanding
managerial processes and behaviors must rely upon teacher beliefs
(Andrews, 1987; Ames & Ames, 1987; Mitchell, 1987, p. 226)
inferred directly from verbal reports (Locke, 1977, p. 183). The
importance of the qualitative aspects have been summed up by
Landy, Zedeck & Cleveland (1983) who wrote that "[a]n
organization with a positive climate and employees with strong
commitment can replace a performance-appraisal system that
monitors and controls employee performance."
To summarize, the phenomenological aspects of qualitative
indicators used as measures of managerial control processes are
as follows:
Clarity: a cognitive perception related to the
administrators' skill in communication of standards
Difficulty: a cognitive and affective perception of
task standards
Adequacy: a cognitive perception related to the
administrators' skill in communication of useful
information
Utility: an relational perception related to the belief
that information is used in managerial decision-making
Fairness: an affective and procedural indicator related
to the balanced use (e.g., objectivity) of assessment
measures
Worth: a cognitive perception related to the
organizational effort needed to conduct systematic
evaluations; and, an affective indicator related to
individual effort as well
Meaningfulness: an affective indicator of individual
needs related to the rewards and penalties of an
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organization
Equitable Distribution: a procedural indicator related
to the implementation of rewards and punishments
Conclusions
The discussion of managerial control processes and
behavioral indicators fulfills the first research objective of
the study. The literature reviews presented numerous
suppositional and empirical definitions ascribed to the concept
of control. Although no comprehensive framework emerged from the
social science disciplines, there were key signposts indicating
which next steps needed to be taken. It was evident across
empirical studies that control mechanisms varied according to
organizational settings; therefore, a study of school building
control activities was needed as a preliminary step in order to
test for the presence of school managerial control.
It was also evident across studies that the language of
control needed to be systematized. The aims of such an effort
would be threefold: (1) a more precise statement of theory; (2)
better empirical indicators of managerial control activities; and
(3) improved communication and generalizability (Hughes, Price, &
Marrs, 1986). In Chapter Four, the latent, aggregate concepts
have been explicitly stated. A logical process model provided
the framework within which specific managerial activities could
be categorized. At the empirical level of measurable indicators,
specific managerial activities were categorized by quantity and
quality, the former indicative of structure, whereas the latter
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characterizes managerial discretion.
The study now proceeds towards the development of a valid
and reliable scale of school managerial control based on the
hypothesized model.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Procedures and Methods
Introduction
Most discussions of organizational dynamics remain at
abstract and theoretical levels because the concepts used have
not been empirically established. This is as true for managerial
processes as it is for organizational paradigms. The terms
standards, information, assessment, and incentives - activities
which are performed at the work level - are themselves latent
variables comprised of multiple factors. Each factor, therefore,
needs to be uniformly measured in order to unify and validate the
meaning of the theoretical construct of managerial control,
Measurement involves the systematic identification of
observable indicators. Based on logical categories of judgment,
the indicators have been categorized into quantitative,
qualitative, and relational items anchored in the unique
contextual configuration of the particular organization being
studied. The lack of progress made in defining school managerial
control is directly attributable to the absence of measurable,
behavioral indicators for each of the managerial processes.
The apparent simplicity of school organizations contrasts
sharply with the documented complexity (Lortie, 1977), such that
neither formal institutional descriptions (Dye, 1984),
bureaucratic characteristics, nor single entity measures provide
adequate explanations to understand school organizations and
behaviors. It is becoming more evident that the so-called
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dysfunctional aspects of school organizations are, in fact,
prototypical of other complex organizations (Weick, 1985, p.
115), and that the logic of open systems analyses is compelling
(w. Harrison, 1987; Thompson, 1967).
The primary objectives of this research have been to
establish empirical indicators of managerial control and to test
their theoretical validity and statistical reliability within
school organizations. Despite the exploratory nature of the
study, the spirit of the analysis was confirmatory in that it
sought to test specific hypotheses about the construct of
managerial control which were derived from published social
science literatures and the empirical study conducted
preliminarily for this research (see Chapter Three).
SamplePopulation
The subjects in this study were public school teachers
(N=486) working within Dade County, Florida, the largest of
sixty-seven school districts in the state of Florida and the
fourth largest school district nationally. The teachers were all
employed at one of fourteen (14) schools which were selected on
the following sampling criteria:
Principal Tenure: In each of the fourteen schools, the
principal had been in office for at least three
consecutive years at the same school.
Meritorious Recogniton: Seven schools were selected
because they had received meritorious recognition by the
county at least two times during the first three years
that the merit school program was established. The
district's designation for a merit school was based on
improvement in reading and mathematics on Stanford
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Achievement Tests, participation in a physical
fitness program, and school-wide projects. Students'
scores were statistically compared with similar students
by grade level, sex, ethnic group, income group, and prior
scores.
The seven merit-schools selected were then matched with
other schools having similar racial and ethnic
backgrounds and where the principal also had at least
three years tenure. Two of the schools in this matching
group had actually received a second level designation of
merit-school for one year under broader criteria of
recognition.
. Instructional Level: each instructional level was
represented in the sample as follows: four high schools,
four junior high schools, and six elementary schools. The
two additional elementary schools were included because of
their smaller faculty size in contrast to junior and
senior high schools.
The sample population permitted some exploratory testing
of statistical differences among (a) schools (P. Blumenfeld,
personal communication, January 1, 1989), (b) levels of
instruction (Corcoran, 1985), (d) size (Peterson, 1984), (e)
tenure (Applewhite, 1965), and (f) school effectiveness
(Peterson, Hallinger, & Murphy, 1987; Wellisch, et al., 1978).
In order to conduct a large scale survey of teachers,
approval for the study was received from the school district's
Central Office. The granting of approval was made contingent
upon agreement from individual school principals to conduct the
study at their schools (Appendix C). Principals of the fourteen
schools were mailed a letter describing the purpose of the study
and requesting the school's participation and assistance in the
dissemination and collection of the questionnaire. Out of the
fourteen schools originally chosen for participation, only one
school principal, at the high school level, refused to
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participate. That school was replaced with a two-time merit
winner.
The sample survey population of classroom teachers is
presented in Table 12. Of the 907 teachers surveyed, 523 were
employed at the four senior high schools (S1 to S4), 182 at the
four junior high schools (J1 to J4), and 202 at the six
elementary schools (El to E6). The symbol (M) after the school
abbreviation designates a district merit school.
Table 12
Sample Survey tPopulation:* Classroom Teachers Per School
Elementary Junior Senior
Schools High Schools High Schools
ElM 47 J1M 54 Sl 122
E2 36 J2M 45 52M 152
E3M 39 J3 29 53M 122
E4 28 J4 54 S4 127
E5 35
E6M 17
Elementary School Junior High Senior High
Total 202 Total 182 Total 523
Merit School Total: 476
Matching School Total: 431
Grand Total: 907
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Instrumentation: questionnaire
The decision to develop a survey questionnaire to measure
the theoretical construct managerial control - as opposed to
using an existing standardized instrument - was based on the
needs (1) to study building-level processes unique to school
curricular and instructional tasks, and (2) to establish a basis
for the construct validity of the concept of managerial control
within school organizations. No standardized questionnaire has
been designed to meet either of these primary objectives.
All of the standardized questionnaires on organizational
attitudes and behaviors lack school contextual situations,
particularly with regard to curriculum and instruction. The
Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionn (MA, the
Organizational Assessment Inventor ), and the Survey of
Organizations [which has not been updated since 1972], (N.
Harrison, 1987, p.140) all provide technical information on scale
development and have validity and reliability measures. Both the
MOAQ and OAI reflect multi-organizational perspectives which
incorporate environmental, tasks, technology, personnel, history,
and organizational size variables (N. Harrison, 1987, p. 65-66).
The disadvantages inherent in adapting a standardized
instruments were persuasive. While it is possible to draft
situation-specific questions to be included within the
standardized instruments (N. Harrison, 1987, pp.63-66), Converse
and Presser (1986, p. 51) and Schuman and Presser (1981) have
warned of the negative effects on validity and reliability as a
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result of borrowing questions and creating a new question order
and context. Furthermore, most of the shorter organizational
instruments (a) do not provide any technical data, (b) were
designed for workshops and training, or (c) were not developed
specifically for school organizations (M. Harrison, 1987, pp.140-
141). only the Job Diagnostic Survey (developed by Hackman &
Oldham, 1980) seemed potentially useful since it focused on job
characteristics that affect motivation.
Item Construction
In the preliminary study, principals and informants were
asked about the goals of each of the four instructional tasks,
how those goals were communicated and implemented, the criteria
and assessment behaviors used to distinguish success or deviance
from the goals, and what recognition and sanctions were used.
The interview questions were task specific, yet allowed for open-
ended responses and for follow-up clarification. Other questions
referred to the organizational framework used in each task and
environmental impact on curriculum and instruction, i.e., state
and district mandates, the collective bargaining contract, and
parent-community participation.
The findings from the principals' interview study (see
Chapter Three) were used to develop the teacher survey
questionnaire. To a large extent, linking data from different
sources is an interpretative process requiring judgment and
choice (Fielding & Fielding. 1986, p. 5). However, others, such
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as Wellisch, et al. (1978) have combined case study data from
principals with survey data from teachers.
The managerial control questionnaire is made up of forty-
eight questions in which four curricular and instructional tasks
are measured under the four managerial control processes. The
four control processes are standards, information, assessment,
and incentives - each measured by twelve items [the terms items
and indicators are used interchangeably (Stevens, 1986, p. 337);
variables refer to the aggregation of items] representing
specific curricular or instructional tasks: teacher evaluation,
staff development, curricular development, and the selection of
textbooks and instructional materials. Based on the interview
findings, the questions were also designed to differentiate
formal and regular structural behaviors from discretionary
aspects of managerial activities. Thus, sixteen items contained
a frequency measure of building administrator-teacher
interactions (defined as structure); while, thirty-two items
measure discretionary qualities of managerial behaviors (defined
as discretion). Two additional questions were added to the
questionnaire to measure teacher satisfaction with (a) their own
job and with (b) their current building administrators.
The questionnaire instrument developed for managerial
control employs unidimensional scaling of teacher responses. At
this stage of analysis, to hypothesize multidimensions of
managerial control without first measuring how teachers respond
to a particular attribute of managerial control would be
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theoretically unwise (McIver & Carmines, 1981, p. 14).
The sixteen frequency indicators measure school structure,
stability, and regularity; the thirty-two discretionary
indicators measure salient behavioral qualities for each of the
control processes. Table 13 provides a listing of abbreviations
for the specific indicators.
Table 13
School i Control Variables Their Abbreviations
Curricular and Instructional Tasks
Teacher Evaluation TE
Staff Development SD
Curriculum Development CD
Selection of Textbooks and Instructional Materials ST
Control Processes and Variables
Standards S
Frequency F
Clarity C
Difficulty D
Information I
Frequency F
Adequacy a
Utility U
Assessment A
Frequency F
Fairness f
Worth W
Incentives I'
Frequency F
Meaningfulness M
Equitable Distribution E
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Multiple questions for each variable are used to avoid over-
generalizations caused by single item responses to global
questions (Schuman & Presser, 1981, p. 313). This procedure is
usually more reliable than single-item measures (McIver &
Carmines, 1981, p.15). Each question contains a concrete
situational reference to aid recall (Sudman & Bradburn, 1983, pp.
72-73) and to link teacher responses to overt behaviors (Schuman
& Presser, 1981, p. 243). Lastly, question order was randomized
to avoid any sequencing effects (Schuman & Presser, 1981, p. 54).
Pre-Test Procedures
Pre-testing of the survey instrument was conducted in two
stages on a sample population similar to the study population
(Coverse & Presser, 1986, p.68). The first pre-test objective
was to clarify the meaning of each of the questions. In extended
discussions of 1 to 2 hours each, a small sample (N=5) of Dade
County, Florida public school teachers at the three levels of
instruction reviewed and discussed the questions, offering
suggestions on language to bring greater clarity to each
question. The first session was held with only one teacher,
while the subsequent two sessions used pairs of teachers. After
each pre-test session, the questionnaire was revised to
incorporate the suggestions offered. With each session, there
were progressively more items on which both the teacher and
researcher could agree. Initial response agreements reached on
the meaning of each question progressed from 13 questions at the
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initial session to 28 questions and ultimately to 34 questions
out of 48 items. Disagreements generally focused on the specific
use of a technical term found within the school district or the
state education department or concerning the source of control.
Question stems which included only the principal were adjusted to
include the phrase "or other school administrators" so that the
questionnaire would have greater content validity for junior and
senior high schools which employ assistant principals.
The second stage of the pre-test procedures involved
recording responses to the questionnaire in order to (a) measure
response variability and internal consistency of the items, (b)
finalize the order of presentation, and (c) establish time
parameters (Converse & Presser, 1986, pp. 54-55). Twenty-one
completed questionnaires [out of 27 administered] were judged
suitable for response analysis. The teacher-subjects were all
graduate students in education at a nearby state university
campus. They were asked to respond to managerial behaviors by
choosing one of four responses: strongly agree, agree, disagree,
and strongly disagree. The responses identify whether teachers
believe the task specific managerial behavior occur within their
own schools and strength of that belief. Means, standard
deviations, Cronbach Alpha coefficients, and corrected item-to-
total correlations were analyzed. The stems of the items with
low corrected item-to-total correlations (<. 40) and low squared
multiple correlations [not shown in Table 14] were revised to be
more syntactically consistent with those items in the composite
variable that had higher correlations. Table 14 provides a
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statistical summary of t pre-tests results. Similar data on
the final version of the SXCQ have reported i Chapter Six
to facilitate comparisons with pre-tested instrument.
Table 14
Pre-Test Statiestics on the SMC i i
Item Means ron ac Corrected Item-
Alpha Total Correlation
-------------------------------------------------- ®-------------
FSTE 3.0 .78 .436
FSSD 2.9 . 3 .6037 .562
FSGD 2.6 .75 .114
FSST 2.9 .79 .101
- --------------------------------- ,----------------------------
GSTE 2.3 .7 .622
GSSD 2.7 .73 .7909 .680
GSG 2. .7 .545
GSST 2.8 .60 .570
---------------------------------------------------------------
ST 2.6 .85 .425
DSS 2.6 .67 .1884 .045
DSGD 2.5 .75 .413
SST 2.7 .67 -. 359
---------------------------------------------------------------
I 2.7 .6 .571
FISD 2.1 .70 .6500 .280
FIG .7 .56 .207
FIST 2.6 8 .708
aT 2.3 .66 .399
aS 2.3 .64 .721 .770
aIGD 2.7 .5 .400
aST 2.4 .59 .50
---------------------------------------------------------------
UTE 2.4 .75 .34
UIS 2.3 .56 .4419 .262
UIC 2. .54 .31
UIST 2.0 .3 .092
---------------------- --------- ---------------- ------ ------
F T 2. .81 -. 031
F S .9 .68 .0938
FAG 2.3 .73 .252
FAST .2 .56 -. 041
------------------------------------
,----------------------------
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Table 14 continued
LATE 2.1 .54 .325
fASD 2.6 .74 .5938 .587
fACD 2.4 .67 .379
fAST 2.4 .60 .234
WATE 2.5 .83 .653
WASD 2.5 .76 .7142 .421
WACD 2.3 .86 .721
WAST 2.0 .56 .246
FI'TE 2.5 .87 .482
FI'SD 2.3 .85 .6773 .619
FI'CD 2.6 .68 .409
FI'ST 2.3 .44 .384
MI'TE 2.4 .81 .111
MI'SD 2.1 .73 .5280 .547
MI'CD 2.0 .89 .400
MI'ST 2.0 .59 .279
EI'TE 2.7 .85 .306
EI'SD 3.0 .76 .6395 .567
EI'CD 2.4 .59 .518
EI'ST 2.2 .94 .362
Overall Alpha = .8658
In addition to item revisions, the response options on
the SMCQ were increased from four to six (B. Greenberg, personal
communication, February, 1, 1988; P. Johnson, personal
communication, February, 4, 1988). At the request of the Dade
County Public School Research Review Committee, a seventh Don't
Know option was added. Further changes regarding item language
and demographic information (B. Greenberg, personal
communication, February, 1, 1988) were also made before the final
version of the questionnaire was administered to the sample
survey population.
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School ouestionnaire
Teacher survey responses to the individual items were
measured along a 6 point Likert-type scale: For example, item 10
reads:
All grade levels, departments and programs at my school are
evaluated on an equitable basis
Strongly Disagree (6), (5), Disagree (4), Agree (3), (2),
Strongly Agree (1).
The Don't Know (DK) option was given a value of 0. Likert
scaling employs a single stimulus and a single type of response
on which to scale subjects (McIver & Carmines, 1981, p. 9).
All of the questions reflected a positive bias. The
response order, however, began with the negative choice "strongly
disagree" in order to counter both a primacy effect which
generally occurs by the response order (Schuman & Presser, 1981)
and an agreement response bias (p. 177). In order to force value
and attitude choices (p. 313) as well as increase the number of
usable responses, there was no middle alternative. According to
Schuman and Presser (1981, p. 301) approximately 25 percent of
the sample may be affected by the Don't Know response, although
the distribution of responses is not likely to be noticeable.
The items on the SMC questionnaire were placed in a random
order. To assist in data analyses, however, the items on the
questionnaire are presented in Table 15 by their aggregate
variables beginning first with the frequency of standards items.
The abbreviations follow the outline presented in Table 13. In
the parenthesis after the written item, the actual placement on
the SMCQ has been indicated.
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Table 15
items on the School Manaerial Cnrlqetonie(MO
Arrane b gratVriles
Standards
FSTE: The principal or other school administrator frequently
reviews good teaching practices with teachers (item 6)
FSSD: Each year, the principal or other school administrator
sets in-service and professional growth guidelines
for me and the other teachers (item 33)
FSCD: The principal or other school administrator frequently
communicates schoolwide objectives for meeting state and
county curricular goals (item 16)
FSST: Whenever I am selecting textbooks and instructional
materials for my classes, my school administration
reviews the criteria for selection to be used (item 45)
CSTE: In my opinion, the principal or other school
administrator states clearly the classroom teaching
behaviors that she/he values most (item 11)
CSSD: The principal or other school administrator makes it clear
how inservice workshops and staff development
opportunities offered at my school relate to my classroom
teaching (item 22)
CSCD: The principal or other school administrator makes it clear
how state and county curricular requirements are to apply
to my school, my students, and to the courses I teach
(item 5)
CSST: Criteria for selecting textbooks and instructional
materials established by my school administration are
clear (item 50)
OSTE: The teaching behaviors that my principal would most like
to see in the classroom are more difficult than those in
TADS (item 31)
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Table 15 continued
DSSD: The principal keeps raising the standard of performance
expected of me as a teacher (item 24)
DSCD: The principal expects the academic course requirements for
my students to be higher than state and county standards
(item 32)
DSST: The principal expects me to find the best available
materials even if I have to go outside the list of state
adopted textbooks (item 46)
Information
FITE: The principal of other school administrator frequently
provides me and the other teachers with information about
TADS and other effective teaching behaviors (item 41)
FISD: My school administration frequently sends me information
regarding staff development opportunities and activities
(item 37)
FICD: My school administration frequently sends me information
on new ideas in curriculum and instruction (item 49)
FIST: Information is regularly available to me at my school
regarding the publication of new textbooks and
instructional materials (item 34)
aITE: I consider the information I receive from my school
administrators regarding teacher evaluation to be
adequate (item 7)
aISD: The information I obtain from staff meetings and in-
service activities held at my school give me an adequate
understanding of how to do my job well (item 8)
aICD: My school administration provides me with adequate
information to participate in curricular planning and
innovative projects (item 28)
aIST: The information I receive through my school administration
regarding published material is adequate for deciding on
texts and instructional materials (item 39)
UITE: The principal uses the information from classroom
observations to generally improve the caliber of teaching
at my school (item 38)
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Table 15 continued
tUISD: The school administration keeps records of the
participation and progress of teachers engaged in staff
development (item 44)
UICD: My school administration uses teachers' ideas in
developing and/or implementing curriculum (item 47)
UIST: My school administration accepts teachers' input on
which instructional materials to use in the classroom
(item 48)
Assessment
FATE: The process of evaluating teachers occurs at my school
more often than just when I am being observed for
TADS (item 4)
FASD: The school administration evaluates each staff
development workshop or TEC inservice session offered
at my school (item 43)
FACD: The principal and the school administration regularly
monitor what I am teaching through a variety of ways
(e.g., the lesson plans and objectives, class visits,
etc.) (item 26)
FAST: My school evaluates textbooks and instructional materials
more frequently than the time-tables established by the
state or county (item 42)
fATE: The criteria used by the principal and other school
administrators to evaluate classroom teachers are fair
(item 40)
fASD: I would say that the principal and administrative staff
have an accurate assessment of the professional needs of
teachers (item 21)
fACD: All grade levels, departments and programs at my school
are evaluated on an equitable basis (item 10)
fAST: The procedures used at my school for selecting textbooks
and instructional materials give a fair assessment to the
alternative choices (item 13)
WATE: Time and effort devoted to classroom observations, both
formal and informal, have been worthwhile to me as a
teacher (item 29)
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Table 15 continued
WASD: Time and effort devoted to the evaluation of inservice
staff development and training workshops given at my
school are worthwhile (item 15)
WACD: The formal and informal assessments by my school
administrators of the courses I teach have been
worthwhile both for me and for my students (item 30)
WAST: The efforts taken at my school to evaluate textbook and
other instructional materials make a difference in how
well my students learn (item 23)
Incentives
FI'TE: The principal and other school administrators frequently
recognize my strengths as a classroom teacher, and, when
needed, offer to get me help in areas in which I could
improve (item 20)
FI'SD: After I attend a staff development workshop or training
session, the principal or other school administrator will
frequently support my efforts to incorporate new ideas
into my classes (item 19)
FI'CD: The principal or administrative staff frequently responds
to my ideas for curricular improvement (item 3)
FI'ST: The principal frequently finds ways to meet my
requests for more materials and books (item 12)
MI'TE: Classroom observation comments from school administrators
about my teaching motivate me to incorporate new teaching
behaviors and ideas into my classes (item 1)
MI'SD: My principal's efforts to encourage my continued growth
as a teaching professional (e.g., master plan credits,
finding substitutes to cover my classes) are meaningful
(item 17)
MI'CD: Providing me with released time and hiring substitutes
to cover classes are meaningful ways in which my school
administration shows its support of my efforts to improve
my courses (item 9)
MI'ST: The school administration has shown its support and trust
of my efforts to get the best materials for my students
by delegating authority to select textbooks and
instructional materials to grade levels and departments
or by using discretionary funds (item 18)
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Table 15 continued
EI'TE: In my opinion, the principal equitably rewards teachers
whose performance is well-above-average and treats fairly
teachers whose performance need improvement (item 35)
EI'SD: All teachers who participate in staff development
activities receive similar kinds of recognition and
rewards from the principal and other school
administrators (item 36)
EI'CD: The principal does not favor one grade level or
department over another when it comes to distributing
resources and money for program development and curricular
improvement (item 27)
EI'ST: The principal does not favor one grade level or
department over another when it comes to distributing
resources and money for textbooks and materials (item 2)
TOTAL 48 questions
Data Collection
Data collection procedures at 12 of the 14 schools were
similar. A school building administrator, either the principal
or an assistant principal, was hand-delivered a questionnaire
packet for distribution to each classroom teacher on staff.
Attached to the questionnaire was an envelope and a cover letter
explaining the purposes of the study and instructions for
returning the questionnaire to a central location at the school
(Appendix D). In a few instances, the building administrator
attached a memo to the teachers requesting their voluntary
participation.
At two elementary schools, E2 and E3M, different procedures
were followed: E2 permitted the researcher to administer the
questionnaire at a faculty meeting and collect it immediately
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upon completion; the principal at E3M requested that teachers be
given a stamped self-addressed envelope for return by mail, which
was done.
After approximately one week, follow-up procedures were
initiated at all of the schools. The follow-up included
announcements by building administrators and a memorandum
thanking participants and granting other teachers an additional
week to complete the questionnaire. Follow-up memos were given
to grade-level and department chairpersons to be posted in the
teachers' lounge and/or placed in teachers' mailboxes. In order
to increase the response rate at S4, the researcher was permitted
to collect follow-up questionnaires by sitting in the faculty
lounge for a complete day. Two public address announcements were
made to encourage teachers on a voluntary basis to come to the
faculty lounge. In informal conversations with the teachers who
came by, they noted how busy they were particularly around
graduation time. Despite the low response rate, the completed
questionnaires did not indicate any unique systematic bias and,
therefore, were used in the data analyses.
Table 16 summarizes the teacher responses by school.
Overall, 54 percent of the teachers in the survey population
completed the SMCQ. The highest response rate came from
elementary school teachers, 76 percent, as compared to 63 percent
and 41 percent from junior high and senior high school teachers
respectively. The effect of the alternative data collection
procedures at E2 and E3M was negligible, except to note that on-
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site administration of the SMCQ had the highest return rate of
all schools, 97 percent. The return rate from teachers at merit
schools was 59 percent, while teachers at the matching schools
had a somewhat lower return rate of 47 percent. In addition, of
the 486 respondents, 471 indicated their level of teaching
experience. One-third had taught for three years or less; two-
thirds had four years or more teaching experience.
Table 16
Teacher ResponsestoheSC
Classroom First Follow-up Total
School Teachers Return Return Return Percentage
ElM 47 37 3 40 85%
E2 36 35 0 35 97%
E3M 39 29 2 31 79%
E4 28 14 7 21 75%
E5 35 14 0 14 40%
E6M 17 13 0 13 76%
Subtotals 202 142 12 154 76%
JlM 54 29 5 34 63%
J2M 45 31 0 31 69%
J3 29 11 5 16 55%
34 54 26 8 34 63%
Subtotals 182 97 18 115 63%
--------------------------------------------------------------------
51 122 55 1 56 46%
S2M 152 80 2 82 54%
S3M 122 45 7 52 43%
S4 127 22 5 27 21%
Subtotals 523 202 15 217 41%
---------------------------------------------------------------
Totals: 907 441 45 486 54%
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DataAnalyses
The teacher data responses from the questionnaire were all
reviewed for accuracy. Variable codes were entered by the
researcher on a micro-computer using a word processing program
for later transfer as an ASCII file to a mainframe computer.
Missing values and Don't Know responses were each coded
separately in order to analyze these independent responses. In
understanding building-level control, these responses might
indicate (a) that teachers do not know what the school
administration is doing within a particular task or, perhaps, (b)
that teachers have been given discretion to act autonomously on a
specific task relatively independent from close administrative
supervision.
The data were subsequently analyzed [more accurately,
operationalized) in three stages: descriptive statistics,
reliability and construction validation procedures, and post hoc
tests of significance.
Descritive Saistic
Means, percentage frequencies, and correlations were
calculated for each item in the scale as well as for latent,
composite variables. These statistics were empirically analyzed
as part of the initial decision-making process of validation and
reliability testing for each item. Mean values were calculated
both conservatively, i.e., by requiring that each item be
answered under each task, and more liberally, i.e., by
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substituting mean averages by instructional levels for all
missing values and by accepting 75 percent responses per variable
(P. Johnson, personal communication, October, 21, 1988). The
only purpose for using the more liberal mean values was to assure
a sufficiently large enough sample size for valid reliabilities
and principal components analyses.
The mean statistics on the Likert-type scale offered an
indication of the strength or intensity of the teacher's
agreement that the task specific managerial behavior occurs
within their school (Converse & Presser, 1986, p. 37). The lower
the mean, the stronger was the teacher's perception that the
specific administrative control behavior occurred at the school
building-level.
The interpretation of descriptive statistics derived from a
nonstandardized instrument led to a particular concern with
identifying method interference. Such instances may have
occurred due to (1) items which may have been misinterpreted by
teachers to mean what building administrators ought to do rather
than what current building administrators were actually doing
(see item 9); (2) items which might be confused with another
item because of (a) consecutive placement (see e.g., items 7 and
8, 31 and 32, 38 and 39, 42, 43, and 44, and 47 and 48) or (b)
syntax similarities, (see e.g., items 2 and 27 or items 15 and
29); and, (3) missing and DK responses which ultimately may have
affected either the content validity of the item or its
reliability.
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ReliabilitieSanCosrc Validation
The primary objective of the study was to increase our
understanding of the meaning of managerial control. In order to
support school managerial control as a construct, three criteria
needed to be met: (1) establishing the uniqueness of the two
dimensions of managerial control and the four managerial control
processes; (2) obtaining consistent measures across a variety of
curricular and instructional tasks; and (3) distinguishing
managerial control from other managerial concepts in general and
from the concept of job satisfaction in particular. Construct
validity is a necessary precondition for theory development
(Hughes, Price & Marrs, 1986). The major obstacle in
ascertaining validity is that the hypothetical constructs are not
directly observable, but rather exist as part of theory (Hoyle,
in press).
Looking at the inter-item correlations is the first
"objective check" (McIver & Carmines, 1981, p. 24) of the
reliability of each item. Three other reliability measures have
been used to interpret the correlations: (1) Cronbach Alpha
coefficients, (2) corrected item-to-total correlations, and (3)
squared multiple correlation coefficient in which each item is
regressed on the remaining items. Each of these analyses were
performed on both the total items in the managerial control scale
and on the hypothesized latent variables.
The development of a construct scale necessitates the
identification of underlying concepts which explain the
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relationship within a group of variables. In most instances, the
number of underlying concepts are less than the number of items
in the scale. In order to test the underlying aspects of the
school managerial control model, principal components analyses
were performed on all 50 items on the SMCQ as well as on the
latent families of items. Based, in part, on the results of
these reliability tests, decisions were made to retain or reject
specific items in the scale. These calculations and
interpretations may be considered confirmatory in that they were
conducted within the theoretical parameters of the model proposed
in Chapter Four. In social science research, an emerging method
used to test hypothetical factors and model parameters is
confirmatory factor analysis (Dunteman, 1989, p. 59; Hughes,
Price, & Marrs, 1986). The confirmatory factor model not only
specifies the number of common factors and observed variables to
be analyzed, but also imposes substantive constraints on the data
by stating specific relationships among latent and observable
variables (Long, 1983a, p. 12). Under the conditions present
within this study, e.g., high communalities of the variables and
a large number of variables, both principal components and factor
analysis are likely to give similar results (Dunteman, 1989, p.
60; Stevens, 1986).
Inferential Statistics
Empirical studies of organizational control have been
labelled exploratory (Peterson, 1984; Sproull, 1981). Therefore,
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they have tended to describe their findings and report statistics
rather than test specific hypotheses (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975;
Hanson, 1981; Peterson, 1984). Even when the samples have
included schools from each of the three levels of education,
elementary through high school, researchers have not analyzed
differences among the instructional levels (Hanson, 1981).
The aim of construct validation procedures is to establish a
unique solution of the hypothetical model. Meaningfulness,
however, is dependent upon substantive theory. Statistically
significant differences, in fact, may not be appropriate to
concepts originating from common factors. Nevertheless, the
value of a measurement model ultimately rests with its practical
implications. Therefore, a number of univariate and multivariate
inferential tests of significance using the actual mean value
data was reported independently of the reliability findings
reported in the previous section.
In the managerial control model, standards, information,
assessments, and incentives are defined as latent variables
which can be viewed as responses or dependent variables. Since
the effects of schools (Blumenfeld, personal communication,
January 1, 1989), instructional levels (Corcoran, 1985; Dornbusch
& Scott, 1975; Rowan, 1985), size (Peterson, 1984), tenure
(Applewhite, 1965; Etzioni, 1965) and effectiveness (Hallinger &
Murphy, 1985; Peterson, Hallinger, & Murphy, 1987; Wellisch, et
al., 1978) have been associated with other control studies, post
hoc univariate, repeated measures, and MANOVA's were conducted to
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determine the interactive effects with the managerial control
processes of standards, information, assessment, and incentives.
In exploratory research, "both (author's emphasis) the univariate
and multivariate tests [for repeated measures are] routinely used
because they may differ in the treatment effects that they
discern (Stevens, 1986, p. 414). Considering the complexity of
variables involved with managerial control, there is a need to
study their interaction effects. Although the mathematical basis
for applying MANOVA is generally accepted, there is considerable
debate as to its proper use (Bray & Maxwell, 1985). Thus, these
tests will rely on good judgment and interpretation. Where
statistical significance is observed, further analyses may need
to be conducted to isolate the specific effects. Since none of
the inferential tests of significance was part of an experimental
research design, the results simply suggest to researchers
specific avenues of study that may offer insights regarding these
relationships as well as alternative paths of investigation.
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CHAPTER SIX
Data Analysis
Introduction
In order to test the validity and reliability of the
measures of the school managerial control model, data from the
School Managerial Control Questionnaire (SMCQ) were analyzed at
various levels of aggregation. Although Vickers (1967) warned
that with every aggregation, the "indices of control become less
significant" (p. 29-30), the definition of managerial control
must reflect the complexity of school organizations and
underlying conceptual relationships. Statistically, aggregations
are more sensitive to systematic bias (Blalock, 1985), and, as a
rule, yield higher R squared statistics than do individual level
data (Kenny, 1979, p. 262). Nevertheless, the evidence from
social science literatures on organizational control makes it
clear that multiple items are needed to measure that complexity
(Morris & Fitz-Gibbon, 1978, pp. 14-29; Pfeffer, 1978a; Schein,
et al., 1961). The aggregation of the multiple items reflect
latent variables or theoretical constructs supported by empirical
data (James, et al., 1982, pp. 104-105). Each of the items on
the SMCQ is a descriptive, observable indicator relating to a
specific task context as well as to the latent variables of
managerial control. While confirmatory analyses begins with
observable indicators, it must also extend beyond descriptive
statistics.
The fact that there is so little published empirical support
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for specific managerial behaviors which influence school control
(Bossert, et al., 1982; Duke, 1982), careful attention must be
paid to descriptive responses reported by school teachers. The
descriptive data analyses proceeded from the specific items
through the levels of aggregation hypothesized by the school
managerial control model. The actual mean values were reported,
since any missing values or teacher Don't Know responses were
considered important data findings.
In addition to reporting means, frequencies, and
correlations for individual items, unidimensional scaling,
reliability tests, and principal components analysis procedures
were conducted as described in the previous chapter. The purpose
of these statistical tests was to explore the underlying factors
of teacher perceptions of managerial control and to guide further
construct validity testing of the proposed model. In order to
maximize the sample size for reliability tests and principal
components analyses, mean values by instructional levels were
substituted for all missing values and Don't Know responses.
Because of the limitations of a single study, only initial
results of construct validation testing results can be reported
here.
Finally, given the descriptive and exploratory nature of
this study, findings from a number of post hoc tests of
significance regarding the effects of schools, levels of
instruction, tenure, and school effectiveness were also reported.
Here, again, the actual mean data were used to limit the
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systematic bias of aggregation. These statistical results may
suggest a number of hypotheses leading to future research on
school managerial control.
Although a complete description of the SMCQ instrument is
found in Chapter Five, a review here of item abbreviations should
facilitate their quick and accurate reading. The items on the
SMCQ measure the attributes of two dimensions: structural-
frequency (F) and discretionary-quality of the four managerial
control processes, i.e., standards (8), information (I),
assessment (A), and incentives (I'). The qualitative indicators
under each managerial control process vary and are abbreviated as
follows:
clarity of standards (C)
difficulty of standards (D)
adequacy of information (a)
utility of information (U)
fairness of assessment (f)
worth of assessment (W)
meaningfulness of incentives (M)
equitable distribution of incentives (E)
Each item is also linked contextually to a specific curricular
and instructional task: teacher evaluation (TE), staff
development (SD), curriculum development (CD), and selection of
textbooks and instructional materials (ST).
In reading an item abbreviation, the first letter refers to
the measure of managerial behaviors, either frequency or a
quality; the second letter refers to the managerial control
process; while, the last two letters refer to the specific task.
For example, the item abbreviated as CSTE reads:
clarity of standards for teacher evaluation.
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The abbreviation MI'SD reads:
meaningfulness of incentives in staff development.
On the SMCQ, teacher responses (N=486) on a Likert-type
scale ranged from one, representing "Strongly Agree' to six,
representing "Strongly Disagree." Therefore, the lower the mean
value, the stronger the teacher perception that the specific
managerial behavior occurs within the school- building. In Table
17, the top 12 items with the lowest mean values have been
reported along with their standard deviations and the cumulative
percentage of teacher agreement. The latter statistic is the
percentage of teacher responses from one "Strongly Agree" to
three "Agree" on the Likert-type scale. The column labelled
"number of responses" excluded two distinct categories: (a)
teachers who stated that they Don't Know (DK) whether that
managerial behavior occurs with respect to one of the behavioral
indicators, and (b) missing values, i.e., items left blank.
Teachers chose the DK response far more often than omitting a
response (see Table 19).
Eleven of the 12 items receiving the strongest teacher
perceptions of school managerial behavior reported in Table 17
belonged to the hypothesized dimension of discretionary behavior.
Of the qualitative indicators, teacher input [utility of
information] in the selection of textbooks and instructional
materials (UIST) ranked first, followed by another information
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item, adequacy of information in teacher evaluation (aITE). A
third information process indicator made the top quartile, the
utility of information for staff development (UISD). However,
the low number of responses (n=208) to this item indicated that a
majority of the teachers responding (57.2%) did not necessarily
agree that this managerial behavior was present in schools.
Table 17
Top qurilofTahrAreetesoestItsonheSC
Cumulative
Number of Standard Percentage of
Item Responses Mean Deviation Agreement
UIST 445 2.39 1.15 90.6
aITE 477 2.45 1.16 88.1
fATE 456 2.45 1.17 90.6
fAST 408 2.48 1.32 82.1
MI'ST 437 2.49 1.37 82.2
EI'ST 431 2.52 1.59 75.9
FI'SD 407 2.54 1.26 83.5
MI'CD 450 2.56 1.50 78.0
CSCD 472 2.57 1.33 82.6
fASD 457 2.57 1.32 80.5
CSTE 467 2.59 1.29 80.3
UISD 208 2.60 1.29 83.7
The managerial process with the most items was incentives,
with four, one more than either information or assessment. The
multiple items indicating fairness of assessment in (a) teacher
evaluation, (b) selection of texts, and (c) staff development
also had strong teacher agreement. The managerial process with
the least items in Table 17 was standards, which included only
items pertaining to clarity, more specifically the clarity of
standards for curriculum development (CSCD) and the clarity of
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standards for teacher evaluation (CSTE). In Dade County,
Florida, formal standards for both of these tasks originated
above the individual school-level.
All four curricular and instructional tasks were represented
within the managerial processes. The selection of texts and
instructional materials ranked first in teacher agreement with
four items, followed in order by teacher evaluation and staff
development with three items, and curriculum development with two
items.
In Table 18, the bottom quartile is shown, representing the
12 items with the lowest levels of teacher agreement; although,
here, too, a majority of the teachers were generally in agreement
with the behavioral impact of the managerial activities. Unlike
the preponderance of discretionary qualities appearing in Table
17, eight out of the bottom 12 indicators belonged to the
structural-frequency dimension. Three of the items referred to
the frequency of standards, while three others referred to the
frequency of assessments.
Seven of the 12 item in Table 18 referred to the managerial
control of standards. All four of the items having to do with
the difficulty of standards were included, along with three out
of the four structural-frequency indicators of standards. The
managerial process which appeared next most often was assessment
with three items, all pertaining to the structural-frequency of
assessments. Interestingly, the tasks listed under the
structural-freuency dimension of standards and assessments were
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the same: teacher evaluation, staff development, and selection of
textbooks and instructional materials. The singular exception
under the structural-frequency of standards and assessments was
the task of curriculum development, which received relatively
high levels of agreement (79.2% and 75.2 % respectively).
Table 18
Bottom qupartile of Teacher Agreement Responses to Items on the
SMCO
Cumulative
Number of Standard Percentage of
Item Responses Men Deviation Agreement
DSTE 392 3.69 1.30 32.7
FSSD 394 3.50 1.34 47.7
FAST 276 3.30 1.37 54.7
FSST 339 3.27 1.40 59.9
DSCD 428 3.19 1.38 58.2
FSTE 459 3.09 1.40 63.6
FATE 446 3.08 1.51 67.3
FASD 222 3.08 1.45 67.1
DSSD 439 3.05 1.32 63.3
FICD 459 2.99 1.38 68.4
DSST 367 2.94 1.43 67.8
FI'CD 423 2.92 1.38 69.5
In general, the number of responses per item were lower for
the bottom quartile of teacher agreement. Particularly low
response rates were given to the frequency of assessments for
selecting texts and instructional materials (FAST) (n=276) and to
the frequency of assessment for staff development (FASD) (n=222).
Obviously mean values were higher in Table 18, but so also were
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standard deviations. The frequency of agreement ranged from a
low of 32.7 percent for difficulty of standards in teacher
evaluation (DSTE) to a high of 69.5 percent for the frequency of
incentives for curriculum development (FI'CD).
In both Tables 17 and 18, missing values and teacher DK
responses were excluded. As stated previously, these two
responses highlighted specific school building managerial
behaviors of which teachers admitted they were not aware.
In Table 19, a majority of the teachers surveyed indicated
that they did not know whether their input was used in developing
a staff development program at their school (UISD) or whether
school administrators evaluated staff development programs
(FASD). Over 40 percent of the teachers were not aware of the
frequency of assessment of textbooks and instructional materials
(FAST). Over 30 percent were not aware of the frequency of
standards for the selection of textbooks and instructional
materials (FSST). Other items which received high DK responses
were the equitable distribution of incentives for staff
development (EI'SD) and the difficulty of standards in the
selection of textbooks and instructional materials (DSST).
When these responses were calculated for each of the three
levels of instruction, the percentage of elementary school
teachers who indicated Don't Know for these items was lower than
for teachers at the junior high or senior high school levels.
This was particularly true for the frequency of assessment for
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textbooks, the equitable distribution of incentives for staff
development, and the difficulty of standards for the selection of
textbooks. Conversely, junior high school teachers registered
the highest percentages of DK and missing values among the three
levels of instruction.
Table 19
Items With Low Teacher Response Rates By Instructional Levels
Instructional Levels
Elementary Junior Senior
Missing DK Total (n=154) (1=115) (n=217)
Item % % % % %
UISD 1.6 55.6 57.2 55 60 58
FASD 2.1 52.3 54.4 47 54 59
FAST 1.4 41.8 43.2 35 52 44
FSST 2.3 28.0 30.3 26 33 32
EI'SD 2.9 23.0 25.9 18 32 29
DSST 2.5 22.0 24.5 20 30 24
Three of the top four items in Table 19 were structural-
frequency indicators. Only two of the four curricular and
instructional tasks were found to have a high number of teacher
DK responses: staff development and the selection of textbooks
and instructional materials.
Two items [not shown in Table 19] were left blank by
teachers far more often than any of the other 48 items. They
were frequency of assessment in teacher evaluation (11.1%) and
the equitable distribution of incentives for the selection of
textbooks and instructional materials (7.2%). The actual mean
values for the former item were over 3.0, indicating teacher
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disagreement that "the process of evaluating teachers occurs at
my school more often than just when I am being [formally
observed]." With respect to the equitable distribution of
incentives for selecting texts and instructional materials, those
who responded [over 80%] agreed that this managerial behavior was
practiced.
Item Correlations
Correlational analyses based on actual mean values were
performed for each of the 50 items on the SMCQ. As behavioral
indicators of specific tasks and processes which have all been
hypothesized as relating to the domain of managerial control, the
inter-item correlations were predictably high and positive.
Nevertheless, with the large number of variables in the matrix,
it was unrealistic to comprehensively describe the inter-item
correlations. "The goal of principal components analysis is to
decompose the correlation matrix.... Variables that correlate
highly with a particular principal component give meaning to the
component" (Dunteman, 1989, p. 21). Since greater theoretical
significance is attached to the meanings of aggregate variables,
only the highest correlations might be of interest at this time
(Table 20). Most of these individual item pairings will
anticipate latent variable relationships.
In judging the correlation between two items, four factors
seemed to be associated with the high correlations: (1)
consecutive placement on the SMCQ, (2) similar structure or
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quality, (3) similar process, or (4) similar task. Although the
items on the SMCQ were ordered on a random basis, in some
instances, items measuring the same managerial behavior were
consecutively placed. These pairings tended to result in the
highest positive correlations among the 48 managerial control
items (Table 20). Yet, in only one instance was consecutive
placement the single commonality between the items.
Table 20
{iihest Positive Correlations and Commonalities on the SMCO
First Correlational Second
Item Coefficient Item Commonalities
WATE .86 WACD (placement, process, behavior)
UICD .77 UIST (placement, process, behavior)
FASD .77 UISD (task)
FIST .74 aIST (process, task)
FICD .71 CSST (placement)
CSST .71 aIST (task)
WATE .71 UITE (task)
FSST .70 FASD (dimension)
UISD .70 UICD (process, behavior)
FISD .70 aIST (process)
An additional pair of items with a high positive correlation
fell outside of the four primary influence factors: fairness of
assessment in staff development (fASD) correlated positively,
.73, with satisfaction of school administrator performance. The
influence of teacher satisfaction on managerial control is
important in order to identify processes and specific managerial
behaviors which correlate with both concepts. The effects of
teacher satisfaction are present within each of the item's
measures.
266
Correlations between managerial control and satisfaction.
Correlations were calculated between the forty-eight
managerial control items and two satisfaction indicators.
Bachman & Tannenbaum (1968, Chapter 16), C. Greene (1981, pp.
218-230), Locke (1977) and Turcotte (1974) have all demonstrated
a somewhat variable, but positive correlation between performance
and satisfaction. C. Greene (1981) reported that recent
motivation research seemed to reject the view that satisfaction
causes performance, yet only moderately supports the view that
performance causes satisfaction. Two intervening variables
identified in the literature have been rewards and effort. It is
important, therefore, to establish the relationship between
satisfaction and the processes and tasks of managerial control.
Two items on the SMCQ, numbers 14 and 25, sought to measure
different aspects of teacher satisfaction. Item 14 read:
I am satisfied with the job my school administration is
doing.
Item 25 read:
I am generally satisfied working at my school.
The former referred to satisfaction with the performance of the
administration, while the latter with personal job satisfaction.
Practically all [98 percent] the teachers in the sample
responded to these two satisfaction items. On the basis of mean
values, personal job satisfaction (item 25) ranked first with the
highest level of teacher agreement (2.03). That is, teachers
reported a higher level of satisfaction with their jobs than with
any of the 48 managerial control behaviors. High school teachers
reported to be the most satisfied with their jobs as well as with
their school administrators. Junior high school teachers were
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the least satisfied with the performance of their school
administrators (mean value of 2.8).
The two satisfaction items, however, exhibited a number of
pairwise correlations with the managerial control items that were
lower than those found among the managerial control variables
themselves.
At the level of curricular and instructional tasks, the low
correlations between satisfaction and managerial control were
even clearer, although the relationship is certainly complex.
The lowest correlations between satisfaction items and managerial
control items reported in Table 21 included variables related to
the lack of meaningful incentives or managerial effort as
measured by frequency of interactions and difficulty of
standards.
Table 21
Low Item Correlations Between Managerial Control and Satisfaction
School Administration Job
Item Satisfaction Satisfaction Comments
FSSD .40 Less teacher job
satisfaction
with the
infrequent setting
of personal in-
service goals
DSTE .25 .23 Less overall
teacher
satisfaction
with the level of
difficulty in
standards expected
in teaching
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Table 21 continued
DSCD .33 .30 Less overall
teacher
satisfaction
with the level of
difficulty in
curriculum
development
standards
FAST .37 Less teacher job
satisfaction
with the regular
procedures for
assessing
texts or other
materials
MI'CD .34 Less teacher job
satisfaction
with the
incentives to
develop
curriculum
The low correlations between satisfaction and specific
managerial control items were also supported by the high mean
value scores of each control item, except the meaningful
incentives for curriculum development. In fact, the means scores
indicated some degree of teacher disagreement, ranging from 3.19
to 3.69. As for the meaningful incentives for curriculum
development, (MI'CD), it might have been that teachers
misinterpreted the written item as a behavior that school
administrators ought to do, rather than answering the question
based on the behavioral impact of providing released time and
hiring substitutes. Possibly, these behaviors were not regular,
on-going managerial activities at some schools in the sample.
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The data on inter-item reliabilities, however, presented a
somewhat different picture of the relationship between managerial
control and satisfaction. Here, it was not job satisfaction
which influenced teacher perceptions of managerial control, but
rather satisfaction with the performance of school
administrators. Both the corrected item-to-total correlation and
the squared multiple correlation were very high (.783 and .731
respectively), and if satisfaction with school administration was
deleted from the statistical analysis, the overall Alpha
Coefficient would be lowered from .9747 to .9738.
Thus, while there is some correlational evidence to support
the distinction between managerial control and teacher job
satisfaction, the concepts of managerial control and satisfaction
with administrative performance were clearly interrelated.
Latet AgreateVariables
The first level of aggregation above individual items
combined indicators of structural-frequency and discretionary-
quality for each task under one of the four managerial control
processes. Thus, the four frequency items pertaining to
standards were combined as were the frequency items under
information, assessments, and incentives. Likewise, all of the
salient qualitative items were combined under their respective
managerial control process. Table 22 indicates the number of
teacher responses, actual mean values for the first-level
aggregation, and the cumulative percentage of teacher agreement
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for each managerial variable. The loss of responses from the
original N486 occurred because data was quantified only from
those teachers who responded to all four items comprising that
variable. The most severe losses were reported for the frequency
of assessments (n=168) and the utility of information (n=190).
Table 22
Means and Frequencies of Aggregate Managerial Control Variables
Cumulative
Number of Frequencies of
Variable Responses Means Agreement(%)
Frequency/Standards 278 3.11 52.2
Clarity/Standards 368 2.67 69.8
Difficulty/Standards 294 3.20 44.9
Frequency/Information 412 2.77 64.8
Adequacy/Information 398 2.65 71.1
Utility/Information 190 2.48 76.8
Frequency/Assessment 168 2.98 57.7
Fairness/Assessment 333 2.47 74.8
Worth/Assessment 346 2.75 65.9
Frequency/Incentive 343 2.65 68.8
Meaning/Incentive 394 2.62 71.1
Equity/Incentive 297 2.69 68.7
Within the managerial control process labelled standards,
69.8 percent of the teachers agreed that clarity of standards
existed within their schools, while structural-frequency and
difficulty of standards were the least evident. The latter
variables had mean values over 3.0, also suggesting some teacher
disagreement with these managerial activities. Their cumulative
percentage of teacher agreement was the lowest reported for all
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of the aggregated variables, 52.2 percent and 44.9 percent
respectively.
With respect to information, both of the qualitative
variables, adequacy and utility, received higher teacher
agreement than the structural-frequency of information.
Similarly, the data reported for assessments indicated that the
structural-frequency of assessments had a lower level of teacher
agreement than either of the two qualitative variables.
Only under the managerial control process of incentives did
the data demonstrate that structural-frequency was evident to the
same extent as the qualitative variables of incentives.
Although some task differences were evident in Tables 23
through 26, the impact of school managerial control behaviors
were found across the different curricular and instructional
tasks. For example, within the task of teacher evaluation, the
cumulative percentages of teacher agreement for clarity of
standards, adequacy of information, and fairness of assessments
were all high. Within the process of standards, frequency and
difficulty were consistently lower than clarity for all four
curricular and instructional tasks. Likewise, all three
indicators under the process of assessment demonstrated a
consistency across the curricular and instructional tasks.
When the items on the SMCQ were aggregated by curricular and
instructional tasks under the managerial control process of
standards (Table 23), the percentages of teacher agreement were
lower for the structural-frequency of standards in staff
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development and selection of textbooks and instructional
materials than for teacher evaluation and curriculum development.
Overall, the clarity of standards by tasks was high, although it,
too, followed the same task pattern as structural-frequency. In
contrast, teachers reported low agreement about the presence of
difficulty of standards, especially for the task of teacher
evaluation. Thus, for example, teachers viewed standards for
teacher evaluation to be clear, somewhat frequent, although not
difficult.
Table 23
Cumulative Percentages of Teacher Agreement on Curricular and
Instructional Tasks for Standards
Teacher Staff Curriculum Selection
Evaluation Development Development Texts
Standards
Frequency 63.6 47.7 79.2 59.9
Clarity 80.3 73.6 82.6 73.7
Difficulty 32.7 63.3 58.2 67.8
On the SMCQ, teachers registered consistently high agreement
about information managerial behaviors for each of the four
curricular and instructional tasks (Table 24). Of the three
behavioral indicators, utility of information in the selection of
textbooks and instructional materials ranked highest overall with
90.6 percent, followed by the adequacy of information for teacher
evaluation with 88.1 percent.
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Table 24
Cumuatie Pec nagesof eachr Areement on Curcla n
Instructional Tasks for Information
Teacher Staff Curriculum Selection
Evaluation Development Development Texts
Information
Frequency 72.9 81.8 68.4 77.6
Adequacy 88.1 78.8 77.7 78.1
Utility 77.4 83.7 81.7 90.6
Utility of information was defined as the teachers'
perception that their feedback information and suggestions were
used by school administrators. The two tasks in which utility
was ranked highest were the selection of texts and instructional
materials and in staff development. Teacher evaluation and
curricular development ranked somewhat lower in terms of utility
of information. The adequacy of information ranked highest
(88.1%) for the task of teacher evaluation. Under the
structural-frequency of information, teachers agreed most on
staff behaviors, with selection of texts second, followed by
teacher evaluation, and curriculum development.
The data reported in Table 25 indicate that the structural-
frequency of assessments across three of the four curricular and
instructional tasks received less teacher agreement than did
almost all the discretionary, qualitative assessment behaviors.
Only 54.7 percent of the teachers reported agreement with the
structural-frequency of assessments of textbooks and
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instructional materials. Along the structural-frequency
dimension, teachers reported highest agreement for the task of
curricular development assessment.
The highest percentage of agreement among teachers was for
the fairness of assessments with respect to teacher evaluation.
Teacher judgment as to the worth of assessments was consistent,
varying only 4 percent across all tasks.
Table 25
Cumulative Percentages of Teacher Agreement on Curricular and
Teacher Staff Curriculum Selection
Evaluation Development Development Texts
Assessments
Frequency 67.3 67.1 75.2 54.7
Worth 72.5 76.5 72.5 75.1
Fair 90.6 80.5 80.5 82.1
The data presented for the managerial process of incentives
in Table 26 indicate a somewhat different pattern of teacher
agreement of managerial activities than found in the other
managerial processes. Incentives were the only managerial
control process in which the structural-frequency measures were
congruent with the discretionary, qualitative indicators of
meaningfulness and equitable distribution. Only under
information did teachers also report such high levels of
agreement for structural-frequency activities.
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The two highest percentages of teacher agreement for
incentives were reported for the structural-frequency of staff
development (83.5%) and for the meaningfulness of incentives for
selection of textbooks and instructional materials (82.2%).
Teacher response rates to the indicators of meaningfulness were
higher than for either the indicators of structural-frequency or
equitable distribution. For meaningfulness in curriculum
development, 450 teachers responded, while 437 teachers responded
to the meaningfulness in the selection of textbooks and
instructional materials. Interestingly, the level of teacher
agreement about equitable distribution of incentives was lower
across all tasks in comparison to either frequency or
meaningfulness indicators.
Table 26
Cumulative Percentages of Teacher Agreement on Curricular and
Instructional Tasks for Incentives
Teacher Staff Curriculum Selection
Evaluation Development Developmen Txts
Incentives
Frequency 76.7 83.5 69.5 76.1
Meaningfulness 76.4 77.3 78.0 82.2
Equity 71.7 74.2 72.6 75.9
The second level of aggregation combined both the
structural-frequency items across all four tasks with the
indicators of discretionary quality under each of the four
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managerial control processes. In Table 27, teachers reported
highest agreement about managerial behaviors pertaining to
information and the lowest agreement on managerial behaviors
related to standards. The reduced sample sizes occurred because
data was tabulated only from those teachers who answered every
item [12] within the aggregation.
Table 27
Means and Cumulative Per cenae ofTa r eeent of
Manarial Control Processes
Cumulative
Percentages of
Process NMeans Areement (%)
Standards 202 2.94 54.5
Information 166 2.49 75.3
Assessments 143 2.59 69.2
Incentives 232 2.53 70.7
Of the teachers who responded to all twelve indicators of
information, 75 percent agreed that school administrators managed
curriculum and instruction through information systems. In
contrast, only a little over one half of the teachers agreed that
school building administrators actively managed standards for
curricular and instructional tasks. Both incentives and
assessments fell between the other two managerial processes.
Although the mean values and percentage frequency of agreement
for incentives and assessments were similar, there was a
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considerable difference in the number of teacher responses to the
respective twelve indicators for each process. Almost an
additional one hundred teachers responded fully to managerial
activities related to incentives as opposed to assessments.
Model Testing
The proposed model of managerial control is a theoretical
construct made up of latent variables, with explicitly stated
relationships among the items on the SMCQ. The objective of
construct validation is to arrive at a unique model solution
which is explained by the data. At this stage of theory
development, however, with only one sample population, the
initial objective is to make intelligent decisions on whether to
accept or reject specific items for inclusion in a scale of
school managerial control.
Since the hypothesized elements and relationships comprising
the model of school managerial control were proposed as necessary
attributes, decisions to reject specific items were guided not
only by empirical data, but by social science control theory as
well. In fact, there are no purely statistical procedures which
identify latent variables or guarantee theoretical validity
(Heise, 1974, p. 9).
Reliabilities
The initial statistical reliability techniques for
unidimensional scaling measured both the corrected item-to-total
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correlations and Cronbach Alpha coefficients which assess the
internal consistency of items and serve as the basis for creating
factor scores (Armor, 1974; Heise, 1985). Since item-to-total
correlations are biased because each item contributes to the
total scale score, thereby inflating the correlation coefficient,
corrected item-to-total correlations were computed to eliminate
that item's variance. (McIver & Carmines, 1987). Aggregate
variable correlation matrices and squared multiple correlation
statistics were also used to determine the reliability for each
item.
Most reliability measures are affected by the number of
items in the scale. When the 48 items on the SMCQ were analyzed
[the two satisfaction items were excluded here], the Cronbach
Alpha coefficient was .9732 [compared with the Cronbach Alpha
coefficient on the pre-tested scale of .8658 [see Table 14]. The
coefficient is an estimated average of each inter-item
correlation (Armor, 1974, p. 19). The corrected inter-item
correlations for each of the managerial control items also
established a measure of item discrimination; that is, ideally,
correlations among items of the same latent variable should have
higher coefficients than with the overall model.
Twelve items explicitly met the ideal discrimination
criterion (Table 28). That is, their latent aggregate variable
corrected item-to-total correlation was higher than their
correlation to the overall model, excluding the two satisfaction
items. Since many factors influence the correlations, e.g., the
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number of items, the amount of variance of each item, and the
existence and relative size of the aggregated items, the
calculated differences cannot be considered conclusive in
determining reliability.
Table 28
Corrected te toTalCorrelation Differences Betweene 
andreqate
Variables and the Overall Model
Corrected Item-to- Corrected Item-to-
Total Aggregate Total Overall
Item Variable Correlations Model Correlations Difference
DSSD .452 .282 .17
DSCD .519 .415 .10
EI'CD .681 .614 .07
EI'ST .573 .515 .06
WACD .776 .731 .05
WATE .750 .708 .04
UICD .776 .750 .03
UIST .702 .679 .02
MI'CD .554 .533 .02
FSSD .659 .645 .01
aISD .640 .628 .01
FICD .758 .758 -
Ten of the twelve items in Table 28 identified discretionary
behaviors. Given the difference between the number of items in
the model versus the aggregate variables (48 versus 4), even
items which did not meet this criterion may be considered to
discriminate. Certain items had low corrected item-to-total
correlations with the overall model. These included difficulty
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of standards for the selection of textbooks and instructional
materials, the utility of information in staff development, the
frequency of assessment for the selection of textbooks and
instructional materials, and the meaningful incentives for
teacher evaluation. Each of the four processes were represented
along with three different tasks.
At the other extreme, certain items had high overall model
corrected item-to-total correlations. These included the
fairness of assessment for staff development, the adequacy of
information for curriculum development, the frequency of
information for curriculum development, and the clarity of
standards for staff development. Three processes and only two
tasks were represented in this grouping of items.
Pre-test reliability statistics have been reported in Table
14. The same analyses were repeated on the revised items used in
the survey study (Table 29). The Cronbach Alpha coefficients on
all twelve aggregate variables were higher on the revised survey
items. The highest Cronbach Alpha coefficient belonged to the
aggregate variable labelled frequency of information, while the
lowest Alpha coefficients were found in the difficulty of
standards and the frequency of assessments.
A comparison of corrected item-to-total correlations with
coefficients on the correlational matrix provided two method
evidence for deciding whether to retain or reject specific items
(McIver & Carmines, 1987). Low correlations indicated a weakness
in that item. The weakest items appeared to be the task of
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selecting of textbooks and instructional materials as it related
to the managerial process of standards, the utility of
information pertaining to staff development, the frequency of
assessments, fairness and worth of assessment as it related to
textbook selection, and the meaningfulness of incentives as it
related to teacher evaluation.
Table 29
Reliability Statistics for School Managerial Control
Corrected
Item-Total Cronbach Correlation
Item Correlation Alpha Matrix
TE SD CD ST
FS .8062
FSTE .618 1.000
FSSD .659 .516 1.000
FSCD .636 .572 .524 1.000
FSST .581 .432 .570 .456 1.000
CS .8094
CSTE .603
CSSD .645 .497
CSCD .647 .526 .550
CSST .615 .477 .539 .512
DS .6818
DSTE .452
DSSD .488 .312
DSCD .519 .453 .405
DSST .399 .255 .372 .295
FI 
.8544
FITE .662
FISD .704 .550
FICD .758 .635 .663
FIST .665 .527 .585 .608
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continuedTable 29 TE SD CD ST
----------------------------------------------------------------
aI .8119
aITE .610
aIS .640 .562
aIG .652 .502 .520
I8 .61 .453 .49 .57 1.000
----------------------------------------------------------------
DTI .8194
UITE .599
UISD .523 .416
UIC .776 .866 .514
ST .792 .689 .433 .745
----------------------------------------------------------------
F .7252
FAT .494
F S .544 .330
FAQ .583 .497 .444
FAST .491 .311 .515 .379
----------------------------------------------------------------
A .8110
fATE .630
fAS .719 .63
fAC .617 .501 .566
fAST .555 .411 .526 .462
----------------------------------------------------------------
.8192
WAT .75®
W S .565 .495
WAS .776 .850 .525
AST .490 .424 .412 .438
----------------------------------------------------------------
F' .7992
FIITE .621
I'S .634 .574
FI' .620 .489 .514
IIS .580 .46 .456 .515
----------------------------------------------------------------
r .7474
MIITE .376
MIISD .683 .372
III .554 .248 .598
I'S .573 .323 .559 .451
----------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 29 continued
EI' .7921
EI'TE .581
EI'SD .586 .666
EI'CD .681 .445 .441
EI'ST .573 .354 .341 .709
The corrected item-to-total correlations consistently showed
that the items for the task of selecting textbooks and
instructional materials were the weakest variable under the
managerial control process of standards. Low squared multiple
correlations between the items and the total also supported this
conclusion. The multiple R squared coefficients for the
selection of textbooks and instructional materials were .368
(FSST), .383 (CSST), and .172 (DSST), which accounted for only a
small amount of the variance. Similarly, the multiple R squared
coefficients for the selection of textbooks and instructional
materials under the process of assessment were also low: .301
(FAST), .319 (fAST), and .244 (WAST).
Based on the data in Table 27, the selection of textbooks
and instructional materials under the managerial control
processes of standards and assessment appeared to be among the
weakest items. Other items must also be considered questionable
based on these internal reliability statistics. Yet, there is
still the question of whether these data identified single weak
items or clusters of items. In order to provide more evidence of
the underlying relationships between items, principal components
analyses were conducted.
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Principal Components Analysis
Principal components analyses were performed on the overall
model as well as on latent, aggregate variables. Principal
components analysis may yield as many components as there are
indicators; thus, the pivotal question raised by this procedure
is, how many hypothetical factors have substantive meanings
(Heise, 1974, p. 9). The factor loadings or coefficients offer a
broad numerical solution as to the underlying dimensions of the
items which may then be interpreted for substantive
relationships.
Principal components analysis partitions the total variance
of all the items (Stevens, 1986, p. 338). Statistically, factor
scores are Pearson r's. The first principal component explains
the highest percentage of the total variance. The second
component is the linear combination of items which are
uncorrelated with the first principal component. It explains the
next highest percentage of the total variance [after the variance
attributed to the first component has been removed].
Principal components analysis provides a matrix between the
items and the derived factors or components. There are a number
of methods used to guide the analyses of the factors (Dunteman,
1989, pp. 22-23; Stevens, 1986, pp. 340-343): (a) Kaiser's
criterion of retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than one;
(b) Jolliffe's criterion of retaining factors with an eigenvalue
cutoff of 0.7; (c) the retention of factors which explain up to
70 percent of the total variance; (d) a scree graph which plots
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the steep drop of eigenvalues; and, (e) the calculation of a Q/P
ratio <.30 (where Q is the number of factors and P is the number
of variables). The interpretation of the retention criteria,
however, is not straightforward, especially if there are
particular items with high coefficients in factors with low a
amount of variance. Moreover, the relationship between the
sample size, number of variables, and mean communality [the
portion of the total variance that is shared with the remaining
p-1 variables (Dunteman, 1989, p. 55)] determine the accuracy of
the above methods. In general, for N > 250 and a mean
communality > .60 [i.e., for each factor], the Kaiser or scree
criteria have been shown to be accurate (Stevens, 1986, p. 341-
342) .
The coefficients under each factor correspond to the largest
associated variance, often referred to as an eigenvalue. Hence,
there is another decision which must be made regarding the
meaningfulness of coefficients. "Certainly any loading which is
going to be used to interpret a factor should be statistically
significant at a minimum" (p. 343). Since measurement error or
chance may be prevalent in principal components analysis, Stevens
has recommended taking sample size into account in calculating
significance [p > .01, two-tailed test] (p. 344). The critical
value of N=500, is .117. Therefore, as a rough estimate, by
doubling the critical value, only factor loadings > 2(.117) =
.234 in absolute value would be statistically significant. A
more conservative estimate would, of course, explain more of the
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variance and be of greater practical significance. Thus, factor
loadings between .4 and .5 would be minimally acceptable for
purposes of this study (Armor, 1974, p. 35; Dembo & Gibson,
1984).
In order to facilitate the interpretation of principal
components analysis, Kaiser developed a varimax rotated analysis
of factor scores resulting in higher loadings on a smaller number
of items (Stevens, 1986, p. 343) and communality coefficients of
less than one. The varimax rotation maximizes the sum of the
variances of the squared factor loadings within each column and
offers a unique solution (Dunteman, 1989, p. 49). The tables and
interpretations used here were all varimax rotations.
The initial statistics in the principal components analysis
of all 50 items on the SMCQ resulted in six factors with
eigenvalues greater than one, which explained 60.9 percent of the
total variance. However, in order to broaden the analysis and
explain at least 70 percent of the total variance, twelve
principal components were extracted. The first principal
component explained 45.7 percent of the total variance. The
second, uncorrelated component explained 3.9 percent, while the
remaining factors had associated variances of 3.6 to 1.6. Each
principal component had mean communalities greater than .64 on
the final statistics and varimax rotation.
The results of a varimax rotation of the individual
principal components are reported in Table 30. Those items with
the highest factor loadings were listd under each of the twelve
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factors. In six of the factors, an interpretation of the
practical significance was readily apparent and may be considered
meaningful to the construct of school managerial control.
Table 30
Factor LoadisFo Varma Roaiono PrincipalCoontsn
SMCO Items
Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven
EI'TE FIST CSTE WACD FASD EI'ST MI'ST
(.674) (.693) (.643) (.743) (.742) (.833) (.603)
Job Sat. FISD CSCD WATE UISD EI'CD WAST
(.657) (.683) (.602) (.735) (.683) (.772) (.500)
Sch.Adm. aIST FATE MI'TE FAST FI'ST fAST
Sat. (.646) (.598) (.601) (.640) (.495) (.498)
(.620)
FI'SD FICD FSTE fATE FSST fACD
(.556) (.617) (.593) (.422) (.433) (.444)
fASD CSST aITE aITE
(.522) (.509) (.532) (.411)
EI'SD FSCD
(.501) (.510)
Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
Eight Nine Ten Eleven Twelve
MI'CD DSTE FSSD FI'TE WASD
(.802) (.853) (.485) (.476) (.515)
MI'SD DSCD FSST NI'TE aISD
(.626) (.735) (.428) (.431) (.440)
DSST
(.405)
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The first principal component explaining the highest
percentage of total variance was dominated by the two
satisfaction items and those managerial control behaviors which
were associated with incentives. Thus, equitable distribution
and frequency of incentives and fairness of assessments in staff
development and teacher evaluation correlated most highly with
satisfaction. Moreover, three out of the top four managerial
control items referred to the task of staff development. The
next five highest factor scores (> .4) in the first principal
component, however, included two other tasks, curriculum
development and teacher evaluation. Although only one item
measuring utility of information appeared in Table 30 in factor
five, two utility of information items had statistically
significant factor scores greater than .4 in factor one.
Consistent with reliability results, the highest proportion of
variance [68 percent] of all the items in the first seven
principal components was found in the item measuring teacher
satisfaction with the performance of the school administration
[i.e., based on the sum of the squares of the loadings for each
row of the principal components matrix (Dunteman, 1989, p.39)].
The second principal component or factor clearly identified
the managerial control process of information. The specific
indicators with the highest factor scores focused on the
structural-frequency of information rather than on the
qualitative indicators. Three additional information indicators
had factor scores greater than .4 in factor two.
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The items which correlated highly in the third principal
component belonged primarily to the managerial process of
standards, including both structural and qualitative indicators.
The frequency of assessment in teacher evaluation was one of four
items pertaining to directly to the task of teacher evaluation in
factor three. The other predominant task in the third principal
component was curriculum development. Not listed was the item of
FACD, with a factor score of .470.
The fourth principal component identified the indicator of
worth of assessments for teacher evaluation and curriculum
development. In fact, teacher evaluation was clearly the
dominant task in this principal component. Thus, teachers
associated meaningfulness of incentives, worth and fairness of
assessments, and the adequacy of information with teacher
evaluation.
Each of the four items listed under the fifth principal
component also appeared in Table 19. Recall that these were
items with high teacher Don't Know responses, and for FSST, FAST,
and FASD, the mean values were above 3.0, indicating apparent
teacher disagreement about these managerial behaviors.
Therefore, this principal component may indicate behaviors not
part of the construct of school managerial control, and, for that
reason, correlate highly.
Two equitable distribution of incentive behaviors were
associated with satisfaction in the first principal component.
In the sixth principal component, the other two equitable
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distribution of incentive behaviors dominated, selection of texts
and curriculum development. The items supporting this factor
were fairness of assessment in curriculum development and the
frequency of incentives for the selection of textbooks and
instructional materials.
In the seventh principal component, the qualitative indicators
of worth, meaning, and fairness were all associated with the task
of selecting textbooks and instructional materials. No other
curricular and instructional tasks were reported here.
For factors seven through twelve, the practical significance
was limited to just two or three items per factor. Nevertheless,
the correlations linked similar managerial processes, behavioral
indicators, and/or tasks. In the eighth principal component,
meaningfulness of incentives were identified. In the ninth
principal component, two difficulty of standards loaded highly.
The tenth principal component included two frequency of standards
indicators, although the factor loadings were less than .5. The
eleventh factor matched both incentives and teacher evaluations
(again the factor loadings were less than .5]. Included here,
too, however, was the item of difficulty of standards for the
selection of textbooks and instructional materials. In the
twelfth principal component, two qualitative indicators of the
task of staff development were statistically correlated.
Finally, two items on the SMCQ had no practically significant
correlations with any of the twelve factors. They were CSSD and
DSSD.
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The results of principal components analysis on the overall
model in the SMCQ identified factors in which three out of the
four managerial processes predominated: information (factor two),
standards (factor three), and incentives (factors one, six,
eight, and eleven). The other managerial control process,
assessment, was identified primarily as a qualitative variable in
factors one, four, six, seven, and twelve. Within the six
meaningful principal components, four factors tended to focus,
although not exclusively, on specific tasks: factor one (staff
development), factor two (the selection of textbooks and
instructional materials), factor three (teacher evaluation and
curriculum development), factor four (teacher evaluation), and
factor seven (the selection of textbooks and instructional
materials).
While the principal components analysis on the total model
revealed meaningful factors across the managerial processes as
well as across specific curricular and instructional tasks, a
closer perspective was afforded by principal components analyses
of each of the four managerial processes themselves again
substituting mean values by instructional levels. Although the
number of items was reduced from 50 in the overall model to 12
for the aggregate variables, the same criteria for retaining
factor loadings were applied (i.e., >.4). In order to facilitate
initial interpretations, varimax rotations extracted three
principal components for each aggregate variable.
Tables 31 through 34 report data from the varimax rotation of
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the principal components analysis for each of the four latent
managerial process. The rotated factor loadings are followed by
eigenvalues, percent of variance, cumulative percentages, and the
communality estimate of the factors. None of these statistics
were affected by the varimax rotation (Dunteman, 1989).
In Table 31, the first principal component within the
managerial process of standards combined the structural-
frequency dimension with the qualitative indicator clarity of
standards. The specific task of the selection of textbooks and
instructional materials formed its own factor, loading high on
each of its three items in the second principal component. The
third principal component referred to the perception of
difficulty of standards.
Table 31
Varimax Rotation of Principal Components Matrix for Standards
Principal Components
Item 1 2 3
FSTE .787 .102 .144
FSSD .586 .305 .388
FSCD .817 .178 .070
FSST .501 .499 .218
CSTE .755 .141 .162
CSSD .662 .428 .060
CSCD .730 .219 .082
CSST .511 .616 .104
DSTE .038 .105 .848
DSSD .598 .252 .418
DSCD .215 .141 .773
DSST .116 .878 .186
Eigenvalue 5.696 1.253 .831
Percent Variance 47.5 10.4 6.9
Cumulative Percent 47.5 57.9 64.8
Communality .651 .587 .704
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The principal components analysis of items under the
managerial control process of information resulted in three
factors with eigenvalues greater than .8, which explained almost
70 percent of the total variance (Table 32). The first principal
component measured the structural-frequency of information
supported by two adequacy indicators for curriculum development
and the selection of textbooks and instructional materials. The
second principal component identified all four utility of
information items, supported by two frequency behaviors. The
third principal component identified the other qualitative
behavior of adequacy. Four of the twelve information items
contributed to more than one principal component, suggesting that
the items are interrelated.
Table 32
Varimax Rotation ofPrincipal Components Matrix for Information
Principal Components
Item 1 2 3
FITE .470 .487 .347
FISD .752 .336 .186
FICD .666 .449 .244
FIST .823 .185 .198
aITE .161 .306 .820
aISD .355 .073 .783
aICD .595 .346 .408
aIST .771 .269 .257
UITE .358 .526 .423
UISD .217 .783 -. 005
UICD .314 .730 .360
UIST .322 .683 .320
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Table 32 continued
Eigenvalue 6.656 .854 .823
Percent Variance 55.5 7.1 6.9
Cumulative Percent 55.5 62.6 69.4
Communality .579 .713 .704
The principal components analysis of assessments resulted in
three factors with eigenvalues greater than .9, which explained
almost 66 percent of the total variance (Table 33). The first
principal component was dominated by all four fairness items,
joined by two indicators of worth. The structural-frequency
dimension of assessments separated into two principal components:
teacher evaluation and curriculum development were part of the
second principal component, while the items indicating regular
assessments of staff development and selection of textbooks
formed their own factor. In both instances, the structural-
frequency items were linked with judgments as to the worth of
assessments. In fact, in each of the three principal components,
teacher perceptions of the worth of assessment was present.
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Table 33
Varimax Rotation of Principal Components Matrix of Assessments
Principal Components
Item 1 2 3
FATE .082 .691 .261
FASD .140 .352 .723
FACD .260 .671 .320
FAST .193 .190 .814
fATE .708 .388 .037
fASD .697 .445 .179
fACD .706 .276 .106
fAST .714 .033 .361
WATE .391 .796 .106
WASD .533 .406 .207
WACD .385 .785 .160
WAST .584 .121 .543
Eigenvalue 5.913 1.025 .962
Percent Variance 49.3 8.5 8.0
Cumulative Percent 49.3 57.8 65.8
Communality .552 .666 .620
The principal components analysis on the fourth managerial
process oL incentives also resulted in three factors explaining
67 percent of the total variance (Table 34). The mean
communalities Lor the actors were somewhat lower, suggesting the
interrelatedness of the items, particularly the structural-
frequency of incentives which were found in each oL the three
principal components.
The first principal component linked the meaningfulness of
incentives with two structural-frequency items, while principal
components two and three each had two items measuring the
equitable distribution of incentives, In the second principal
component, the frequency, meaning, and equity of teacher
evaluation were highly correlated. While, in the third principal
component, the frequency and equitable distribution Lor the
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selection of textbooks had high factor loadings.
Table 34
Varimax Rotation of Principal Components Matrix of Incentives
Principal Components
Item 1 2 3
FI'TE .536 .551 .128
FI'SD .564 .496 .180
FI'CD .339 .637 .230
FI'ST .400 .315 .630
MI'TE -. 002 .819 .156
MI'SD .769 .333 .154
MI'CD .805 .063 .171
MI'ST .616 .300 .395
EI'TE .393 .620 .274
EI'SD .391 .628 .231
EI'CD .250 .170 .847
EI'ST .066 .197 .889
Eigenvalue 5.961 1.186 .871
Percent Variance 49.7 9.9 7.3
Cumulative Percent 49.7 59.6 66.8
Communality .607 .597 .574
Revised Model Scale
The descriptive statistics, the measures of internal
consistency, and the principal components analyses provided
empirical evidence to interpret the reliability of specific items
on the SMCQ and the practical significance of the aggregate
variables. Of the original 48 managerial control indicators,
there was evidence to support the retention of 35 items. For
five other items, the evidence was less clear in deciding whether
to retain or reject. While for eight items, as presently
written, the decision to reject them was obvious. Table 35
presents the revised scale of school managerial control.
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Seven of the 13 managerial control items that were rejected or
categorized as questionable belonged to the specific task of
selecting textbooks and instructional materials. Of the five
items rejected or questioned which pertained to structural-
frequency, three were from the frequency of assessment. In all,
six of the rejected or questioned items were associated with the
managerial control process of assessments, including items from
the two qualitative indicators of worth and fairness. Likewise,
each of the three indicators under the managerial control process
of incentives had one item rejected or questioned. While for
standards, frequency and difficulty relating to the task of
textbook selection were rejected as were two utility of
information items associated with the tasks of teacher evaluation
and staff development.
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Table 35
The Revised Scale on the_ IiCQ
Its Retained Questionable Items Items Rejected
FST
FSS
SC
CST
CSSD
CSC
CSS
DSTE SST
DSS
DSC
FI
FIS
FIC
FIST
aITE
IS
aICD
aIS
IC UITE
UIST UIS
FAC FATE F SD
AST
fAT f AST
fS
AC
TE S WA ST
WAC
KITE FIIST
FI'S
F'CD
I'C I'
I' SD
MIST
I'T I'S
I'S
'C
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The decisions to reject or question specific items were based
primarily on the empirical data reported in this chapter. The
item FSST reported high teacher disagreement (Table 18) along
with high DK responses (Table 19). In addition, the corrected
item-to-total correlation was lower for FSST than for the other
frequency of standards items (Table 29). Similar evidence was
found to reject DSST. Thus, if these items were deleted, the
Cronbach Alpha coefficient for their aggregate variables would be
higher.
UITE was rejected based on the reliability data which
indicated a low corrected item-to-total correlation (Table 29).
Here, too, the Alpha coefficient of utility would be higher if
the item were deleted. The decision on UISD was based on
reliability data (Table 29) as well as on the low n and high
teacher DK responses (Table 19).
Three frequency of assessment items, FATE, FASD, and FAST,
were rejected or questioned based on teacher disagreements about
the occurrence of these managerial behaviors (Table 18). FATE
was categorized as only questionable since it correlated highly
with strong items in factor three of the overall model principal
components (Table 30); yet, reliability data predicted that the
Alpha coefficient would be raised if it were deleted from the
aggregate variable. FASD was rejected because of its low n
(Table 19) and high correlations with many of the other rejected
items (Tables 20 and 30). The evidence to reject FAST included
all of the above statistics as well as low inter-item
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correlations (Table 29).
The other three assessment indicators were qualitative, fAST,
WAST, and WASD. The deletion of each item would raise the
Cronbach Alpha coefficient of the aggregate variables as
indicated by their low correlations and corrected item-to-total
correlations (Table 29). In addition, the factor loading for
WASD on Factor Twelve in Table 30, did not indicate practical
significance.
The last three items which were either rejected or questioned
were related to the managerial control process of incentives.
The decision to question FI'ST was based primarily on the
reliability data in Table 29. Moreover, both FI'ST and EI'ST
loaded onto Factor Six in the principal components analysis of
the model (Table 30). On the other hand, in support of EI'ST, it
had a higher corrected item-to-total correlation on its aggregate
variable than on the overall model (Table 28). Thus, the
evidence against these items cannot be considered conclusive. In
the case of MI'TE, this item had a low corrected item-to-total
correlation with low correlations and multiple R squared.
The same statistical interpretations were used to justify the
retention of the remaining 35 items. The evidence to support
these items, however, varied significantly. That is, while
certain indicators of behaviors and processes aggregated within
factors precisely as originally hypothesized, other indicators
were empirically linked to items outside of its aggregate
variable. As a result, alternative meanings must be considered
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as to how school managerial control actually operates. For
example, under the managerial process labelled standards,
frequency and clarity loaded onto the same factor (Table 31),
while a unique factor was created by the indicators pertaining to
the selection of textbooks and instructional materials.
Under the managerial process of information, frequency and
adequacy were not clearly distinguishable from the present set of
items (Table 32). Utility, on the other hand, formed its own
unique factor in Table 32, although it was not strongly supported
within the overall principal components model (Table 30).
The structural-frequency of assessments appeared to reflect
curricular and instructional tasks differences. In addition, the
perception of the indicator of worth was possibly not so clear
since factor scores were not consistent within any one category
(Tables 30 and 32).
The evidence to support the structural-frequency of incentives
seemed to confirm the blurred line between structural and
discretionary behaviors (Tables 22, 26, and 34). However, the
statistical differences among the indicators of equitable
distribution seemed to reflect task distinctions (Tables 30 and
34).
The statistical measure of the revised scale of the 35 item
model resulted in an overall Alpha coefficient of .9675 [somewhat
lower than the 48 item Alpha coefficient] and eight principal
components with eigenvalues greater than .75, explaining 69.4
percent of the total variance. The man communality of each of
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the eight factors was greater than .6. Table 36 summarizes the
substantive results from the varimax rotation of the principal
components. The items under each factor were listed in
descending order, beginning with the highest factor scores.
Only the last three items in factor seven had factor scores less
than .4.
Table 36
Varimax Rotation of Principal Components on the Revised SMCQ
Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight
aIST EI'TE FSSD aISD WATE MI'SD EI'CD DSTE
FIST Job/Sat DSSD aITE WACD MI'CD fACD DSCD
FISD FI'CD FACD CSCD fATE MI'ST SAT/SCH
FICD Sch Adm FSCD CSTE aITE ADM
CSST Sat FI'TE FSTE fASD
UIST UICD FSTE
aICD FI'SD
FITE EI'SD
The results of the principal components on the revised SMCQ
closely reflect the hypothesized model of school managerial
control. All four managerial processes were identified:
information in factors one and four, incentives in factors two,
six, and seven, standards in factors three, four, and eight, and
assessment in factor five. Two task differences were also
reflected in certain factors: selection of textbooks and
instructional materials in factor one, and teacher evaluation in
factors four and five.
In the first principal component, the managerial process of
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information dominated. Three of the items with factor scores
between .67 and .70 pertained to the frequency of information.
Four of the eight items pertained to the selection of textbooks
and instructional materials, although the other curricular and
instructional tasks were also present within the managerial
activities of information. The frequency of information was
supported by three qualitative indicators: adequacy of
information, clarity of standards, and the utility of
information. The relationship between adequacy and clarity was
further demonstrated in factor four.
The second principal component related teacher satisfaction
with equitable distribution and frequency measures of incentives.
The factor scores ranged from .63 to .50. Three out of the four
curricular and instructional tasks were present in this factor.
One other managerial activity, the utility of information in
curriculum development also seemed to correlate with teacher
satisfaction and the incentives' process.
The third principal component included all three of the
remaining frequency of standards items along with two other
structural-frequency items for information and assessment. This
factor, therefore, seemed to reflect structural-frequency as a
dimension of managerial control.
As was noted above, the fourth factor linked managerial
activities related to adequacy of information with the clarity of
standards. Three of the four curricular and instructional tasks
were present in this factor, Missing was the selection of
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textbooks and instructional materials.
The fifth principal component identified the managerial
process of assessment along the discretionary, qualitative
dimension. Indicators of worth and fairness had the highest
factor scores ranging from .75 to .53. Only two tasks were
present here, teacher evaluation and curriculum development.
Meaningful incentives across three tasks formed a unique
principal component in factor six. Equity and fairness in factor
seven were again linked to teacher satisfaction with the
performance of school administrators as in factor two. Finally,
the last principal component included only two items, both
related to the difficulty of standards.
As in the initial principal components analysis of the overall
model (Table 30), the item CSSD again did not load highly within
any one particular factor. The validity of this item, therefore,
should be considered questionable.
Inferential Statistics
The decisions leading to the practical significance of latent,
aggregate variables are matters of judgment and interpretation.
Item reliabilities and principal components analyses were
performed on each of the items on the SMCQ as well as on the
latent, aggregate variables in the hypothesized model of school
managerial control. There already appears to be considerable
evidence to support the categories of managerial behaviors and
processes of managerial control. More definitive answers
305
necessitate many other confirmatory factor analyses with many
different samples, which are not possible within a single study
(Armor, 1974, p. 35). Further heuristic evidence relating to the
substantive meaning of managerial control may be gained, however,
through the use of univariate, repeated measures, and
multivariate statistical tests of significance.
In heeding Vickers' (1967) earlier warning concerning
aggregations (pp. 29-30), the tests of significance were
conducted on the data with actual mean values, rather than with
mean substitutions or with factor scores (Stevens, 1986, p. 362).
For some tests, in order to limit the reduction in sample size,
which occurred with aggregations in Table 21, a response
criterion of 75 percent was established. That is, actual means
were analyzed from those respondents who answered 75 percent of
the items within a process (i.e., 9 out of 12 items per
managerial process).
The interactive effects which have been of particular interest
measure the relationships between managerial control on teacher
tenure, levels of instruction, schools, and school effectiveness.
All of these data were collected from the demographic questions
on the SMCQ or from published school district profiles. The
district's own definition of merit- schools (QUIIP) was used to
group the sample of schools (see Chapter Five).
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Structural and Discretioay anerlBhvis
The proposed model of school managerial control hypothesized
the presence of two measurable dimensions, structural and
discretionary behaviors, for each of the managerial control
processes. The differences between these dimensions were
measured by within-subject effects in a repeated measures design.
Statistically significant differences were found between
structure and discretionary behaviors for three of the managerial
control processes, standards, information, and assessments (Table
37). Only under the managerial control process of incentives
were no behavioral differences perceived by teachers.
Table 37
beStructural adDiscretionary Behaviors of Manaerial Control for
the Four Manaerial Processes
Number of Percent of
Processes/ Respondents Total Mean SD F p
Behaviors (N=486)
Standards
Struct. 415 85% 3.12 1.13
Discret. 414 85% 2.93 .93 12.45 .001
Information
Struct. 452 93% 2.78 1.14
Discret. 416 85% 2.60 .97 7.98 .005
Assessment
Struct. 298 61% 3.03 1.18
Discret. 415 85% 2.66 1.03 54.67 .001
Incentives
Struct. 423 87% 2.72 1.12
Discret. 408 84% 2.66 1.07 0.17 .680
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All of the processes reflected stronger teacher agreement for
the discretionary qualities of managerial behaviors of control.
The low n and high mean for the structural dimension of
assessments indicated the sharpest contrast between the two
categories of managerial behaviors.
Teacher Tenure and Instructional Levels
A cross-sectional study of control is limited to the specific
time interval when data are collected. There may be time
intervals in which managerial actions influence satisfaction
which, in turn, may influence behaviors (C. Greene, 1981, pp.
218-230), but which do not necessarily influence control (James,
et al., 1982, p. 51). In order to approach some kind of
equilibrium (p. 52), the variable of tenure is important.
One criterion in the selection of schools in the sample was
whether the principal had been at that particular school a
minimum of three years. On the SMCQ, teachers were requested to
state the number of years of teaching experience. Five choices
were offered: (a) 1 year or less, (b) 2 to 3 years, (c) 4 to 6
years, (d) 7 to 10 years, and (e) more than 10 years. The
response choices "a" and "b" were combined to create a group of
"less experienced" teachers, while the combination of choices "c"
through "e" formed a group of "experienced" teachers.
Instructional levels were categorized by elementary, junior
high, and senior high schools. Thus, differences between
subjects conl be measured for six categories (2 tenure
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categories X 3 instructional levels) against the dependent
variables of managerial control. In Tables 38 and 39, means and
standard deviations are reported for the tenure [abbreviated as
inexperienced and experienced] and instructional level
independent variables. In every instance, the mean values for
experienced teachers were higher than the mean values for less
experienced teachers, reflecting decreased agreement about the
presence and quality of managerial control activities with
increased experience. Mean values greater than 3.0 would
indicate teacher disagreement that these managerial activities
are practiced. Experienced teachers at the junior high school
level had the highest levels of disagreements among all
categories and levels of teachers. Elementary school teachers
appeared to be most in agreement with perceptions of managerial
control activities.
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Table 38
Means and Standard Deviations
the Manaerial Control Processes
Overall
Means Elementary Junior Senior
Variable (N=334) Inexp. Exp. Inexp Exp. Inexp. Exp
Standards M 2.90 2.53 2.89 2.49 3.18 2.66 3.07
SD .97 .89 .97 .99 1.10 .94 .74
Information N 2.61 2.11 2.64 2.35 2.85 2.45 2.74
SD 1.02 .97 1.13 1.09 .99 .82 .93
Assessment 4 2.70 2.21 2.72 2.31 3.02 2.44 2.86
SD 1.01 .95 1.09 .94 1.53 .82 .91
Incentives N 2.62 2.25 2.68 2.14 2.93 2.35 2.75
SD 1.05 1.05 1.11 .96 1.18 .87 .96
When NANOVA tests of significance were conducted, however,
there were no significant interactive effects of teacher tenure
by level on the sum of the means of the managerial processes
(Wilks' Lambda =1.26, df=8,650, p =.259).
Subsequent multivariate tests of significance to determine the
independent effects of teacher tenure or instructional levels on
managerial control resulted in statistically significant
differences for teacher tenure (F= 5.61, df = 4,325, P < .001),
but not for instructional levels.
To determine which of the variables contributed to the overall
significant difference, post hoc univariate tests (E) at the .05
level [df = 1,328) were conducted (Stevens, 1986, p. 122) on the
means reported in Table 39. Univariate F-tests indicated
significant tenure effects for standards, information,
310
assessments, and incentives.
Table 39
Means and Standard D of Teacher Tenure byMagerial
Control Processes
Experienced Less Experienced
Teachers Teachers
Variable Mean SD Mean SD F
Standards 3.07 .97 2.81 .93 16.297 .001
Information 2.73 1.01 2.49 .94 11.703 .001
Assessment 2.83 1.01 2.51 .96 18.484 .001
Incentives 2.79 1.07 2.43 .95 16.893 .001
Given the statistical differences between structural and
discretionary behaviors in three out of the four managerial
processes (Table 37), tests for significant differences between
effects of teacher tenure and level of instruction were
recalculated in a repeated measures design. Repeated measures,
or within-subject designs, reduced the error variance or chance
differences, thereby providing a more powerful test of the
hypothesized differences than did MANOVA tests of significance
(Bray & Maxwell, 1988). At the p <.05 level, there was only one
significant within-subject result: level of instruction by
behavioral dimension for standards [f (2,378) = 4.38, P <.013].
In order to see at what level of instruction the behavioral
difference in standards was significantly different, the data are
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shown in a graph in Figure 4. The overall standard means for the
two behavioral dimensions are plotted against the three levels of
instruction. Based on the differences between overall means, the
significant difference between the behavioral dimensions for
standards appears to be at the high school level [0.3 > 0.1].
Figure_4. The structural and discretionary behaviors for
standards by levels of instruction
Overall
Means
3.2
3.1 x
3.0 x Structure
2.9 Discretion
2.8
Senior Junior Elementary
High High
School Effects
The unit of analysis for the construct validation has been the
individual teacher. But, the question may be legitimately raised
as to the effect that individual schools have on teachers.
Social control theorists and cultural analyses have demonstrated
that individuals are influenced by peers and social systems.
Perhaps managerial control processes and/or managerial behaviors
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in the sample population can be attributed to differences between
schools? School effects were, therefore, tested using repeated
measures. The results indicate that a significant between-
school difference was present for each of the managerial
processes: standards [F= 2.39, df= 13,470, p= .004], information
[F= 1.98, df= 13,467, p= .021], assessment [E= 1.85, df= 13, 470,
p= .033], and incentives [= 1.74, df= 13,467, p= .05]. However,
those differences resulted from only one of the fourteen schools
within the sample. For each managerial process, the elementary
school, E5, had significantly higher mean values for both
structural and discretionary behaviors. In other words, the
teachers working at E5 were in greater disagreement about school
managerial activities than at the other schools, suggesting that
this school's results were anomalous.
In addition, one significant within-school effect was found
for schools and managerial information [E = 2.03, df=1,13, p
<.017]. The graph in Figure 5, plots the means for managerial
information in each of the fourteen schools by the structural and
discretionary dimensions. For purposes of comparison, the
overall sample means for the structural dimension was 2.80, and
2.66 for the discretionary dimension of managerial information.
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Fiqure 5. Individual school effects for the structural and
discretionary behaviors of managerial information.
Means
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The structural and discretionary behaviors at E5 can be seen
in Figure 5 to be considerably higher than the other 13 schools.
The interaction effect can also be seen in the graph. The
difference or interaction between the structural and
discretionary dimensions within E6 (.5) [as well as within E5
(.4)] was greater than the structural-discretionary differences
within the other schools in the sample population. In most
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instances, managerial behaviors were perceived to be practiced
more along the qualitative-discretionary dimension than with
structural frequency. While that difference is statistically
significant for all teachers within the sample population (see
Table 37), the differences within school E6 were the most
graphic.
On the other hand, within school differences revealed that at
certain schools, primarily junior high schools, the managerial
behaviors along the discretionary dimension were not perceived to
be practiced to a greater extent. In Figure 5, a higher level of
teacher disagreement with the presence of discretionary
information behaviors than structural information behaviors was
found within J4. Similar findings were also recorded for
managerial processes of standards within J3 and for assessments
within J1 and J2. These results were, of course, more prevalent
for incentives, since individual teachers did not perceive
significant dimensional differences for managerial behaviors of
incentives.
Therefore, with the exception of the unique responses from
teachers at E5, individual school effects may be said to have
minimal significance.
School Effectiveness
The school sample population was divided into two groups,
merit and matching. Only the school district's own criteria for
merit designation were used, although two of the matching schools
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did receive lesser merit awards during one of the three years in
which the current principal was employed. Univariate and
multivariate tests of significance between merit and matching
schools resulted in significant group differences on each of the
managerial process variables. There were significant differences
between merit and non-merit schools for each of the processes,
but within-group differences (i.e., interactions) were not
significant for the two dimensions of managerial behaviors (Table
40). In other words, the SMCQ instrument measured the
differences within the two groups consistently. The direction of
the mean scores clearly indicated that there was higher teacher
agreement about the occurrence of managerial activities at the
merit-schools than at the matching schools.
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Table 40
Comparison of Mei essMaciQShos yMn.ra
ProcssesandBehaviors
Means
Processes/ Merit Matching
Behaviors Schools Schools F
Standards
Overall 2.89 3.15 7.37* .007
(n=415)
Struct. 3.03 3.23
(n=426)
Discret. 2.83 3.09
(n=424)
Information
Overall 2.57 2.80 5.68 .018
(n=440)
Struct. 2.70 2.92
(_n=462)
Discret. 2.51 2.74
(n=425)
Assessment
Overall 2.61 2.92 9.90 .002
(n=395)
Struct. 2.87 3.24
(n=307)
Discret. 2.55 2.83
(n=424)
Incentives
Overall 2.58 2.82 5.46 .020
(n=426)
Struct. 2.59 2.91
(n=436)
Discret. 2.57 2.81
(n=419)
* Univariate ANOVA tests of significance
The absence of interaction effects would indicate that the
SMCQ measured the difference between merit and matching schools
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in a consistent manner. Only when teacher tenure was added to
the interaction analyses was there a significant interaction
difference reported for the managerial process of information [F=
4.43, df= 1,407, p= .036]. Figure 6 demonstrates that the
significant interaction difference occurred within merit-schools
between experienced and less experienced teachers as measured by
Tukey-Kramer procedures at the .05 level.
_Figure_6. Interaction effect between experienced and less
experienced teachers within merit and matching schools for the
managerial process of information.
Experienced
2.9 I
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The multiple statistical operations performed on the sample
population data were designed to test the data against both the
hypothesized model of school managerial control and against the
descriptive reality of school organizations. In the final
chapter, a summary of the study is presented along with
conclusions and implications drawn from the substantive
literature reviews and data analyses.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Summary, Conclusions, and Implications
Summary
Understanding organizational dynamics, such as school
managerial control, is a search for operational language guided
by theory and tested empirically. The operational definition of
managerial control presented in this study reflected a synthesis
of interdisciplinary concepts linked together by the systematic
analysis of the organization's context and empirical measures.
A review of school organizational literature found that
although control had initially been identified as a formal
mechanism or structurally frequent behavior (Anderson & Brown,
1971), research studies invariably refer to other mechanisms,
less formal and less structural, but even more influential (Cohen
& Miller, 1980). Similar results were reported in non-school
organizations as well (Mahoney & Frost, 1977; Eisenhardt, 1985).
Each time, these mediating variables were reported in the
research on control as either residual findings or as
implications for further research (Applewhite, 1965; Cohen &
Miller, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1985).
While organizational theory attributes both necessity and
potency to the concept of managerial control (Etzioni, 1965;
Pfeffer, 1978a), empirical measures of control over the dominant
school technology of curriculum and instruction are often found
to be uncertain or weak (Deal & Cellotti, 1980; Hannaway &
Sproull, 1978-79; Sroull, 1981; Rowan, 1982). If the reported
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empirical measures of control are valid, then either the
theoretical importance of control has been overstated or the
claims made by effective school and instructional leadership
researchers concerning the emphasis on curriculum and instruction
cannot be reached. If the theoretical shift from authority,
structure, and directives to cultural standards, information
systems, criterion-based assessments, and incentives is to be
empirically understood, then observable measures must be
identified and validated.
Emerging from the reviews of social science theories of
control was the inescapable conclusion that no adequate
definition of organizational control yet existed. At no time,
within any one discipline, did the theoretical construct of
managerial control appear complete and fully developed. Many of
the discussions remained at abstract levels, away from the level
of action on which control was said to operate (Koontz, 1971;
Vickers, 1967). The overriding conclusion reached by Tannenbaum,
et al. (1974) that organizational control was fundamentally
hierarchical, regardless of the cultural context, has
substantively linked organizational structure to control. But
the causal relationships between structure and control were not
found to be conclusive (Mahoney & Frost, 1977). Other processes
were involved. The first research objective of this study,
therefore, was to identify the nature of these internal
managerial dynamics.
Political analyses offered alternative open systems models
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based on the multidirectional concept of influence (Lerbinger,
1965) to replace authoritative power structures (Bacharach &
Lawler, 1982). Thus, two key processes were identified within
political dynamics: information and evaluation (Pfeffer, 1978a).
Sociological definitions of control identified the role of norms
and values in performance (Vickers, 1967). Based on both group
and individual norms, the control process of standards of
performance could be established.
Psychological analyses ultimately turned not only on
individual standards, but also on the process of incentives
(i.e., the distribution system for rewards and penalties)
(Mitchell, 1987; Mitchell & Peters, 1988) which was deemed
essential to individual motivation, learning, and subsequent
behavior (Skinner, 1966). The findings from social-psychology
were reviewed to establish specific qualities which contributed
to personal rule acceptance (Schein, 1972) and implementation.
The synthesis of social science control theories, thus, led
to the proposition that four processes were essential to
managerial control: standards, information, assessment, and
incentives. Having conceptualized an integrated model of
managerial control based on social science theories, the second
objective of this study was to measure managerial control within
a specific organizational context. Context is critical to
control behaviors (Hallinger & Murphy, 1987; Koontz, 1971;
Tannenbaum, et al., 1974; Vickers, 1967). For this study,
curricular and instructional tasks were chosen as the contextual
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focus. Cawelti and Adkisson (1986) have offered a curricular and
instructional framework around four specific tasks: teacher
evaluation, staff development, curricular development, and the
selection of textbooks and instructional materials. A
preliminary study (Chapter Three) was conducted to identify and
categorize school-building managerial activities related to each
of the four managerial control processes. Findings from the
preliminary study of specific managerial activities within the
curricular and instructional context were then used to develop a
measurement instrument of school managerial control.
The lexicon of structural control behaviors is well known
throughout management theory. Among structural mechanisms are
scheduling, monitoring, prescribing, programming, inspecting,
supervising, testing, and checking. The frequency of principal-
teacher interactions for the hypothesized control processes was
used to establish a measure of organizational structure. The
preliminary study also revealed discretionary managerial
behaviors for which qualitative measures were needed. The
language of quality control was found to have a long history.
Many qualitative terms such as responsiveness and sensitivity
were suggested by Frank (1958-59). In 1967, Vickers had argued
for a new, expansive language of control which incorporated
growth, achievement, and development. More recent claims for a
qualitative language have been voiced by Patz & Rowe (1977),
Sergiovanni (1987), Weick (1985), and in the organizational
coupling taxonomy proposed by Astto & Clark (1985). What is
323
significant, therefore, is not so much reflected in language, but
rather in research objectives and measurement methods. Thirty
years ago, Frank's (1958-59) aim was to describe structural,
bureaucratic properties, and the resulting dysfunctions in
managerial responses. In Frank, the qualitative indicators were
proposed only as alternative ideas to the dysfunctional
bureaucratic behaviors. This pattern of research has continued
during the decades of the sixties, seventies, and early eighties
(Miles & Vergin, 1966; Turcotte, 1974; Meyer, Scott, & Deal,
1983).
In contrast, Astuto and Clark (1985) proposed qualitative
indicators as relational measures between principals and teachers
to explain their interactions more descriptively . It is, in
part, upon the latter perspective which this study has been
based. But, whereas Astuto and Clark analyzed structural and
qualitative variables alternately, one of the objectives here was
to measure the two dimensions interactively.
Bolman and Deal (1984) suggested flipping lenses to bring
different perspectives into focus: one structural, one human
resource, one political, and one symbolic. The proposal here was
to define processes of managerial control which incorporated each
of these diverse perspectives. Thus, the essential attributes of
managerial control activities should be structural-frequency and
discretionary-qualities. Guided by substantive theory, a
reciprocal model of managerial control emerged from a
comprehensive review of behaviors nd processes within a
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specific task context. Through this perspective, a three
dimensional construct of managerial control, defined by
processes, behaviors, and task context was matched successfully
to the complexity of school organizational reality (Lortie, 1977;
Weick, 1976; 1985).
To meet the second research objective, a new instrument, the
School Managerial Control Questionnaire (SMCQ), was pre-tested
and administered to a large sample of school teachers from
fourteen public schools within Dade County, Florida. Teacher
responses (N=486) were analyzed through unidimensional scaling
and reliability techniques, and the latent, aggregate variables
of control, hypothesized by the model, were tested using
principal components analysis. The initial interpretation
confirmed the existence of four distinct managerial processes
with both structural and discretionary qualities. Thirty-five of
the original 48 SMCQ items provided reliable and valid measures
of these behaviors. Initial construct validation was begun with
post hoc statistical tests of significance to examine the effects
of teacher tenure, levels of instruction, schools, and school
effectiveness on the proposed model.
The study reflects a managerial research paradigm linking
substantive theory with the organizational context and empirical
measures (Figure 7). The investigative methods used also reflect
different aspects of the paradigm: a synthesis of social science
control theories, the systematic analysis of school managerial
processes and activities, and the multiple testing and
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interpretation of the measures. The investigation has resulted
in a model of school managerial control (see Chapter Four). The
data findings suggest that further model testing is likely to
lead to a valid theory of school managerial control.
Figure_7. Managerial research paradigm
THEORY--------------CONTEXT------------*MEASUREMENT
SYNTHESIS---------*SYSTEMJATIC----------*INTERNAL MODEL
ANALYSIS TESTING
I- I
REVISION(--------EEANE-----RSECY
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Conclusions
The findings in this study provided substantive and
empirical support for the hypothesized model of school managerial
control. The rational managerial control processes of standards,
information, assessment, and incentives were each found to have
distinct structural and discretionary behavioral indicators which
were perceived by teachers across a variety of curricular and
instructional tasks (see Tables 30 and 36). The data findings,
however, did not delimit the two measures of managerial behaviors
as narrowly as was originally hypothesized. That is, within each
managerial control process, the structural-frequency measures
were consistently associated with specific qualitative managerial
behaviors, while other discretionary qualities formed distinct
factors (see Tables 31 through 34). Thus, difficulty of
standards, utility of information, fairness of assessment, and
the equitable distribution of incentives were all somewhat
independent and distinct from the frequency of managerial
behaviors. The model depicted in Figure 8 suggests that the
structural-frequency of managerial control behaviors encompass
certain qualitative indicators, while those just cited form
distinct factors underlying discretionary managerial control.
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Figure_8. Results from aggregate variable testing of school
managerial control
Structural-frequency Discretionary
Dimension Dimension
Structural-frequency D U F E
Clarity t a q
Adequacy f i i U
Worth f 1 r i
Meaning i i n t
-- c- t e y
u y s1 1
Principal components analyses on the overall model of school
managerial control (see Tables 30 and 36) confirmed the presence
of each of the four managerial control processes. The
correlations identified both information and incentives as the
dominant managerial control processes within school buildings.
Specifically, structural-frequency behaviors related to the
process of information for each curricular and instructional task
was highly correlated with adequacy of information (see Table
36). Both of the teacher satisfaction items were closely related
to teacher perceptions of the equitable distribution of
incentives. The structural-frequency of standards also was
identified independently (sgee Table 36) as well as in association
with the qualitative indicator of clarity (see Table 30). The
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fourth managerial control process, assessment, emerged only
within the discretionary dimension of managerial behaviors.
In the revised model scale, the principal components
analysis demonstrated that the lone frequency of assessment item
in curriculum development was correlated with the structural-
frequency of standards. The revised model also indicated that
meaningfulness of incentives and difficulty of standards formed
unique factors. One substantive difference between the aggregate
variable model (see Figure 8) and the revised model in Figure 9
is the reversed roles played by the qualitative indicators of
meaningfulness and equitable distribution. In the former,
meaningfulness is associated with structural-frequency, while in
the revised model, the items of meaningfulness are highly
correlated within their own factor. Likewise, in the aggregate
model, managerial activities for the equitable distribution are
independent of structural behaviors, while in the revised model,
equity is linked to structural-frequency. Given the fact that
teachers did not perceive statistically significant differences
between structural or discretionary behaviors of incentives, both
results are tenable. In general, the results from the revised
model testing were consistent with the findings from the
aggregate variable tests.
The overall and revised models confirmed by principal
components analyses (see Tables 30 and 36) indicate that
information and incentives play the dominant roles in school
managerial control. Figure 9 depicts three levels of school
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managerial control identified by the principal components
analyses of the overall and revised models. Structural-frequency
behaviors for information, incentives, and standards along with
the discretionary qualities of assessment behaviors form the
first structural level of school managerial control. A second
integrative level reflects those qualitative perceptions linked
to structural-frequency behaviors. The third level of school
managerial control is completely qualitative and, therefore,
reflects only independent discretionary managerial behaviors.
The revised model in Figure 9 lists the managerial control
processes in the order of empirical priority, as determined by
the explained variance in the principal components analysis.
Figure 9. Three levels of school managerial control: structural,
integrative, and discretionary under the managerial control
processes
Information----Incentives----Standards----Assessment
Level I: frequency frequency frequency worth/
(Structural) fairness
Level II: adequacy equity clarity
(Integrative) teacher satisfaction
--------------------------------------------------
Level III: utility meaningfulness difficulty
(Discretionary)
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Many of the specific empirical findings of this study
confirm results reported elsewhere. Among the most widely
reported findings to be confirmed were (a) weak formal mechanisms
of control for curriculum and instruction (Deal & Cellotti,
1980), especially for the tasks of staff development and the
selection of textbooks and instructional materials; (b) weak
formal evaluations (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Meyer & Rowan,
1977); (c) overall teacher agreement for the managerial control
process of information (Eisenhardt, 1985; Sproull, 1981; Sproull
& Zubrow, 1981); (d) controls tailored to specific curricular and
instructional tasks, especially the selection of textbooks and
instructional materials (Eye, Netzer, & Krey, 1971; Koontz,
1971); (e) reliance upon informal and intrinsic rewards valued by
teachers (Ames & Ames, 1987; Mitchell & Peters, 1988), and (f)
mediating variables of effort (e. g., frequency behaviors) and
rewards (e.g., incentives) in the relationship between
performance and satisfaction (C. Greene, 1981). Yet, perhaps the
most significant confirmation of all was the finding that
discretionary managerial control behaviors were perceived for
curricular and instructional [i.e., reciprocal-type] tasks
(Thompson, 1967; Mahoney & Frost, 1977), even within the
structural-frequency dimension of school principal behaviors.
The interrelationship between structural and discretionary
managerial behaviors should make it apparent why the sole
reliance on single empirical measures has resulted in
inconsistent and inaccurate findings about school management.
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Except for the managerial control process of incentives, teacher
perceptions were more in agreement with the presence of
discretionary qualities than with the structural-frequency of
managerial behaviors, especially with respect to evaluations.
There were a number of managerial activities within the
curricular and instructional domain of which teachers were not
expressly aware. Among the items receiving the highest Don't
Know teacher responses were (a) the use of teacher input
[utility] in developing staff development programs, (b) the
structural-frequency of evaluations for staff development, and
(c) the structural-frequency of textbook selection evaluations.
There were also a number of statistically significant
differences found. Less experienced teachers were in greater
agreement about the practices of managerial control behaviors for
each of the control processes than were their more experienced
colleagues. Based on mean scores, the largest differences
between less experienced and more experienced teachers were found
in managerial activities within the control processes of
standards and assessment.
Less experienced teachers at merit-schools observed
managerial information activities most positively of all groups
of teachers. The perception on the part of new teachers at
merit-schools may be that curricular and instructional
information is provided more frequently as well as more clearly.
Although C. Greene (1981) and others tend to reject satisfaction
as a cause of performance, the "halo effect" uon joining a
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merit-school faculty should be considered as a possible
explanation.
When instructional levels were considered in the data
analysis, the only statistically significant interaction effect
involved high school teachers who perceived structural and
discretionary behaviors differently for the control process of
standards. High school teachers reported a wider discrepancy
between structural and discretionary managerial behaviors than
did either junior high or elementary school teachers. With
respect to standards, high school teachers also reported the
lowest agreement on the presence of structural managerial
activities. It may be as others have reported (Child, 1977;
Elmore, 1983; Peterson, 1984) that size and bureaucratic effects
create a lesser behavioral impact on high school teachers
regarding the control of standards than for teachers at other
levels of instruction. Alternatively, it may be that their
disagreement about structural managerial behaviors regarding high
school organization standards reflects, a posteriori, a
difference between what teachers view to be the mission of high
schools from the actual managerial practices of high school
administrators.
High school teachers expressed the most satisfaction with
their jobs and with their school administrators. On the other
hand, elementary school teachers were most in agreement with the
occurrence of managerial control behaviors. Junior high school
teachers were not only the least satisfied with their school
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administrators, but they agreed least with the occurrence of
managerial control behaviors. Junior high school teachers also
had the highest percentage of "Don't Know" responses and missing
values. Although not statistically significant, teachers at
junior high schools seemed to disagree about the existence of
discretionary indicators as opposed to their colleagues at senior
high schools or at elementary schools. This was particularly
evident for the managerial process of assessment in which two of
the four junior high schools ranked the structural-frequency of
assessment more prevalent than were the discretionary qualities
of assessment. Given the fact that the school district converted
all of its junior high schools to middle schools one year after
the data for this study were collected, it is likely that in the
last year[s] of its junior high school program, neither
assessments nor standards were communicated clearly or
understood. Thus, junior high school teachers identified more
with formally directed curricular and instructional policies.
The patterns of managerial activities and their behavioral
impact on teachers for each managerial control process revealed
additional insights into what school-building administrators
actually do, especially as it relates to task differences. The
focus of discussion now shifts to a review of findings under each
of the four managerial control processes.
Standards
The expressive and challenging standards reported by the
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principals in the preliminary interview study (see Chapter Three)
were not strongly evident from the survey responses from
teachers. Teachers were not able to discern challenging
standards established by school building administrators. They
clearly voiced their disagreement on items indicating moderately
difficult or challenging standards. Although the principals
spoke of high standards using phrases taken directly from
effective school literature, the perception of difficulty was not
translated into managerial control policies.
The principals had reported that within their schools there
existed criteria for outstanding classroom teaching which
exceeded the district-adopted formal evaluation instrument, and
which were understood by teachers. Principals had defined the
formal instrument as measuring minimal competency. Generally,
the within-school, discretionary criteria reflected qualitative
aspects of classroom instruction, such as a "warm climate" and
"learning as fun" philosophy. These standards were communicated
in expressive language, rather than with instrumental detail
(Etzioni, 1965). Perhaps, the lack of specificity or
instrumental direction contributed to the perceived absence of
challenge or difficulty imposed on curricular and instructional
tasks.
While standards were comparatively weak for three of the
tasks, they were almost non-existent for selection of texts and
instructional materials. Here, the school district would seem to
reflect the national norm. In 28 states, authority to select
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textbooks has been delegated to local districts. In Florida,
however, this authority is retained by the state, although
individual schools have discretionary funds to purchase texts not
officially approved by the state. Yet when Tulley & Farr (1985)
examined textbook adoption statutes they found "little
evidence... [t]o support the expectation that the intent or
purpose of state level textbook adoption is to control
curriculum, instruction, or textbook quality." States have
ignored content of curricular and instructional reforms (Murphy,
Mesa, & Hallinger, 1984). Thus, there would appear to be little
managerial control of standards of texts, other than perhaps from
publishers. Murphy, Mesa, and Hallinger (1984) have advised that
"communication between states and local districts and schools on
textbook selection should focus on what is in the books and the
instructional methodology to convey it rather than on book
purchasing and warehousing." In developing the managerial
control scale for the SMCQ, the task of textbook selection was
rejected for the indicators of frequency and difficulty under the
managerial process of standards.
The educational reform movement of the 1980's has
consolidated power at the state level. Teacher evaluation
instruments, curriculum frameworks, and state-adopted textbooks
are curricular policies currently established at the state level.
Staff development pertaining to certification is also a state-
level function. Nevertheless, teacher perceptions of school
reforms pertaining to effective schooling and teaching have not
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been successfully operationalized at the school level. If
principals do not incorporate externally-directed standards into
their managerial behaviors, the impact on teachers will continue
to be minimal. What makes this finding so disturbing is that if
educational reforms continue to push for significantly new policy
directions for schools, then these external policies must become
more successfully assimilated at the school-level by building
administrators.
A central characteristic associated with effective schools
has been administrative emphasis on instruction and curriculum.
Based on the data, there appeared to be weak measures of teacher
perceptions that building administrators contribute to the
challenge of curricular and instructional work by establishing
moderately difficult, challenging standards.
The frequency of managerial behaviors provided some
indication of administrative emphasis. Several variations of
principal components analyses linked the frequency of standards
with the frequency of assessment. The strength of standards
seemed to be greater for teacher evaluation and curriculum
development than for either staff development or textbook
selection. The former tasks follow more formal structural
procedures. Thus, the teacher evaluation instrument and
curriculum frameworks provided less flexibility for managerial
choice. Teachers were able to perceive this task difference.
But the dichotomy of tasks raises the question of why building
administrators do not assume greater control of school standards
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in areas in which state and district policy directives are less
restrictive.
Overall, agreement on managerial activities relating to the
entire process of standards was considerably less than for
activities pertaining to the other managerial processes,
particularly that of information. Teacher agreement was higher
for the clarity of standards than for either frequency or
difficulty in managing curricular and instructional tasks within
schools.
By applying Thompson's (1967) definition of reciprocal
technology to curricular and instructional tasks, standards might
be considered of lesser importance than other managerial
processes (Mahoney & Frost, 1977), and, perhaps, even replaceable
by the process of information. On the other hand, given the weak
structural control mechanisms of assessments coupled with the
indistinct formal mechanisms of incentives, managing curricular
and instructional standards within schools needs to improve.
Information
In spite of the admitted absence of formal, structural
mechanisms for sharing curricular and instructional information
(see Chapter Three), overall teacher perceptions of the
structural-frequency of managerial behaviors under the process of
information were very high. In addition, teachers agreed with
the existence of utility of information (i.e., teacher input) in
the selection of textbook and instructional materials and the
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adequacy of information for teacher evaluation. The indicators
of frequency, adequacy, and utility were supported by teachers
across all four curricular and instructional tasks. Ironically,
the aggregate correlations for the utility of information in
staff development were so low, and the Don't Know responses so
high that this item was judged to be unreliable. The same
decision to reject the utility of information in teacher
evaluation was reached on the basis of low aggregate correlations
and no significant factor score correlations in the overall
model.
Task distinctions were not readily apparent for information.
Nonetheless, the pattern of information frequency was the
opposite of that reported under standards. That is, teachers
perceived managerial frequency regarding staff development and
selection of texts to a greater extent than for the tasks of
teacher evaluation and curriculum development. Perhaps this
finding suggests that building-level administrators rely upon
external channels from the district or state to convey
information for tasks in which formal mechanisms exist. If so,
in terms of information adequacy, teachers were not affected by
the lower structural-frequency.
Although, there was overall teacher agreement regarding
building-level informational activities, it was clear that
managerial behaviors of utility (i.e., teacher input) were
lacking in teacher evaluation and staff development. The
principal interview ata indicated that in a number of different
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task areas, principals consulted specifically with teachers whom
they trusted.
Two significant interaction differences were also reported
involving the managerial process of information. At two schools,
(E5 and E6), teachers perceived a greater difference between the
discretionary dimension of control behaviors and structure.
The teachers at E5 disagreed more than teachers at the other 13
schools that discretionary managerial control behaviors occurred
within their school. Thus, little significance should be given
to this individual school effect. The difference, however, at E6
(a merit-school), suggests that managerial behaviors within the
discretionary dimension were significantly more evident there
than at the other schools in the sample. Overall, less
experienced teachers at all seven merit-schools identified more
managerial behaviors involving information than did less
experienced teachers at matching schools.
Assessment
Each of the curriculum-oriented principals in the
preliminary interview study offered detailed, personal criteria
on which both teachers and programs were assessed at their
schools. These articulated criteria were distinct from any
standardized testing and/or formal summative evaluations. The
teacher survey data clearly confirmed the lack of formal,
"public" assessments.
The public's preoccupation with standardized assessments was
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contrary to what principals and teachers themselves used to
assess the worth of a curricular or instructional project. Yet,
the within-school measures of assessment have remained hidden
from public view. In most instances, programmatic assessment has
tended to be informal. The percentages of agreement and
reliability data for practically all of the structural-frequency
indicators were lower than for the discretionary indicators of
worth and fairness. Based on the percentages of teacher
agreement on the discretionary indicators of assessment and the
factor loadings of qualitative items, it is clear that teachers
are aware of the informal evaluations conducted at the school-
level. Since principals were able to articulate the within-
school assessment criteria, the reasons for their not making them
more public (i.e., open to public testing) is a political
question of implementation. The principals' views of managerial
assessment indicated a bias towards informal or qualitative
evaluations. Yet, the impact of qualitative managerial
assessments, while critically important, has not been fully
maximized.
Incentives
The interviews with principals noted both attitudes and
managerial behaviors reflecting caution in the incentive
distribution process of official and discretionary rewards to
individual teachers, grade levels, and departments. Their
justification, repeated at all schools, was that such behaviors
341
would not inhibit the efforts of other teachers and divisions.
The principals spoke of their reliance upon formal processes when
it came to penalties and sanctions, in contrast to their initial
use of informal behavior with respect to rewards. Although there
have been unique structural limitations regarding the school
building administrators' ability to distribute rewards and
penalties (Lortie, 1969), the entire pattern of managerial
activity for incentives is characterized by extremely cautious
behaviors. This caution may explain in part an average teacher
response of 16 percent Don't Know to the items within the
variable equitable distribution. In other words, for curricular
and instructional tasks, many teachers do not know whether
incentives are distributed equitably by their building
administrators.
Incentives were the only managerial control process in which
the structural-frequency measures were congruent with the
discretionary qualities. In practice, incentives dominated three
of the eight factors in the revised model of school managerial
control (see Table 36). Equitable distribution of incentives was
linked with frequency to form one factor and with fairness to
form a second factor. Both of these factors were related to
teacher satisfaction. At the same time, the indicator of
meaningfulness of incentives formed a separate unique factor.
Thus, the managerial process of incentives must be considered as
having a powerful influence on the construct of school managerial
control in that teachers broadly experienced these managerial
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behaviors. The strength of teacher identification was also
measured by the cumulative percentages of teacher responses. For
eight of the twelve items, over 40 percent of the teachers
responded "Strongly Agree" [choices 1 or 2 on the Likert-type
scale).
Consistent with the findings reported here, others have
reported that subjective and phenomenological realities were
independent of objective task characteristics (Blase, 1988;
Dornbusch & Scott, 1975). Thus, we found that teachers viewed
standards applied to the task of staff development to be more
difficult than the standards applied to the task of classroom
teaching. Likewise, teacher evaluation, which is characterized
by both a formal instrument and external directives, received
lower teacher agreement concerning the equitable distribution of
incentives than did other less formally structured tasks.
Although further research is needed to establish the relationship
between a scale of intensity as used in this study with a scale
of importance, the phenomenlogical impact of managerial
activities is readily apparent. Therefore, despite the low
number of teachers who are actually rewarded or penalized by a
teacher evaluation system, or no matter how tactful or cautious
or objective a principal may be regarding tasks, rewards, and
punishments (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975), misunderstandings among
teachers can and still arise within schools (Blase, 1988).
Not surprisingly, the specific task of textbook and
instructional materials' selection recorded the highest level of
343
teacher agreement for meaningfulness of incentives. It would
appear, therefore, that to a certain degree the absence of
structural control resulted in higher teacher agreement
concerning the quality of managerial behaviors. Given the dual
perspective of managerial behaviors as structural and
discretionary, qualitative indicators of controls should not be
equated with either teacher autonomy or managerial weakness.
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The implications for further research suggested by this
study divide into three directions: (1) continued theory-building
of the construct of managerial control, (2) further measurement
validation with the present and subsequent sample populations,
and (3) empirical hypothesis testing.
Theory-building
The present state of the art in control theory depicts an
entangled web of control mechanisms (R. Campbell, et al., 1985;
Peterson, 1984; Peterson, Murphy, & Hallinger, 1987), each with
its own measures (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1978; Peterson, 1984).
Conceptually, the web is as inchoate and impractical as were the
idiosyncratic control definitions of previous decades
(Cartwright, 1965; Lortie, 1969). Organizational theory-building
still confronts an impasse of contingent situations and
disciplinary biases with few practical guidelines for analyzing
managerial processes and behaviors. It remains a matter of
complexity, without control (Elmore, 1983). Missing is a
philosophy of control, i.e., the systematic analysis from which
to derive principles guiding administrative practice.
The managerial control model identified and measured in this
study represents an initial step towards defining a theory of
control suitable for managing school organizations. What began
as a rational process model moving logically from standards to
information to assessment to incentives (see Chapter Three,
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Figure 1) evolved into a descriptive picture of school managerial
control processes dominated by information and incentives with
interactive structural and discretionary behaviors (se Figures 8
and 9). The principal components analysis assumed that these
processes were statistically uncorrelated. Substantive theory
suggests that the processes themselves are interrelated.
Therefore, measures between processes should be considered.
Although standards, information, assessments, and incentives
are viewed as latent, aggregate variables which can be applied to
diverse situations, they are also measurable and heuristic.
Blalock (1982) recommended that
the major orienting principles in each discipline be
organized in terms of social processes that are sufficiently
general in nature that they may be described and analyzed in
terms of propositions that are not tied to particular time-
and space bound entities... (p. 164).
Neither the substantive theory nor the measures, however,
have been fully articulated. More theory development along the
lines proposed by the managerial research paradigm (see Figure 7)
is still needed.
Many ways of knowing came into play in this research
effort: phenomenological judgments were made as to the best
evidence of what can arguably be described as the subjective
reality of control (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Heilbroner, 1975;
Zaner, 1970); pragmatic choices of what to include and exclude
were based on essential attributes, i.e., behavioral indicators
which had practical implications (James, 1968). The thoughtful
traditions of rationalism and empiricism served as guideposts for
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establishing common needs (Heilbroner, 1975; Katz, 1965; E.
Langer, 1983) and for testing whether those needs were being met
by what participants actually did within school buildings (Miles,
1981). And, above all, the theory-building effort was symbolic,
ever alert to new relationships, possibilities, and aesthetic
interpretations (S. Langer, 1951; Vickers, 1967).
The underlying logical categories offered by Aristotle and
Kant (i.e., quantity, quality, relation, and modality) served as
the model for the concept of dimensionality. The categories of
quantity and quality were defined as measures of managerial
behavior. Quantity delimited structure, the first level of
managerial control, while quality gave meaning through
discretionary behaviors. The data findings, however, indicated
that certain qualities were associated with structure, whereas
other qualities formed separate and distinct factors in
managerial control. The former have been labelled integrative or
the second level of control. The latter were called purely
discretionary, or third level control. Level two qualities may
be viewed as alternative managerial behaviors for structural-
frequency. On the other hand, structural behaviors may be said
to encompass certain qualitative meanings.
Possibly, the independent, discretionary qualities of
managerial behaviors, such as difficulty, utility, fairness,
equity, and/or meaningfulness, reflect a measure of importance,
rather than strength or intensity as measured by the Likert scale
items. That is, the items on the School Managerial Control
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Questionnaire measured only the strength of agreement between
teachers and building administrators; they did not attempt to
measure how important or central to teacher job performance the
specific managerial behavior was.
Alternative processes may also be projected as relating to
control in just the same manner as the four proposed managerial
processes. Among those already reported as residual findings
from control research have been communication (Bidwell, 1965, p.
1014; Blau & Scott, 1962, p. 183), socialization (Etzioni, 1965),
improvement (Bossert, 1985; Patz & Rowe, 1977), enabling and
intention (Barth, 1987; R. Harrison, 1985, pp. 132ff), delegation
and coordination (Blau & Scott, 1962, p. 183; Bossert, et al.,
1982; Cohen & Miller, 1980; Wellisch, et al., 1978). At present,
the judgment here is that these processes are less derivative
from social science theories of control, and, therefore, are
either collateral processes or not essential properties of
control, Because of the defined parameters of managerial control
as a reciprocal process within an organization, the alternative
control process of staffing (Etzioni, 1965) was deliberately
excluded from the analysis.
The selection of structural and discretionary behavioral
indicators was admittedly arbitrary. Therefore, others may be
found to be more suitable and distinct. For example, it is
likely that the indicator of "dependence" (Astuto & Clark, 1985)
belongs somewhere within the model; and, that the indicator of
frequency could be more clearly distinguished from the attributes
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of stability, regularity, and consistency (Astuto & Clark, 1985).
Among the indicators used here, the definitions of clarity,
adequacy, and worth need further refinement in their behavioral
or contextual meanings. Out of the original 48 items, 35 were
retained in the revised model. Perhaps the decision to reject
items had as much to do with the contextual managerial activity
as with the behavioral indicator itself. For example, item 1,
MI'TE, which defined meaningfulness of teacher evaluation
incentives, was rejected. As written, the item linked "comments"
made by school administrators to incentives. If instead of
"comments," the item was rewritten to describe a managerial
"action" performed by school administrators, then meaningfulness
might be more accurately measured in relationship to the process
of teacher evaluation incentives. The preliminary study reported
over 150 different managerial activities. Therefore, it would be
relatively simple to substitute alternative managerial activities
for each of the rejected items, and then retest.
Construct Validation
At this stage of theory development, the proposed model of
school managerial control begins as a measurement model with no
hypothesized causal relationships (Hoyle, in press, p. 4). The
identification of the latent variables and their behavioral
indicators was followed by empirical testing of the internal
relationships among the variables. The next steps would be to
employ other research designs and statistical methods to further
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establish the internal validity of the findings reported here.
The high variance reported within the initial factors for each of
the principal components analyses suggests that either (1) the
construct has not been as clearly distinguished from among other
highly correlated concepts, most likely satisfaction, or (2)
there was considerable method variance found. Further research
to control for satisfaction and the removal of method variance is
recommended. In terms of construct validity, it is not feasible
to rely solely on the results of a single study (Armor, 1974,
p.35).
Just as conceptual classification schemes differ, so, too,
do the methods used to classify and interpret. It is even
possible to reach different conclusions from the same data set
using the same methods (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1987, p.15).
Unlike hypothetical-deductive research, construct validation is
an on-going search for language, meanings, and measures.
Quantitative research literature describes a variety of
classification methods which theorists may employ singly or in
conjunction.
Interview and survey data, unidimensional scaling,
reliability tests of items, and principal components analyses
were the procedures and methods used in this study. Further
construct validation would require the continued search for
convergent and discriminant validity (Sullivan & Feldman, 1979,
18ff). In addition to replication studies which are strongly
recommended, other research designs might utilize teacher
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interviews for more in-depth responses, structured observations
(Mintzberg, 1971) instead of self-report data, and case studies
to capture the unique cultural context of schools and principal-
teacher interactions.
Methodologically, the choices may be even more varied. In
each instance, however, substantive theory and judgment play a
considerable role in the use of such alternatives as discriminant
analysis (Klecka, 1987), cluster analysis (Aldenderfer &
Bashfield, 1987), factor analysis (Kenney, 1979; Kim & Mueller,
1978), or covariance structural models (Herting, 1985; Hoyle, in
press, Lennox, 1988; Long, 1983a; 1983b).
The advantages in having used principal components analysis
in the initial stage of construct validation are well supported
(Dunteman, 1989. p. 9; Heise, 1974; Lennox, 1988; Stevens, 1986,
p. 338). The obvious disadvantage to principal components
analysis was that measurement error (i.e., error variance) was
part of the analysis because the total variance was used in the
identification of construct factors (Lennox, 1988).
The primary advantage of a linear structural equation model,
such as LISREL, is that it incorporates and corrects measurement
error (Herting, 1985, p. 264; Long, 1983b, p. 16), By comparing
the variances of the hypothesized model to the variances in the
sample data (Hoyle, in press, p. 11), LISREL measures (a)
covariation among dimensions, (b) error covariances, (c) error
variances of each indicator, and (d) covariation error between
pairs of indicators (Herting, 1985, p. 297). Yet, every step of
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the analysis is somewhat of an art (Hoyle, in press, p. 22), and
its use, especially in developing the dimensions of the
construct, may not always be appropriate (Lennox, 1988).
The significance of theory-building and construct validation
is associated directly with the practical consequences. To a
large extent, the practical consequences of school managerial
control must await the validation of the internal structure of
empirical data before external validation can occur. The very
same post hoc tests of significance of the effects of relevant
criteria (e.g., teacher tenure, instructional levels, school
effects, and school effectiveness) performed on valid and
reliable items can be considered criteria for external
validation.
HYpotheses Testing
This study focused on the curricular and instructional
domain within school-buildings. The operational definition of
managerial control extended across four specific tasks. Yet,
curriculum and instruction is, obviously, only one managerial
context of building administrative activity. Similar studies may
be designed within other school organizational contexts, such as
budgeting or school-based management activities.
While increased teacher participation in managerial
decision-making emerges from the proposed model of managerial
control, participation alone is not a sufficient criterion for
school improvement. t its clear from this study that single
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entity definitions of managerial concepts (e.g., participation in
decision-making) lead to neither good theory nor consistently
good practice. The increased professionalization of teachers is
not simply a matter of participation across diverse tasks.
Rather, participation must be instituted across managerial
processes and coupled with understanding and the freedom to grow.
With respect to teacher development, the study found a
significant difference regarding the practice of managerial
behaviors between experienced and less experienced teachers.
Experienced teachers were less in agreement about managerial
control behaviors of curriculum and instruction than were less
experienced teachers. It is likely that new teachers rely more
on managerial directives and appreciate structural managerial
behaviors more so than do tenured teachers. It would also appear
that this reliance extended to all four managerial processes for
less experienced teachers, while experienced teachers focused
upon information and incentives. In their Life Cycle Theory of
Leadership, Hersey and Blanchard (1978) have suggested that
control is primarily a function of the maturity of those being
supervised. Perhaps, the responses by experienced teachers
reflect a more accurate view of school managerial control.
Insights as to the reasons for these differences might contribute
to policy discussions regarding principal and/or teacher staffing
and transfers.
When merit and matching schools were compared, the more
effective schools showed an overall significantly higher level of
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teacher agreement of the occurrence of managerial control
behaviors. Thus, it may not be simply that experienced teachers
become more autonomous from managerial activities, but rather
that in effective schools managerial activities are qualitatively
better. The significance of this finding should not be ignored.
Stephenson and Levine (1987) found no significant student
academic achievement difference between merit and non-merit
schools using the same definition of merit schools as in this
study. Although the two studies are not comparable, the
implication here is that managerial practice does lead to
significant differences in teacher performance.
Within the educational reform movement, the public emphasis
on accountability has led to externally directed policies by
state legislators and others external to schools. In practice,
these policies operate within only the structural dimension of
control. Yet, the findings indicate that qualitative aspects of
managerial control behavior play at least as significant a role,
if not more. The most logical way to integrate quality with
structure would be to insure that school building managers have
internalized these reform policies. Yet, a Rand Corporation
study (cited in Wirt & Kirst, 1982) of principals' job from 1975-
80 [prior to the reform movement!] reported that principals felt
"more constrained by rules, more subject to public scrutiny, and
less in control of their schedules.... A majority of the
principals reported that they now spend less time supervising
instruction." (pp. 149-59). Increased centralization and
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bureaucratization of curriculum and instructional areas at the
state and district levels have severely curtailed the principals'
sphere of authority (Meyer, 1983).
Despite such trends, the findings here indicate that
principals have an even broader discretionary avenue open to them
along which to influence teachers. Not only are there
discretionary behaviors within each of the four managerial
control processes, but even within their structural role,
principals can and often do exercise quality control. The
hypotheses presented at the end of the preliminary study, Chapter
Three (pp. 159-160), identified some of the discretionary
behaviors practiced by curriculum-oriented principals. They
included the use of effective school research language, use of
personal school-level criteria for success, communication of
trust in the performance of certain members of their staff and
faculty, strategies to overcome structural constraints, and
demonstration of administrative support and caring.
What the debate between leadership and management has chosen
to ignore is that within the managerial role lie matters of
substance, meaning, and necessity. Such is the nature of school
control. Thus, the challenge facing school managers has always
been, to paraphrase Shakespeare, to make a virtue of managerial
necessity.
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I have enclosed a copy of the readers' comments pertaining to your study.
We would like to remind you to display the "RRC Approval Number" in the up-
per right corner of the first page of any correspondence to potential parti-
cipants, and suggest that you provide principals of schools involved a copy
of this letter.
Finally, please send a copy of the study abstract to the Research Review
Chairperson when the study is completed; and the Committee wishes you every
success in your research activity.
Sincerely yours, YOUR RESEARCH REVIEW
APPROVAL NUMBER IS 118.
Sylvia H. Rothfarb, Ph.D.
Chairperson
Research Review Committee
Enclosures
HR /pw
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Appendix B
Intevie Guide Used in the Preliminary Study
Interve Gud
General Information: name of the principal and school
number of years in this position and in
previous position
size of the school, number of administrators
tenure of staff
Questions:
1. If you were to divide the Job you do as principal Into two
categories, top administrator and instructional leader, what
percentages do you think accurately reflect the time you devote
to each?
2. What criteria do you think is used to judge your performance
as a principal?
3. Dde County uses TADS to valute teachers. In addition to
TADS, do you have any specif ic goals for judging teacher
performance?
4. Who does the TAPS observations? How are they scheduled? How
do you ensure consistency in the observations?
5. Outside of a po five TADS evaluation, do you reward
outstanding teachers?
6. When TAS observa tions rv a1 a problem, how do you inform the
teacher and then monitor th t eacher's improvement?
7. What kind of relation'hi does TAPS crete between teachers
and administrators?
8. How would you improve the teacher evaluation process?
9. I would like to define staff development as programs for
professional growth. What kinds of staff development programs
are available to teachers and administrators?
10. Is there a schedule of staff development opportunities? (a
schedule of regular meet ings, announcements?)
11. Are teachers given any rewards or recognition for staff
development participation?
12. Are records kept in this area?
13. What kind of follow-up or feedback 'sharing' is required?
en couraged?
14. would you recommend any changes in this area?
15. Over the past year or two, what kinds of innovations have
occurred at the school? a n you describe the process and
par ticipants?
16. Were any of the innovations evaluated? How and by whom?
17. in the regular school program, how are high standards
maintained?
18. Are programs regularly evaluated?
19. Are outstanding programs singled out for recognition?
20. What do you do with less successful programs?
21. The state and county have approved book lists. Do you rely
solely on these sources for texts and instructional materials?
22. How would you describe the textbook selection process?
23. Do you keep records of the materials used/Is this the same
process used in changing texts/are these records used in your
evaluation of departments and the department heads/ how are
materials evaluated? (depending on the completeness of the answer
to #22, one of the above questions was used as a follow-up.)
24. Are you satisfied with the selection process?
General Questions
25. To whom are you most accountable?
26. If you could hire more personnel, what type of people would
you choose?
27. In the four areas discussed, how much control do you think
you really have? Would you want more or less?
28. In terms of curriculum and instruction, what impact do the
following have:
a. school budget
b. collective bargaining agreement
c. state curriculum laws
d. district policy
e. community and parents
29. If I were to walk around the school and ask various people
what they thought your goals for the school were, what would I
hear?
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Appendix C
School District Approval to Conduct Teacher
Survey Study at 14 Schools
DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
SCHOOL BOARD ADMINISTRATION BUILDING * 1450 NORTHEAST SECOND AVENUE MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132
DR. JOSEPH A. FERNANDEZ DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS ni MICHAF I KROP
CHAIRMAN
DR. RAY TURNER Mfl. G, S s FRADOOCK
ASSISTANT SPE I ENDENT \IC IC AIRHMAN
OFFICE OF ED CA IONAL ACCOUNTA BILITY M A I c EJA Y
(305) 376-1506 DR. I USA CATR I U INH E CG
M. JANE11R Mt ALII Y
M. UE3[E [ ENICK
MR, WILLIAM HTUN R
March 14, 1983
Mr. Ira E. Bogotch
College of Education
Department of Educational Policy
Florida International University
University Park
Miami, Florida 33199
Dear Mr. Bogotch:
The Research Review Committee has approved your request to conduct the
study, "Managerial Control of Curricular and Instructional Tasks," with the
following provisions:
1. The agreement to participate (or not) in the study is at the discretion
of the school principals).
2. Participation of all subjects is voluntary.
3. The study will involve no more than 1,050 DCPS teachers in grades K-12.
Teacher participation must be completely voluntary, must occur during
planning or other non-teaching time, and will not exceed .5 hours.
4. Confidentiality and anonymity of all responses must be assured.
5. Data collection efforts of the' stody will be -completed (in DCPS) by
August 31, 1988.
6. To respond to some of the items in the instrument requires a perspective
that most teachers may not have (i.e., items 2, 10 and 42). The Commit-
tee is therefore requesting that you include an "unable to respond" op-
tion in the instrument.
Finally, a copy of the approval letter should be shown to each principal
from whose school participation is requested. If you have any further ques-
tions, do not hesitate to call me at (305) 376-1506.
Please send a copy of the study abstract to the Research Review Committeewhen the t i complete. Te Committee wishes you every success in yourresearch activity.
Sincerely yours, YOUR RESEARCH REVIEW
APPROVAL NUMBER IS 153.
Dr. Sylvia H. Rothfarb
Chairperson
Research Review Committee
SHR/pw
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Appendix D
etter and School Managerial Control Questionnaire
Florida International University
The tae Un iv sity of Florida at !ii
o, r Division of Educational Policy and Human Resource Development
May, 1988
Dear Teacher:
All Dade County principals are judged on 19 managerial
competencies based on data obtained from the Florida Council on
Educational Management. Less emphasis has been given to the
views of teachers. As a result, school administration research
findings tend to reflect a decidedly managerial perspective.
Strong evidence, however, supports the importance of teachers'
input in building and maintaining successful schools.
Your participation is requested in a research study that takes an
in-depth look at one of the principals' competencies through the
eyes of teachers. It asks specifically for your views concerning
the quality of your school's administration in accomplishing
curricular and instructional tasks only.
The attached questionaire takes about 15 minutes to complete.
our rsoses will be comltely anonyous. Not even your
chool will "be identified. The number in the upper right hand
corner of the questionaire will permit the researcher to
determine the percentage of responses from any one school. No
name is attached to any number.
I have arranged with your school administration for assistance in
the collection of the questionaire. Simply as a matter of
convenience, an "in-box" will be placed in the office for you to
drop off the completed questionaire. I would prefer that you put
the questionaire into the envelope provided and seal it. I will
personally come to your school on Monday, May 16 to pick them up.
If you wish, you may mail the questionaire to me care of F.I.U,
College of Education.
I would also be happy to send you a summary of the findings if
you leave a note in the envelope with your name and address on a
eparrt_ piece of paper.
I sincerely thank you for your cooperation.
Yours truly,
Ira Elliot Bogotch
College of Education
University Park, Miami, Florida 33199
(305) 554-2724
andi tn tt ee..'
No.School Curric .. ular & InstructionalMagentIsr et
Please respond to the following statements about your current prinqpa
and school administration. The response choices range from:
strongly strongly don't
disagree disagree agree agree know
6 5 4 3 __2 1 0
1. Classroom observation comments from school administrators
about my teaching motivate me to incorporate new teaching
behaviors and ideas into my classes
2. The principal does not favor one grade level or department
over another when it comes to distributing resources and
money for textbooks and instructional materials
3. The principal or administrative staff frequently responds
to my ideas for curricular improvement
4. The process of evaluating teachers occurs at my school
more often than just when I am being observed for TADS
5. The principal or other school administrator makes it clear
how state and county curricular requirements are to apply to
my school, my students, and to the courses I teach
6. The principal or other school administrator frequently
reviews good teaching practices with teachers
7. I consider the information I receive from my school
administrators regarding teacher evaluation to be adequate _
8. The information I obtain from staff meetings and
inservice activities held at my school give me an
adequate understanding of how to do my job well
9. Providing me with released time and hiring substitutes to
cover classes are meaningful ways in which my school administra-
tion shows its support of my efforts to improve my courses
10. All grade levels, departments and programs at my school are
evaluated on an equitable basis
11. In my opinion, the principal or other school administrator
states clearly the classroom teaching behaviors that she/he
values most
12. The principal frequently finds ways to meet my requests for
more and better instructional materials and books___
13. The procedures used at my school for selecting textbooks and
instructional materials give a fair assessment to the
alternative choices
strongly strongly don't
disagree disagree agree agree know
6 5 4 -3 2 1 0
27. The principal does not favor one grade level or department
over another when it comes to distributing resources and money
for program development and curricular improvement
28. My school administration provides me with adequate information
to participate in curricular planning and innovative projects
29. Time and effort devoted to classroom observations, both formal
and informal, have been worthwhile to me as a teacher
30. The formal and informal assessments by my school administrators
of the courses I teach have been worthwhile both for me and for
my students
31. The teaching behaviors that my principal would most like to
see in the classroom are more difficult than those in TADS
32. The principal expects the academic course requirements for my
students to be higher than state and county standards
33. Each year, the principal or other school administrator sets
inservice and professional growth guidelines for me and the
other teachers
34. Information is regularly available to me at my school regarding
the publication of new textbooks and instructional materials
35. In my opinion, the principal equitably rewards teachers
whose performance is well-above-average and treats fairly
teachers whose performance need improvement
36. All teachers who participate in staff development activities
receive the similar kinds of recognition and rewards from the
principal and other school administrators
37. My school administration frequently sends me information
regarding staff development opportunities and activities
38. The principal uses the information from classroom visits and
observations to generally improve the caliber of teaching at
my school
39. The information I receive through my school administration
regarding published materials is adequate for deciding on texts
and instructional materials
40. The criteria used by the principal and other school
administrators to evaluate classroom teachers are fair
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Appendix E
Survey Follow-up Letters and Sample Memos
1988
w i
You rE r -ice 4 i "4
- ; 1 The 
- of the -tudy is to _ m
-h of curricular !r- tional -,,;-in-
f or,.- goes 
- the 4 ri_ 1 a!!
, i .
Of course.. the of the study r,!ndent upon f-' number of
To those of - -i who have
-i i k you. If you not yetI in your 4 utpleted the ire and 'i i a fill it
out, seal *t i- e e provided, and ,
school secr s r. school , A. the
i 'our a i q P m
4-1 
1
again, Once o you- r3port.
Sincerely,
Ira Elliot Bogotch
TO: Faculty
FROM: Vice-Principal
SUBJECT: FIU Survey
DATE: May 4, 1988
Our school has been selected toparticipate in a county-wide
study of Dade County Administrators. We would appreciate
fifteen minutes of your time to complete the attached
questionaire. Thank you
P lease return the questionaire to a box by Mrs. desk
by Tuesday, May 10, 1988 .
lb E M R A UM tay 11, 1988
TO:- FACULTY MEIBERS
FROM1: r, Assistant Principa(f
Senior High School
SUBJECT: VOLUNTARY COMPLETION OF SURVEY
Senior High School is one of several schools selected
to participate in the attached F.I.U. survey.. Completion of the
survey is voluntary. The completed form is to be returned in the
envelope and placed in the box in the curriculum office labeled
".I.U. Survey" no later than Monday, May 16, 1988.
JS/ec
